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ABSTRACT
In an effort to make more spectrum available, recent initiatives by the FCC let
mobile providers offer spot service of their licensed spectrum to secondary users, hence
paving the way to dynamic secondary spectrum markets. This dissertation investi-
gates secondary spectrum markets under different regulatory regimes by identifying
profitability conditions and possible competitive outcomes in an oligopoly model. We
consider pricing in a market where multiple providers compete for secondary demand.
First, we analyze the market outcomes when providers adopt a coordinated ac-
cess policy, where, besides pricing, a provider can elect to apply admission control
on secondary users based on the state of its network. We next consider a compe-
tition when providers implement an uncoordinated access policy (i.e., no admission
control). Through our analysis, we identify profitability conditions and fundamen-
tal price thresholds, including break-even and market sharing prices. We prove that
regardless of the specific form of the secondary demand function, competition under
coordinated access always leads to a price war outcome. In contrast, under uncoor-
dinated access, market sharing becomes a viable market outcome if the intervals of
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prices for which the providers are willing to share the market overlap.
We then turn our attention to how a network provider use carrier (spectrum) ag-
gregation in order to lower its break-even price and gain an edge over its competition.
To this end, we determine the optimal (minimum) level of carrier aggregation that
a smaller provider needs. Under a quality-driven (QD) regime, we establish an effi-
cient way of numerically calculating the optimal carrier aggregation and derive scaling
laws. We extend the results to delay-related metrics and show their applications to
profitable pricing in secondary spectrum markets.
Finally, we consider the problem of profitability over a spatial topology, where
identifying system behavior suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Hence, we pro-
pose an approximation model that captures system behavior to the first-order and
provide an expression to calculate the break-even price at each network location and
provide simulation results for accuracy comparison. All of our results hold for general
forms of demand, thus avoid restricting assumptions of customer preferences and the
valuation of the spectrum.
viii
Contents
1 Introduction and Motivation 1
2 Background and Related Work 10
2.1 Survey of FCC Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Competition in Private Commons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Carrier Aggregation in LTE-Advanced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Many-Server Approximations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2 Carrier Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Analysis of Multicell Networks under Spatial Interference . . . . . . . 19
3 Coordinated Access 21
3.1 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Optimal Coordinated Access Policy and Profitability . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Best Response under Coordinated Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Uncoordinated Access 50
4.1 Uncoordinated Access with Stochastic Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1.1 Profitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.2 Market Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1.3 Profitable Sharing Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
ix
4.2 Fluid Approximation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.1 Characteristic Prices and Market Sharing Interval . . . . . . . 63
4.2.2 Duopoly Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.3 Quality of Service Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5 Carrier Aggregation 103
5.1 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2 Quality-Driven Approximation of Erlang-B Formula . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3 Optimal Carrier Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4 Structural Properties of Optimal Carrier Aggregation . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.1 Scaling Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.2 Traffic Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5 General Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.6 Numerical Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.7 Extension to Delay Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.8 Applications to Secondary Spectrum Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Networks with Spatial Interferences 132
6.1 Spatial Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.2 First-order Erlang Fixed Point Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.3 Profitability of Secondary Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3.1 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions 152
Curriculum Vitae 166
x
List of Tables
4.1 Equilibrium prices and resulting profits for the setting considered in
Example 4.1.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1 LTE bandwidth configurations and associated number of resource blocks
as specified in 3GPP Release 8 (3GPP, 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.1 Blocking probabilities of a symmetric hexagonal network given in Fig-
ure 6·2 with two different configurations. Bi is the blocking probability
obtained from the simulation of the exact system. Bˆi and bˆi represent
the approximations made in Eq.’s (6.5) and (6.10), respectively. The
error percentages are between the simulated and approximated call
blocking probabilities (Bi and Bˆi). All cells have a capacity of C = 20.
The interference weights are the same and wij = w for all i,j. . . . . . 140
xi
List of Figures
1·1 Illustration of provider competition over the secondary users in a pri-
vate commons setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1·2 Illustration of profitability and market sharing price intervals under
uncoordinated access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3·1 Market model: Two providers each with a capacity Ci, i = 1, 2, and a
dedicated (primary) demand λi compete for secondary demand. . . . 22
3·2 Behavior of break-even price as a function of network parameters. . . 30
3·3 Illustration of the two cases considered in the proof of Lemma 3.3.2 . 34
3·4 Representation of a price war as a result of best response dynamics
under coordinated access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3·5 Different reward maximizing prices as provided in Examples 3.4.1 and
3.4.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4·1 Revenue rates under optimal coordinated and uncoordinated access
versus secondary demand - network parameters: pi = 30, λi = 13,
Ci = 20 and Ki = 50. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4·2 Point (A) represents the Nash equilibrium under optimal coordinated
access, and the continuum of points in (B) is the set of Nash equilibria
under uncoordinated access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xii
4·3 Market model: Two providers i = 1, 2, each with capacity Ci and fixed
primary demand λi, compete for secondary demand stipulated by a
general function of price p, σ(p). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4·4 Market sharing revenue change regions in Theorem 4.2.3 with respect
to the market sharing price pMS(α). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4·5 An illustration of the prices p¯ and p¯α under a generic secondary demand. 73
4·6 Best response of network provider i: a) When the competitor price is
below pBEi , the provider sets its price to p
BE
i ; b) When the competitor
price is within the market sharing interval, the provider matches the
price; c) When the competitor price is above pMSi , the provider sets its
price slightly lower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4·7 Illustration of the two possible types of market outcomes. . . . . . . . 87
5·1 Illustration of sessions and flows. Each session consists of one or more
flows separated by idle periods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5·2 QD Approximation with C = (1 + γ)λ and γ = 0.25. The stem plot is
the Erlang-B formula given by Eq. (5.1) while the line plot is the QD
formula given by Eq. (5.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5·3 Optimal level of carrier aggregation ψ∗(n) of the smaller provider with
respect to scaling factor n for different initial traffic loads ρ = λ/C.
Solid lines are exact, markers are QD approximation, and C = 50. . . 110
5·4 Linear upper bound on the optimal level of carrier aggregation ψ∗(n)
provided in Theorem 5.5.1, with C = 50 and ρ = 0.5. . . . . . . . . . 118
xiii
5·5 C = 50 - Piecewise linear upper bounds on the optimal level of carrier
aggregation ψ∗(n) obtained by the initial linear upper bound provided
in Theorem 5.5.1, the slope of which is then adjusted at integer val-
ues of the scaling factor n using the derivative expression provided in
Eq. (5.29). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5·6 Comparison of optimal carrier aggregation under loss and delay sys-
tems, with C = 50 and ρ = 0.7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6·1 A Hexagonal Lattice Topology Network. Cells that are in the interfer-
ence neighborhood of the black cell are colored red. . . . . . . . . . . 133
6·2 A symmetric hexagonal network - Red cells are in the interference
neighborhood of the white cell, where a call arrival to the white cell
will also occupy w units capacity in the red cells. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6·3 The auxillary model to of the symmetric hexagonal network provided
in Figure 6·2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6·4 Occupancy process of cell i when the secondary demand is set to ∞
and the threshold value is T . T + 1 channels are always occupied by
secondary users. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6·5 The break-even price and the optimal threshold value that minimizes
it as provided in Eq. (6.19) for a network with 7 cells, each with a
capacity of C = 30 and the interferences are as shown in Figure 6·2
with w = 0.1. (K=100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6·6 The simulated profit of a network provider shown in Figure 6·2 for
different prices. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
(w=0.05, C=5, λ=3, K=100). The results are obtained after 10 mil-
lion primary arrivals at each cells and over 60 simulations. . . . . . . 150
xiv
List of Abbreviations
AP . . . . Access Point
BE . . . . Break-even
EFPA . Erlang Fixed Point Approximation
FCC . . . Federal Communications Commission
MS . . . . Market Sharing
NE . . . . Nash Equilibrium
PCAST President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
QD . . . . Quality Driven
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
When the first AM radios were built, surely no one envisioned that the spectrum on
which these electromagnetic waves propagate would become a scarce resource that
would auction for values exceeding a billion dollars in today’s market. Yet, it is a
reality of the modern information age where mobile phones, tablets and computers
are a part of our daily lives, all of which heavily use the same wireless spectrum. As
a highlight to the value of wireless spectrum today, the highly publicized auction of
the 700 MHz band brought in $19.52 billion alone to the federal government (Federal
Communications Commission, 2008).
With the proliferation of smart devices that drive the demand for data, wireless
spectrum is more valuable than ever. There is a need to rethink the way in which the
wireless spectrum is being managed. Under the legacy regulatory framework license
holders (e.g., network providers) can deliver only predetermined services and cannot
transfer spectrum access rights in any form. Removing the existing inefficiencies in
the way spectrum is allocated to license holders is one possible solution to increase
its availability.
To address spectrum scarcity issues, reallocation of government held spectrum is
pursued all around the globe,(e.g., switching from analog to digital broadcast in the
US and utilizing TV White Spaces). In July 2012, the President’s Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology (PCAST) published a report identifying the need for better
1
2spectrum management methods and proposed spectrum sharing as the end goal in
envisioning better spectrum utilization (President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology, 2012).
As a step in this direction, recent initiatives by governmental agencies extend the
reach of spectrum management policies that license holders (e.g., network providers)
are entitled to pursue (Akyildiz et al., 2006; Bae et al., 2008; Bykowsky, 2003;
Bykowsky et al., 2010; Chapin and Lehr, 2007; Mayo and Wallsten, 2010). In re-
cent years, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has made stringent
efforts to clear spectrum bands and reallocate them for more efficient use. The main
goal of this dissertation is to provide insight into the possible outcomes of these ini-
tiatives as well as studying their economic feasibility and ability to foster secondary
spectrum market. We are specifically motivated by two recent rulings: i) private
commons (Federal Communications Commission, 2003) and ii) reserved spectrum in
auctions (Federal Communications Commission, 2004), which are explained in further
detail in Chapter 2.
Realizing the potential of spectrum markets entails a number of challenges for
a spectrum provider. One such challenge concerns strategic pricing of secondary
spectrum access in the face of uncertainty of the demand function at every adver-
tised price: Providing secondary access at a charge returns an immediate revenue for
the provider, but it also incurs an opportunity cost due to lost primary revenue as
spectrum is fundamentally a finite resource. The balance between these two effects
determines the profitability of secondary spectrum provisioning, and it may possibly
depend not only on the secondary price but also on the secondary demand. The re-
lationship between secondary price and demand, however, is difficult to characterize
explicitly and it may also be time-varying. Therefore obtaining results that hold for
general forms of demand provides applicable and realistic insight to any price analysis.
3 
Provider 1 Provider 2 
Primary Users 
Secondary Users 
Primary Users 
Figure 1·1: Illustration of provider competition over the secondary
users in a private commons setting.
This issue is further aggravated in competitive situations in which multiple spec-
trum providers compete for the same pool of secondary demand. In such situations a
provider may opt to beat the price of competitors thereby winning entire secondary
market, or may opt to match competitors’ price thereby serving part of the market
but at a higher price. It is not readily clear which alternative is favorable, especially
under the alluded uncertainty in the price-demand relationship.
Finally, the provider faces the decision to implement admission control on the
secondary demand. In a coordinated access implementation the provider grants ad-
mission to secondary demand only under certain favorable conditions. Alternatively,
the provider can opt for an uncoordinated access regime where no distinction between
primary and secondary access requests is made, except for pricing. The implemen-
tation of either policy will have an impact on the pricing strategy and the market
outcome.
As one can conclude from the discussion above, the problem can quickly take a
complex form with several layers. The main goal of this dissertation is to provide
insight into profitable pricing of secondary spectrum access and the possible compe-
tition outcomes of different access policies in markets that involve multiple providers
4as illustrated in Fig 1·1.
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation we consider a single geographic loca-
tion where the providers are aiming to maximize their revenues collected form the
secondary users who access the network spectrum opportunistically. We consider a
game theoretic setting and identify equilibrium prices in term of Nash equilibria. In
particular we seek to answer the question whether a single provider will win the entire
secondary market or several providers will choose to share the market.
In Chapter 3, we consider an optimal coordinated access policy implemented by
the participating providers, which is a occupancy based policy that admits secondary
access requests if the network is serving a number of users less than certain threshold
value at the time and rejects it otherwise. We adopt a model that explicitly cap-
tures the random nature of spectrum access requests of both primary and secondary
users. Our conclusions make no assumptions on the secondary demand function, and
therefore hold for arbitrary price-demand relations.
First, we prove the existence of a break-even price for each provider, which guaran-
tees profitability as long as the provider sets its price above or equal to this value. We
explicitly characterizes the break-even price, which is independent of the parameters
of other providers and possesses the fundamental property of being insensitive to the
specific shape of the demand function of secondary users. The analysis further reveals
that the break-even price directly relates to the fraction of lost primary users (in the
absence of secondary users), which can be expressed using the well-studied Erlang-B
function. The break-even price therefore inherits all the mathematical properties of
that function.
Our next contribution is to show that, under an optimal coordinated access policy,
market sharing between providers is not an equilibrium outcome. Thus, a provider
that employs optimal coordinated access opts to beat the price of its competitors,
5leading to a price war. Furthermore this property holds irrespective of the specific
relation between the secondary price and the secondary demand. We formally estab-
lish the dominating strategy of each provider and list all possible market outcomes
(i.e., Nash equilibria), which this price war can lead to. We demonstrate that the
provider with the lowest break-even price wins the market. If multiple providers have
the same break-even price, they are coerced into an equilibrium in which no provider
makes a profit.
In Chapter 4, we revisit the same model except one where providers implement
uncoordinated access policies instead of coordinated access.
Under uncoordinated access, we show that market equilibria may be drastically
different than those under coordinated access. Through a numerical study, we il-
lustrate that depending on the shape of the secondary demand function, market
equilibria may reflect a situation wherein providers share the market by matching
each other’s price strictly above their respective break-even prices.
Theoretical analysis of the uncoordinated case is more complex because results are
highly dependent on the specific shape of the demand function. Therefore, we relax
the stochastic nature of traffic and assume a fluid model. Under this fluid relaxation,
we obtain results once again for general demand functions satisfying mild technical
conditions.
We prove the existence of a unique break-even price pBE for any given secondary
demand, for which we provide an explicit expression. However, unlike the coordinated
access case, the break-even price depends on the specific secondary demand function.
Unique to the uncoordinated access setting, we derive another unique threshold
price, called market sharing price pMS, below which a provider finds it desirable
to share secondary demand with another provider (i.e., its revenue increases). We
demonstrate that the market sharing price is strictly greater than the break-even
6 
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 price: 𝑝𝐵𝐸  
Profitable, 
sharing 
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no sharing Unprofitable 
Market sharing 
 price: 𝑝𝑀𝑆 
0 price 
Figure 1·2: Illustration of profitability and market sharing price in-
tervals under uncoordinated access
price, regardless of the demand function. This leads to the conclusion that there
always exists a price interval in which a network provider would choose to reduce its
secondary demand and maintain profitability as illustrated in Fig. 1·2.
Next, under the same fluid model, we analyze a duopoly competition where net-
work providers make pricing decisions to maximize their revenues. We formally es-
tablish the best response strategy of each provider and use them to identify the two
possible market outcomes in the form of Nash equilibria: i) if the market sharing
intervals overlap, then the providers end up sharing the market; ii) if the market
sharing intervals do not overlap, then the provider with the lower break-even price
captures the entire market, which reflects the result of a price war. The equilibria
prices under the first case are possibly much higher than the break-even prices of each
provider, while under the second case the equilibrium price is slightly less than the
higher break-even price.
Having investigated the secondary spectrum markets from a pricing point of view,
in Chapter 5 we turn our attention to the possibility of providers sizing their capacity
in an effort to lower their break-even and market sharing prices. Thus, we consider
a market where providers have the freedom to acquire larger bandwidths in an effort
to drive their costs down. We are particularly motivated by the FCC ruling that
decided to set aside 30 MHz of spectrum for service providers that hold less than
7a third of the spectrum in a specific market (Federal Communications Commission,
2014a; Federal Communications Commission, 2014b).
We determine the optimal (minimum) level of carrier aggregation that a smaller
provider needs to bring its quality of service in line with a larger provider operating
in the same market. Furthermore, we aim to provide insight into the relationships
between the optimal level of carrier aggregation and fundamental network parameters,
such as the traffic load and capacity.
Towards this end we make several contributions. First, we propose an asymptot-
ically exact approximation of the Erlang-B blocking formula under a quality-driven
(QD) regime that holds for large traffic and network capacities (Borst et al., 2004).
Since the Erlang-B formula does not easily yield itself to mathematical analysis, the
QD formula is useful to provide more explicit insight into the impact of network
parameters.
Using the QD formula, we identify the optimal carrier aggregation decision for the
smaller provider through which the market outcome becomes favorable. We provide
an efficient method for numerically calculating the optimal level of carrier aggregation.
We also derive scaling laws on optimal carrier aggregation with respect to the scaling
factor, i.e. the ratio of the capacity of the larger provider to that of the smaller
provider, and establish a sub-linear relationship. We prove that while the level of
carrier aggregation needed increases with the scaling factor, it decreases when the
initial traffic load of the providers gets higher.
We extend our results to delay-related metrics (i.e., based on the Erlang-C for-
mula) and discuss the application of our results to the profitable pricing of secondary
users in a dynamic spectrum sharing scenario as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
As a final contribution of this dissertation, we consider the secondary spectrum
markets under a larger network topology subject to spatial interference between access
8points (APs). We seek to expand the profitable pricing analysis presented in Chapters
3 and 4 where we establish the break-even price for a single AP.
In Chapter 6, we identify necessary pricing of secondary access to ensure prof-
itability in a network consisting of multiple access points (APs) some of which are
in interference with each other. In our calculations we adopt a first-order approx-
imation model based on the Erlang fixed point model that explicitly captures the
random nature of spectrum access requests of both primary and secondary users and
is asymptotically optimal in a system where the demand and service capacities are
proportionally scaled up. Once again our conclusions make no assumptions on the
secondary demand function, and therefore hold for arbitrary price-demand relations.
First, we show that in a network where individual APs experience a low level of
blocking and interference, it is possible to decouple the steady state behavior of APs
by using a first-order fixed point approximation formula. This approximation allows
us to characterize the opportunity cost incurred at each AP due to the admission of
secondary users to the network separately from its neighboring APs.
Our next contribution is to characterize and provide an expression to calculate the
break-even price for at each AP. This break-even price is the lower limit to the price
values for which a provider’s profitability is guaranteed. The chapter characterizes the
break-even price (under the first-order approximation), which is independent of the
parameters of other providers and is insensitive to the specific shape of the demand
function of secondary users.
In summary, in this dissertation:
• We investigate price thresholds and market outcomes in secondary spectrum
markets both for coordinated and uncoordinated access. We show that uncoor-
dinated access might lead to market sharing in contrast to coordinated access
9that always results in a price war..
• We investigate how a network provider can utilize carrier aggregation in order
to gain a competitive edge over its competitors and provide scaling laws.
• We consider the profitable admission secondary demand in a network with a
spatial topology subject to interference. We provide a first order refinement
of the Erlang fixed point approximation to decouple interference between the
neighboring cells and use it to determine profitable pricing of secondary access
in the network.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. We start by providing background
on regulatory initiatives and surveying related work in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we
consider the implementation of a coordinated access policy in a private commons
setting and present the resulting market equilibrium. We determine the optimal co-
ordinated access policy and derive the break-even price for each provider. Next, in
Chapter 4 we turn our attention to the implementation of uncoordinated access in
private commons and revisit the profitability conditions and the market outcomes. In
Chapter 5, we determine the impact of reserving spectrum for smaller providers and
how this can be implemented using carrier aggregation. We consider the problem of
optimal carrier aggregation and investigate its relationship with respect to network
and market parameters. In Chapter 6 we revisit the question of profitability of sec-
ondary spectrum access in a network topology under spatial interference constraints.
We conclude the dissertation in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we first provide a detailed overview of FCC policies relevant to this
dissertation. Then, we survey related work on competition and spectrum pricing for
secondary markets and highlight the differing contributions of our research. The re-
lated work is categorized as following: In Section 2.2 we provide a literature survey on
work that consider provider competition in private commons. In Section 2.3, we dis-
cuss related work on carrier aggregation and many-server approximations, specifically
the Quality-Driven (QD) approximation in two separate subsections. In Section 2.4,
we discuss related work that consider larger network topologies consisting of multiple
access points subject to interference and their profitability.
2.1 Survey of FCC Policies
Private Commons. The FCC introduced a spectrum access policy model known as
Private Commons, which is deemed both “commercially viable and technologically
feasible” (Federal Communications Commission, 2003; Buddhikot, 2007). This new
model supports spectrum transactions, where ownership of spectrum remains with the
license holder providing service to its primary users, but this provider may also provide
spectrum access to secondary users for a fee. As pointed out in FCC’s report on
secondary spectrum markets, private commons is a framework of spectrum ownership
where license holders can grant secondary access to their spectrum band at their own
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discretion. Control of secondary access in private commons can be implemented in
several different ways (Federal Communications Commission, 2004). In particular,
access to the spectrum by secondary users may be coordinated by the provider, via
signals that determine when or how such access is allowed (Buddhikot, 2007). A
notable coordinated policy is the so-called threshold (reservation) policy, whereby
secondary spectrum access is permitted as long as the number of channels occupied
in a given spectrum band is below a certain threshold. Threshold (reservation) policies
have the distinct advantage of requiring only the current number of customers present
in the system to make an admission decision. Theoretical properties of the threshold
policy, including optimality in certain settings, have been extensively studied in the
literature (cf. (Miller, 1969; Key, 1990; Ramjee et al., 1997; Mutlu et al., 2009; Mutlu
et al., 2010) and references therein). Access to a band may also be uncoordinated, in
which case primary and secondary users share access to the band on an equal basis, in
a way similar to ISM bands (Buddhikot, 2007). Uncoordinated access policies have
the advantage that they are simple to implement with no to little extra operating
costs and it can be argued that they are the most egalitarian access policy. The
access policy is arguably the most commonly used and important (besides price) way
a service provider can influence customer behavior within its network.
Private commons bear significant potential to increase spectrum utilization since
cellular networks are generally over-provisioned to cope with short-term spikes in
their loads. For instance, a measurement based study of close to 20,000 GSM
base stations deployed in Germany indicates that the majority of base station in
crowded areas, such as city centers, remain under-loaded by its contracted users at
all times (Michalopoulou et al., 2011). Another study conducted in the Common-
wealth of Virginia indicates that the US market is no exception to the case with
maximum network occupancy levels around 45% (Shared Spectrum Company, ). A
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measurement based study by Kone et. al. (Kone et al., 2012) indicates that con-
servative policies that minimize interference to primary users (such as one proposed
by Jung and Liu (Jung and Liu, 2012)) result in spectrum inefficiencies, where only
20-30% of the available spectrum is extracted for secondary use. Such studies suggest
that providing spot-on service to secondary users could increase spectrum utilization
levels and thus translate into increased revenue rates.
To capture the entire spectrum of the provider competition one needs to take into
account a global perceptive where the best interests of firms and customers are taken
into account while trying to move the system to a desirable point from a regulatory
perspective. Furthermore, since radio spectrum has a spatial component as well as a
temporal once, one needs to consider the competition at a variety of locations, each of
which might exhibit unique characteristics, such as the different telecommunications
patterns observed in intense traffic load situations at dense urban centers such as
New York and Chicago and sparsely populated rural areas where spectrum is under
a light load.
Spectrum Reservation. To preserve the competitive landscape of the wireless
industry, the FCC has decided to set aside 30 MHz of spectrum for service providers
that hold less than a third of the spectrum in a specific market (Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 2014a; Federal Communications Commission, 2004). With the
600 MHz spectrum auction on the horizon, this ruling is poised to have a significant
impact on the industry (Wall Street Journal, 2014). The ruling has already caused
some controversy in the market as it restricts the amount of spectrum larger providers
have access to (Reuters, 2014), though some public interest groups are asking for it
to be increased to 40 MHz (Fierce Wireless, 2015).
The policy ruling is facilitated by a central feature of LTE-Advanced networks (as
defined in 3GPP Release 10 and beyond) called carrier aggregation (Iwamura et al.,
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2010; Wang et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2010; Doyle et al., 2012). Carrier aggregation
allows service providers to aggregate contiguous or non-contiguous component carriers
up to 100 MHz total bandwidth. This significantly improves the performance of the
network compared to LTE specifications defined in Release 8 (3GPP, 2012), where
the maximum supported bandwidth is 20 MHz.
A significant challenge associated with the ruling is to identify how much ad-
ditional spectrum a smaller provider needs to improve its service to the level of a
larger provider, which initially holds a competitive advantage in the market due to
economies of scale. If this criterion is met, the spectrum reservation policy effectively
fosters a competitive market. Otherwise, the policy inherently risks wasting highly
valuable spectrum. We study this question in Chapter 5.
The problems considered in this dissertation exist in the wider literature of cognitive
radios and dynamic spectrum sharing technologies. The literature includes proposed
methods of utilizing TV white spaces to the deployment of small cells in an effort to
better utilize the existing spectrum, all enabled by the emergence of cognitive radios
(Nekovee, 2009),(Chandrasekhar et al., 2008). While some papers investigate these
problems from a technical point of view there also exists a large literature concern-
ing the economic analysis of the implementation of said technologies. Within the
proposed methods of spectrum sharing and the different analytical approaches, our
contributions sit in the techno-economic analysis of secondary spectrum markets, im-
plemented in the form of private commons, where both the traffic characteristics of
the resulting wireless networks and their economic interpretation through profitabil-
ity analysis and equilibrium concepts are being investigated. We present the related
work in the subsequent subsections.
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2.2 Competition in Private Commons
Network providers in spectrum markets may face competition at two different levels.
The first level consists of competition between secondary network providers to lease
spectrum from a primary provider (or the government) that holds a spectrum license.
The second level of competition arises after the said leasing of the spectrum, and is
among providers, which hold a license or lease, competing to offer their services to
the end-users.
Many papers in the literature consider the first level of competition, while our
research is positioned to addresses the second one. For instance, in the works by
Jagannathan (Jagannathan et al., 2012), Kasbekar (Kasbekar and Sarkar, 2012a),
Duan (Duan et al., 2010), Ren (Ren et al., 2011), Niyato and Hossain (Niyato and
Hossain, 2008), Sengupta and Chatterjee (Sengupta and Chatterjee, 2009) and Xing
(Xing et al., 2007), game theoretic approaches to spectrum auctioning and leasing are
analyzed. The set-up of all these papers (i.e., competition between providers to lease
spectrum) is different from what we consider (i.e., competition between providers to
lure users).
Several papers study the problem of ensuring profitability in secondary spectrum
markets. Niyato and Hossain (Niyato and Hossain, 2008) derives market equilibria
pricing by taking into consideration the demand and supply dynamics of spectrum
auctions. However, the model uses a very specific secondary demand based on the
utility from owning the spectrum and how much it costs to lease the spectrum. On the
other hand, our results hold for general demand functions. Drawing conclusions under
general demand functions generally requires a more elaborate analysis, as illustrated
by several papers (Allon and Gurvich, 2010; Andrews et al., 2013; Besbes and Zeevi,
2009). Also, secondary users have the option to lease parts of their spectrum from
15
different spectrum owners.
On the end-user side, Alanyali et al. (Alanyali et al., 2011) establishes a pricing
policy which guarantees profitability for the network provider as long as a demand
is generated. However, this paper assumes a monopolistic framework, while ours
considers an oligopolistic one. Furthermore, (Alanyali et al., 2011) considers a multi-
cell setting with a single frequency band in each cell, while in the related chapters we
focus on an isolated cell offering multiple frequency bands.
Mutlu et al. (Mutlu et al., 2009) also consider a monopolistic framework and
derive an optimal coordinated access policy under which revenue from secondary
users is maximized. The results of that paper show that a threshold policy is optimal
for coordinated access in an isolated cell, assuming that a provider advertises a fixed
price (i.e., the price does not depend on the instantaneous channel occupancy). These
results are leveraged for the analysis in our work.
In a work by Ileri et al. (Ileri et al., 2005), a comprehensive model including both
the auction and the end-user sides of the competition is studied. Different from our
work, this model focuses on the auctioning side of the competition where the revenue
generated by secondary users is used to compensate for the costs of auctioning. In
our model, we assume that providers own spectrum and need only to consider the
revenue brought in by the primary and secondary users.
The works by Maille and Tuffin (Maille and Tuffin, 2010) and Maille et al. (Maille
et al., 2011) use a model where both the auction side and the service side of the com-
petition are considered. The work in (Maille and Tuffin, 2010) specifically focuses on
the competition between two different but substitute technologies while (Maille et al.,
2011) models a three level competition, where spectrum owners, lessees and users each
make their own separate decisions. These decisions include the use of different tech-
nologies. In our model, we assume that providers offer the same type of services
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and therefore cannot influence the secondary users’ preferences beside the price ad-
vertised. A related work by Ren et al. (Ren et al., 2011) studies and compares the
market outcome achieved by respectively enforcing cooperation or competition among
providers. While such external interventions might be useful in analyzing hypothet-
ical outcomes, our model refrains from such enforcements as it aims to characterize
the outcomes of a natural competition. In a work by Kim et al. (Kim et al., 2011),
competition between two providers is analyzed where network pre-emption allows for
primary users to evict secondary users from the system. Unlike ours, the network
model is not a finite capacity multichannel network but rather a spatial distribution
of channels that turn on and off, and the analysis relies on an approximation. In
one recent study by Korcak et. al. (Korcak et al., 2012), the possibility of collusion
between several wireless network providers is considered. This collusion is based on a
coalition game model. In contrast, in our model, network providers do not communi-
cate with each other about their intentions (i.e., it is a non-cooperative game). Thus,
the possibility of market sharing between the providers is purely a result of market
dynamics.
A paper by Fortetsanakis et. al. (Fortetsanakis et al., 2012) considers the second
level of competition, where providers offer what the authors call the Flex Service. The
simulation based results indicate that the welfare of the market increases through the
use of a central database which collects information about pricing and quality of
service. This work relies on explicit demand and utility functions. Our results hold
without making such assumptions.
None of the previous work surveyed here considers competition among network
providers implementing either coordinated or uncoordinated access and facing sec-
ondary demand governed by a general demand function. The characterization of the
market equilibrium and demonstration of a price war won by the provider(s) with the
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lowest break-even price as well as the possibility of market sharing equilibria under
uncoordinated access policies are unique contributions of this work.
2.3 Carrier Aggregation in LTE-Advanced
In this section, we survey previous work on many-server approximations of queuing
systems and on carrier aggregation.
2.3.1 Many-Server Approximations
The many-server approximation that forms the basis of the QD regime was first
introduced in Iglehart’s work (Iglehart, 1965). The paper considers a setting where
the arrival rate and the number of servers both become very large and the ratio of the
arrival rate to the service rate (i.e., the traffic load) is a constant that is strictly smaller
than one. Under proper statistical assumptions, the process describing the evolution
of the queue occupancy converges to a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck diffusion process. Halfin
and Whitt (Halfin and Whitt, 1981) provide another many-server approximation that
characterizes queues in a quality-and-efficiency driven (QED) regime, i.e., where the
arrival rate and the number of servers both become very large and the traffic load
approaches one. The work of Zeltyn and Mandelbaum (Zeltyn, 2004) provides an
overview of different types of many-server approximations and is useful as a general
reference. In our work, we utilize the QD regime approximations that allow us to
analyze the quality of service experienced by voice calls and data flows in cellular
networks.
Scaling laws in wireless and wired networks have been studied in various con-
texts (Bolcskei et al., 2006; Gupta and Kumar, 2000; Xie and Kumar, 2004; Ozgur
et al., 2007). The work of Bolcskei et al., for example, focuses on the gains realized
by increasing the number of antennas in a MIMO relay network. This work falls
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under the broad category of papers that analyze the dimensioning of telecommuni-
cations networks. Such papers are crucial in providing a better understanding of
the relationship between resource allocation and system performance, allowing policy
makers to look past the current state of the market. Another example is the work
by Xie and Kumar (Xie and Kumar, 2004), where this time the focus is on the ca-
pacity achieved by cooperation between the nodes of a wireless network. The scaling
question has been raised once again but this time for ad hoc networks by Ozgur and
Leveque (Ozgur et al., 2007).
2.3.2 Carrier Aggregation
Carrier aggregation has been gaining significant attention since it has been introduced
in 3GPP Release 10 on LTE-Advanced in 2011. Several papers in the literature ex-
plain practical considerations to achieve desired performance levels in networks, such
as deployment options, implementation frameworks, and challenges in the physical
layer (Iwamura et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2010). The work by Shen
et al. (Shen et al., 2012) provides an overview on all layers, while also underlining
the interest of several major U.S. providers in the technology. Alotaibi and Sirbu
provide a comprehensive cost benefit analysis of spectrum aggregation in (Alotaibi
and Sirbu, 2011) and how it impacts network performance in (Alotaibi and Sirbu,
2015). A recent paper by Doyle et al. (Doyle et al., 2012) introduces an interesting
application of carrier aggregation. The authors consider the possible uses of carrier
aggregation in a dynamic spectrum access, such as dynamically aggregating carriers
to address coverage or congestion issues. They also propose a regulatory framework
that supports this enhanced form of carrier aggregation.
Fungibility of the aggregated spectrum is considered in (Weiss et al., 2012), where
the authors seek to identify whether all spectrum bands provide the same perfor-
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mance. For example, low frequency spectrum, such as the 600 MHz band considered
in Chapter 5, is generally viewed as more desirable than higher frequencies because
of its propagation properties.
Considering the impact of spectrum reservation for smaller providers on the com-
petitiveness of a wireless market is beyond the scope of the previous work surveyed
here. The identification of the optimal carrier aggregation and the scaling laws pro-
vided thereunto, as well as simple methods of calculating it, are the unique contribu-
tions of this chapter.
2.4 Analysis of Multicell Networks under Spatial Interfer-
ence
Modeling multi-cell networks with interference has been vastly studied in the liter-
ature. Perhaps the best known work in the area of modeling large networks is the
seminal work of Kelly (Kelly, 1991; Kelly, 1986) where the fixed point methods are
used to study loss networks with different routing schemes. Kelly established the so-
called Erlang fixed-point approximation as an asymptotically exact (with respect to
network size) and unique solution to obtain the loss probabilities in larger networks.
Al Daoud et al. (Al Daoud et al., 2010) make use of this fixed point approximation to
identify the price admission decision in a wireless network setting with interferences.
That work, however, considers optimal pricing where the network provider leases a
part of its network to a third party instead of identifying the minimum profitable
price under the coexistence of both types of user in the same network which is our
focus.
Several papers study the problem of pricing spectrum in a spatial network. The
work Alanyali et. al. (Alanyali et al., 2011), which was also discussed in section 2.2,
establish a pricing policy in a multi-cell setting which guarantees profitability for the
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network provider as long as a demand is generated. However, (Alanyali et al., 2011)
considers a single frequency band in each cell, while our focus is on cells each offering
multiple frequency bands. Kasberkar and Sarkar (Kasbekar and Sarkar, 2012b) study
the pricing competition between network providers where spatial reuse of available
bandwidth is taken into consideration. The model resembles that in (Alanyali et al.,
2011), as they are mainly concerned with conflict graphs which determine whether
spectrum can be used in neighboring cells. It, however, does not consider the question
of profitable pricing and the possibility of co-existence in neighboring cells under
limited interference.
In section 2.2 we mentioned that Mutlu et al. (Mutlu et al., 2009) derive an
optimal coordinated access policy under which revenue from secondary users is max-
imized and showed that, for an isolated cell, a threshold policy was optimal. The
results of this work are leveraged for the analysis of multiple cells as well. Specifi-
cally, by decoupling the spatial interference effects of the network, the optimal policy
for an isolated cell becomes the optimal policy for the decoupled network as well.
None of the previous work surveyed here considers the profitable pricing of sec-
ondary users in a multi-cell network with interference, where the provider is facing
secondary demand governed by a general demand function. The use of the fixed point
methods to decouple the cells in the network and thus obtaining the break-even price
under the secondary demand are the unique contributions of this dissertation on the
subject.
Chapter 3
Coordinated Access
In this chapter we consider the profitable pricing of secondary access and competition
between network providers under the implementation of coordinated access by the
participants. We first provide a detailed description of the model under consideration.
Next, we establish the optimal coordinated access policy and identify profitability
conditions. We then demonstrate that the best response behavior of coordinated
access leads to a price war, which gives the market outcome.
3.1 Network Model
In this section we introduce the network and market models considered and the
accompanying notation. For convenience of exposition we present here a model with
two providers, and later extend it to an arbitrary number of competing providers:
Each provider i = 1, 2 has a finite number of channels Ci, and a dedicated primary-
user base whose traffic generation rate (i.e., the average number of requests per unit
time) is represented with λi > 0. For each primary user serviced, provider i collects
a reward of Ki units.
The providers compete for an additional secondary demand, which is raised
through offering secondary service at a fixed access price for the duration of a con-
tract period. The contract period is long enough (relative to inter-arrival and holding
Results presented in this chapter appear in part in (Kavurmacioglu et al., 2012a),(Kavurmacioglu
et al., 2012b),(Kavurmacioglu et al., 2014a)
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Figure 3·1: Market model: Two providers each with a capacity
Ci, i = 1, 2, and a dedicated (primary) demand λi compete for sec-
ondary demand.
times of calls) to allow an equilibrium analysis. In the course of the contract period,
neither the pricing nor the users preferences change.
If provider i charges pi units per secondary access then the intensity of secondary
demand is σ(pi). Here σ(·) is the well-known demand function and it is assumed to
be continuous and non-increasing. We denote the maximum value of the secondary
demand by σmax = σ(0).
We shall assume that each demand type (primary and secondary) consists of a
random sequence of request arrivals that occur according to independent Poisson
processes. We also assume that, if granted, each request holds a single channel for a
random duration that is generally distributed with unit mean, independently of other
requests and arrival times. We shall assume that the channel holding statistics are
identical for primary and secondary requests. Such an assumption is valid when both
types of traffic are generated by similar applications.
The general form of aggregate secondary demand σ(p) captures the heterogene-
ity of customer preferences. Indeed, the demand function implicitly represents the
fraction of users (user types) that find each price value acceptable. The generality
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of the demand function allows consideration of different user types. The separation
between primary and secondary users and the random nature of service times capture
additional levels of heterogeneity in our model.
Secondary demand is assumed to be attracted to the provider charging the lowest
price. This behavior can be explained by price aversion, a concept employed in
marketing management (Tellis and Gaeth, 1990). When both providers charge the
same price, the resulting secondary demand splits between the two providers according
to a static probability vector [α1, α2] such that α1 + α2 = 1 and α1, α2 > 0. Namely,
each provider i receives a secondary demand of volume αiσ(pi) every time market
prices are equal.
Each provider i also has the choice of admitting or rejecting secondary requests
according to an access policy, which we denote by Ai. We assume that actions taken
by Ai depend only on the number of each class of users (primary and secondary)
in the system. Thus, Ai belongs to the class of occupancy-based policies, the per-
formance of which are insensitive to the call length distribution except through the
mean (Mutlu et al., 2010). Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume ex-
ponentially distributed service times for the purpose of analysis in the rest of this
chapter.
Since providers have a finite number of channels to provide service with, they
cannot accommodate new requests if all of the channels are occupied. This results in
some requests being blocked. We define Bi,j(λi, σ, Ai) as the blocking probability for
class j users (j = 1 for primary and 2 for secondary) when secondary demand is σ
and the access policy is Ai.
The goal of each provider is to maximize the total revenue collected. The revenue
rate of provider i when it services secondary demand of σ units is given by:
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Wi(pi, σ, Ai) = (1−Bi,2(λi, σ, Ai))σpi + (1−Bi,1(λi, σ, Ai))λiKi. (3.1)
Here the first and the second terms are respectively the revenue generated by pri-
mary and secondary requests that are admitted by the provider. Each term represents
the expected long time rates per unit time.
Since the secondary demand a provider receives depends on prices of both
providers, so does the revenue of the provider. We define the reward Ri(pi, p−i)
of provider i as its revenue when provider i and its competitor −i charge secondary
access pi and p−i units respectively. Namely,
Ri(pi, p−i) =

Wi(pi, σ(pi), Ai) if pi < p−i
Wi(pi, αiσ(pi), Ai) if pi = p−i
Wi(pi, 0, Ai) if pi > p−i.
(3.2)
Hence the reward is affected by the amount of secondary demand provider i captures
through the relationship between its own price pi and the price of the other provider
p−i. Once the prices determine the secondary demand for each provider, the rewards
are further shaped by the providers’ access policies. Each provider has full infor-
mation on its own network parameters and can observe the prices advertised by its
competitors.
3.2 Optimal Coordinated Access Policy and Profitability
For a given secondary demand σ and secondary price p, let A∗(p, σ) denote a coor-
dinated access policy that maximizes the revenue rate for a provider (for analyses in
which we consider a single provider, we will drop index i from our notation for the
sake of simplicity). We refer to A∗(p, σ) as the optimal coordinated access policy. We
represent the resulting maximal revenue W ∗(p, σ) as follows:
W ∗(p, σ) = W (p, σ, A∗(p, σ)) = max
A
W (p, σ, A). (3.3)
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One can formulate the provider’s optimization problem using a Markov decision
process (MDP), where the state is the total number of users in the network. Note
that primary and secondary users have identical channel holding statistics, hence
once admitted to the network they are indistinguishable. At every state, the provider
needs to make a decision whether to admit or reject a secondary user arrival in order
to maximize its expected revenue. MDPs can be solved with dynamic programming
(DP) techniques (Bertsekas, 1976). Under the given assumptions, it is well-known
that the coordinated access policy that yields the optimal solution to our DP problem
is a threshold (reservation) policy: Secondary users are admitted by a provider when
the channel occupancy of the provider is below a threshold T ≥ 0 and they are
blocked otherwise (Key, 1990; Miller, 1969; Mutlu et al., 2010; Ramjee et al., 1997).
The optimal threshold value depends on all parameters of the provider including
intensity of the secondary demand. We let the notation A = T correspond to the
implementation of a threshold policy with the specific threshold value being equal to
T .
In the competitive setting considered in this chapter it will be important to identify
conditions under which an optimal policy A∗(p, σ) ever accepts a secondary request.
Under such conditions the secondary price-demand pair (p, σ) yields profit relative
to serving primary demand only; in turn (p, σ) represents an economically viable
situation for a provider. The issue is closely related with the opportunity cost of
accepting a secondary request: On the one hand such a request brings an immediate
revenue of p, on the other hand it may cause rejecting future requests, possibly with
higher immediate revenue, due to the channel that it holds temporally. To identify the
profitability of admitting a secondary user, we utilize a policy improvement technique
based on (Alanyali et al., 2011; Key, 1990). Specifically, we identify a price condition
for which there exists a policy that yields a better revenue than a policy that flatly
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rejects all secondary arrivals. This determines the sign of the balance in the trade-off
when making a control decision to admit a secondary user or not. We state our main
result on this profitability condition in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2.1 For σ > 0 there exists a break-even price pBE given by:
pBE = KE(λ,C), (3.4)
where E(λ,C) =
λC/C!∑C
k=0 λ
k/k!
is the Erlang-B formula. such that:
(a) W ∗(p, σ) > W ∗(p, 0) if p > pBE,
(b) W ∗(p, σ) = W ∗(p, 0) if p ≤ pBE.
Proof. In order to calculate for which prices it is profitable to admit secondary
users, we model the optimization problem as an MDP. Thus, we set up an infinite
horizon average cost dynamic programming problem and identify the prices at which
the optimal policy allows for the admission of secondary users into the network at
some states. To do so, we take the total number of users in the network (i.e., occu-
pancy) denoted by y as the state of the system, J¯ as the time-average reward and
h(y) as the differential reward function (Bertsekas, 1976). J¯ can be interpreted as the
average reward collected from incoming arrivals over a period of time which length
goes to infinity, whereas the differential reward function h(y) characterizes the ex-
pected difference when we start the process from a particular state y instead of an
arbitrary state y′ which we take as the reference such that h(y′) = 0. In our case,
and without any loss of generality, we set y′ = 0.
We uniformize the process with the maximum possible transition rate out of any
state, which we denote by ν , λ+ σ +C. Since the service rate is the same for both
primary and secondary users, they are indistinguishable once in the system. Following
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this observation, at state {y : 0 ≤ y ≤ C} a user (either primary or secondary) will
leave the system with probability y
ν
. With probability λ
ν
a primary user will arrive,
with probability σ
ν
a secondary user will arrive, and with probability C−y
ν
the state will
remain the same (i.e., nothing happens). Note that an arrival of either kind to a full
network is not admitted and thus no reward is collected. Then the well established
Bellman equations for the average reward problem can be formulated as follows:
J¯ + h∗(y) =
1
ν
{ yh∗(y − 1) + (C − y)h∗(y)
+ λ(K + h∗(y + 1))
+ σmax (p+ h∗(y + 1), h∗(y))}, (3.5)
for 0 < y ≤ C − 1. The last term on the right hand side of the equation reflects the
admission choice to be made, that is either admit an incoming secondary user and
collect a reward of p while increment the state or reject the arrival and preserve the
state.
We also consider the two special cases, first when the network is full:
J¯ + h∗(C) =
1
ν
{Ch∗(C − 1) + (λ+ σ)h∗(C)},
and next when the network is empty:
J¯ + h∗(0) =
1
ν
{Ch∗(0) + λ(K + h∗(1)) + σmax (p+ h∗(1), h∗(0))}.
Let us define the lock-out policy as an access policy where all secondary users
are rejected, regardless of network occupancy. We will approach this pricing decision
problem by determining when the lock-out policy on secondary users stops being op-
timal. Assuming a lock-out policy, which we denote by the use of the superscript LO,
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Eq. (3.5) reduces to:
J¯ + hLO(y) =
1
ν
{ yhLO(y − 1) + (C − y)hLO(y)
+ λ(K + hLO(y + 1)) + σhLO(y)}. (3.6)
From the last argument of Eq. (3.5), it is clear that when the state of the network is
y, a lock-out policy is optimal if and only if max
(
p+ hLO(y + 1), hLO(y)
)
= hLO(y)
or:
p ≤ hLO(y)− hLO(y + 1). (3.7)
Therefore if p ≥ hLO(y) − hLO(y + 1), a lock-out policy is no longer optimal, which
is equivalent to starting to admit some secondary users. We shall next obtain an
analytical expression of the quantity H(y) , hLO(y)− hLO(y + 1).
Writing Eq. (3.6) for every state y and taking the difference between every two
consecutive states yields the following set of equations:
(λ+ 1)H(0) = λH(1)
...
...
...
(λ+ y)H(y − 1) = λH(y) + (y − 1)H(y − 2)
...
...
...
(λ+ C)H(C − 1) = λK + (C − 1)H(C − 2)
The solution to this set of equations is
H(y) = K
E(λ,C)
E(λ, y)
for 0 ≤ y ≤ C − 1. (3.8)
Since we are specifically interested in finding the price p at which it is optimal to
admit at least one secondary user into the network, through Eq. (3.7), we know that
this price must be greater than or equal to
min
0≤y≤C−1
H(y) = min
0≤y≤C−1
(
hLO(y)− hLO(y + 1)) .
29
By observing how Eq. (3.8) changes with respect to y, one can come to the conclusion
that H(y) is increasing in y, the minimum value such a price p can take is:
pBE , H(0) = KE(λ,C)
E(λ, 0)
= KE(λ,C). (3.9)
Therefore, as long as the price is greater than pBE, there exists at least one state
y (i.e., when the system is empty) at which admitting secondary customers yields a
better revenue rate than the revenue rate under a lock-out policy. 
Theorem 3.2.1(a) states that if the price exceeds pBE then serving secondary de-
mand yields strictly higher revenue for a provider than not serving it. Conversely, part
(b) of the theorem states that secondary demand does not lead to any revenue im-
provement otherwise, implying that rejecting the entire secondary demand is optimal
for such prices. In effect, at pBE the immediate revenue balances the opportunity cost
of a secondary request. We therefore coin pBE as the break-even price of a provider.
It is striking that the break-even price expression (3.9) does not depend on the
secondary demand. Namely, any price above pBE strictly improves the revenue of a
provider regardless of how much secondary demand it generates. This result can be
intuitively understood as follows: The size of secondary demand does not play a role
in profitability, for any positive secondary demand can be thinned down arbitrarily
by the coordinated access policy. We have shown that at the break-even price the
lock-out policy stops being optimal, which is equivalent to stating that secondary
access is profitable when the network is empty. Since the profitability of the first
admitted secondary user depends on a network where there are no other secondary
users, secondary demand does not affect the break-even price.
Figures 3·2(a) and 3·2(b) illustrate how the normalized break-even price (i.e.,
pBE/K) changes with respect to relevant network parameters, namely the system
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Figure 3·2: Behavior of break-even price as a function of network
parameters.
capacity C and the network load λ/C. The normalized price is given by the Erlang-B
function, which has been well studied in teletraffic theory. In particular upper and
lower bounds are obtained in (Harel, 1988; Janssen et al., 2008), and it is demon-
strated in (Jagers and Doorn, 1986) that for a given arrival load λ, the Erlang-B
function (hence, the break-even price) is a convex function of the capacity C, as can
be observed from Figure 3·2(a). It is also worth noting that as the network capacity
increases, the value of the break-even price at the critical load where λ = C decreases
as demonstrated in Figure 3·2(b).
Figure 3·2(b) shows that for an over-provisioned network (in which primary load λ
is below the capacity C by a significant margin), the break-even price is substantially
lower than the primary price. We observe that for C = 16 the normalized break-even
price is negligible compared to the primary price for network loads below 40%, a
number close to the network utilization measurements reported in (Shared Spectrum
Company, ). As the network capacity increases, it takes even higher network loads to
observe the slightest increase in the break-even price, almost as high as 80% when the
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capacity is increased to C = 128. This result suggests that, in an over-provisioned
network, spectrum sharing at secondary prices that are low relative to primary reward
would result in net profit, regardless of the secondary demand.
3.3 Best Response under Coordinated Access
In competing for and serving secondary demand, a provider’s action consists of an
advertised price for secondary access and an access policy to coordinate secondary
access. For any price, and for any demand the price raises, each provider’s revenue
is highest under optimal coordination. Hence optimal coordination is a dominating
choice uniformly for all situations. In this section we will assume all providers im-
plement optimal coordinated access. With this assumption each provider’s strategic
action reduces to a pricing decision.
In the next theorem, we state that the best response of a provider is to set its price
slightly lower than the competition in order to capture all of the secondary demand
rather than sharing the secondary demand at that price. This can be formalized as
follows:
Theorem 3.3.1 If p > pBE, for any given α ∈ [0, 1] there exists a price p′ ∈ (pBE, p)
such that:
W ∗(p′, σ(p′)) > W ∗(p, ασ(p)). (3.10)
Before we prove Theorem 3.3.1, it is beneficial to establish the strictly dominated
strategies for both providers under optimal coordinated access. This allows for the
characterization of provider i’s best response strategy for any price it’s competitor
chooses. To do so we introduce two lemmas. In the first lemma for two given sec-
ondary demand values of σ1 and σ2 such that σ1 > σ2, we will demonstrate that the
revenue rate when facing higher secondary demand σ1 is never less than the revenue
rate when facing lower secondary demand σ2 (i.e., W
∗(pi, σ1) ≥ W ∗(pi, σ2)).
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Lemma 3.3.1 Let p > 0. For any σ1, σ2 such that σ1 > σ2:
W ∗(p, σ1) ≥ W ∗(p, σ2).
Proof. Consider the optimal access policy A∗(p, σ2) which yields a revenue rate of
W ∗(p, σ2) for demand σ2. Now consider a policy Aˆ(p, σ1) for demand σ1, which does
a random thinning of the secondary demand and brings it to σ2 (i.e., Aˆ(p, σ1) accepts
each arrival with probability σ2/σ1. Note that the thinned arrival process is still
Poisson (Key, 1990). Once the secondary demand is reduced, access policy A∗(p, σ2)
is implemented. Hence Aˆ(p, σ1) and A
∗(p, σ2) generate the same revenue rate, i.e.,
W (p, σ1, Aˆ) = W
∗(p, σ2).
Since by definition A∗(p, σ1) is the optimal coordinated access policy when sec-
ondary demand is σ1, we know that it does not generate a revenue less than the
revenue generated by the policy we have just described. We can formulate this con-
clusion as:
W ∗(p, σ1) ≥ W (p, σ1, Aˆ) = W ∗(p, σ2). (3.11)

In the previous lemma, we have demonstrated that an increase in secondary de-
mand does not result in a decrease in the revenue rate of a provider. In the second
lemma we will build on the previous lemma to show that when the price is set above
the break-even price, an increase in secondary demand translates into strict increase
in the revenue rate.
Lemma 3.3.2 Let p > pBE. For any σ1, σ2 such that σ1 > σ2: W
∗(p, σ1) >
W ∗(p, σ2).
Proof. We know that when the price is greater than the break-even price (i.e.,
p > pBE), an optimal admission policy will never choose the threshold value T = 0.
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Since in this lemma we only consider such prices, we can formalize this result through
the formulation
max
0≤T≤C
W (p, σ, T ) = max
1≤T≤C
W (p, σ, T ).
In Mutlu et al.’s work (Mutlu et al., 2009), it is shown that for a fixed admission
threshold value T > 0, W (p, σ, T ) is a unimodal function with respect to σ for any p.
In other words, W (p, σ, T ) is strictly increasing until is reaches a certain maximum
and strictly decreasing afterwards. We define the value of σ at which W (p, σ, T )
attains its maximum value over the interval [0, σmax] for an admission control policy
with fixed threshold T by:
σT = argmax
σ∈[0,σmax]
W (p, σ, T ). (3.12)
We define d to be the minimum of the distances between any two distinct maxima of
W (p, σ, T ) for different values of T so that
d = inf
m,n∈1,2,...,C
|σm − σn|, σm 6= σn.
Since there are a finite number of possible threshold policies, the infimum is
achieved (i.e., inf = min) and d > 0. Having defined the minimum distance be-
tween distinct maxima of two different threshold revenue functions, we will prove the
lemma by first showing that
W ∗(p, x+ ) > W ∗(p, x), ∀x ∈ [0, σmax] and  < d,
where  is a constant the value of which does not depend on the secondary demand
x.
It should be noted that the value of  does not depend on x. From the way  has
been chosen, there can be at most one distinct maximum over the interval [x, x+ ].
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(a) Case 1: σTˆ /∈ [x, x+ )
 
(b) Case 2: σTˆ ∈ [x, x+ )
Figure 3·3: Illustration of the two cases considered in the proof of
Lemma 3.3.2
In the rest of this proof, let Tˆ denote the optimal threshold value at x (if there are
more than one we can choose any). We will complete our proof by distinguishing
between two cases, as illustrated in Fig. 3·3:
Case 1: σTˆ /∈ [x, x+ ).
Given the unimodality of W (p, σ, Tˆ ), this function must be either decreasing or
increasing with respect to σ in the interval [x, x+]. Furthermore, it must also be true
that x < σTˆ . Otherwise, if x ≥ σTˆ , through the way we have defined σTˆ in Eq. (3.12)
we would have W ∗(p, x) = W (p, x, Tˆ ) < W (p, σTˆ , Tˆ ), which is a contradiction to
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Lemma 3.3.1, which we can rewrite in the following form:
W ∗(p, x) ≥ W (p, σTˆ , Tˆ ), ∀x ≥ σTˆ .
Thus W (p, σ, Tˆ ) cannot be decreasing but must be increasing in σ over the interval
[x, x+ ). By definition of optimality:
W ∗(p, x+ ) ≥ W (p, x+ , Tˆ ) > W (p, x, Tˆ ) = W ∗(p, x).
Case 2: σTˆ ∈ [x, x+ ).
W (p, σ, Tˆ ) attains its maximum value over [x, x+) at σTˆ . Given the unimodality
ofW (p, σ, Tˆ ) with respect to σ, the revenue function must be increasing on the interval
[x, σTˆ ]. Next we show that the revenue must remain increasing over [σTˆ , x + ) for
at least one other fixed threshold policy, which we prove by contradiction. Suppose
that at σ = σTˆ there exists no threshold policy under which the revenue rate is both
increasing and greater than or equal to W (p, σ, Tˆ ). Then, the revenue function under
the optimal policy must be decreasing right after σTˆ as it is continuous in σ (see also
proof of Theorem 3.3.1). This contradicts Lemma 3.3.1. Hence, there must exist at
least one other threshold policy A = T ′ such that the revenue rate under this new
threshold value W (p, σTˆ , T
′) is increasing and satisfies W (p, σTˆ , T
′) ≥ W (p, σTˆ , Tˆ ).
Since the interval [x, x+ ) contains at most one distinct maximum, W (p, x, T ′) must
remain increasing over the interval [σTˆ , x+ ). Then we can conclude
W ∗(p, x+ ) ≥ W (p, x+ , T ′) > W (p, σTˆ , T ′)
≥ W (p, σTˆ , Tˆ ) > W (p, x, Tˆ ) = W ∗(p, x).
Having shown that W ∗(p, x + ) > W ∗(p, x) for  < d under both cases, we can
finally proceed with making the connection between our proof and the lemma by first
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stating:
W ∗(p, σ1) > W ∗(p, σ1 − ) > W ∗(p, σ1 − 2) > . . . > W ∗(p, σ1 − k), (3.13)
where k is the largest integer such that σ1 − k > σ2. Since we can take any  < d,
we can choose one final ′ = σ1 − k− σ2 < d, such that:
W ∗(p, σ1 − k) = W ∗(p, σ2 + ′) > W ∗(p, σ2). (3.14)
Combining Eqs. (3.13) and (3.14) gets us:
W ∗(p, σ1) > W ∗(p, σ2).

Proceeding with the proof of our theorem, we show that as long as the price
is lowered by less than a certain amount, the relationship established in the Lemma
3.3.2 can be extended to different prices such that W ∗(p′, σ(p′)) > W ∗(p, ασ(p)) where
p′ < p.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1 Through Lemma 3.3.2 we know that the following
inequality holds:
W ∗(p, σ(p)) > W ∗(p, ασ(p)). (3.15)
For a fixed threshold value T , the revenue takes the form:
W (p, σ(p), T ) = (1−B2(λ, σ(p), T ))σ(p)p+ (1−B1(λ, σ(p), T ))λK, (3.16)
where
B1(λ, σ(p), T ) =
(λ+σ(p))TλC−T
C!∑T−1
n=0
(λ+σ(p))n
n!
+ (λ+ σ(p))T
∑C
n=T
λn−T
n!
,
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and
B2(λ, σ(p), T ) =
(λ+ σ(p))T
∑C
n=T
λn−T
n!∑T−1
n=0
(λ+σ(p))n
n!
+ (λ+ σ(p))T
∑C
n=T
λn−T
n!
,
the derivation of which is given in (Mutlu et al., 2009). Since the respective blocking
probabilities of primary secondary users B1(·) and B2(·) are a function of p through
σ(p), which is assumed to be continuous in p, we conclude from Eq. (3.16) that
W (p, σ(p), T ) is also continuous in p.
From the way we have defined the optimal access policy in Eq. (3.3), W ∗(p, σ(p))
is also continuous in p as we consider a finite set of possible values which T can take
(Kaczor and Nowak, 2001, pp. 11&135).
First let us assume that there exists a pˆ ∈ (pBE, p) such that
W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) ≥ W ∗(p, σ(p)).
Then it follows by Eq. (3.15) that
W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) > W ∗(p, ασ(p))
and p′ can be set equal to pˆ. On the other hand, assume that there exists no such
price pˆ < p for which
W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) ≥ W ∗(p, σ(p)).
This implies that the revenue is monotonically increasing for all pˆ < p such that:
W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) < W ∗(p, σ(p)). (3.17)
Then by continuity, the following can be stated for W ∗(p, σ(p)): ∀ > 0, ∃δ(, p) > 0
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s.t. if |p− pˆ| < δ then
|W ∗(p, σ(p))−W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ))| < .
Making use of Eq. (3.17) and our assumption that pˆ < p, we can remove the absolute
value from the previous equation and simplify it to:
W ∗(p, σ(p))−W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) < . (3.18)
Taking  = W ∗(p, σ(p))−W ∗(p, ασ(p)) and cancelling the terms W ∗(p, σ(p)) on both
sides of the inequality (3.18) we obtain −W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) < −W ∗(p, ασ(p)). Multiplying
both sides by −1, the equation finally takes the form W ∗(pˆ, σ(pˆ)) > W ∗(p, ασ(p))
and p′ can be set equal to pˆ. 
Theorem 3.3.1 states that if a provider profits at a given price, obtaining the
entire secondary demand at that price is strictly more profitable than obtaining part
of the demand at a slightly higher price. This property reflects an incentive for each
provider to unilaterally deviate from offering the same price as its opponent, provided
that the price is strictly above its break-even price. This best response dynamics is
illustrated in Figure 3·4 and the resulting market equilibrium is formally analyzed in
the next section.
3.4 Market Equilibrium
Having identified the best response of a network provider under coordinated access
in Theorem 3.3.1 in the previous section, we now proceed to establish the market
equilibrium. Given initial prices p1 and p2 such that pi > p
BE
i , i = 1, 2, the two
providers will lower their prices in turn. This process continues until the market price
drops so low that the provider with the higher break-even price finds himself unable
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Figure 3·4: Representation of a price war as a result of best response
dynamics under coordinated access.
to lower its price any further without incurring a net loss.
We start with a characterization for competitive equilibria in the considered sce-
nario. However, before we do that, it is important to recall the formal definition of a
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.4.1 A pricing strategy profile (p1, p2) is a Nash equilibrium for rewards
Ri(p1, p2) if and only if
R1(p1, p2) = max
p
R1(p, p2)
and
R2(p1, p2) = max
p
R2(p1, p).
Next, we provide a theorem which identifies possible market outcomes in terms of
Nash equilibria.
The first part of the theorem is concerned with the case when one provider (with-
out loss of generality provider 1) has strictly lower break-even price than the other
provider. In the theorem, we show that the provider with the lower break-even price
captures the entire market by pricing below its competitor’s break-even price. How-
ever, when the price is continuous, it is impossible to provide an exact price that
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achieves this best response. Hence, following a well-known approach used in game
theory to address this technicality (Osbourne, 2004, pages 64-67), we assume that
each provider’s price is a multiple of a sufficiently small discretization step .
Additionally, the exact value of the equilibrium price p1 depends on where provider
1’s revenue is maximized over the interval [pBE1 , p
BE
2 − ]. We formally define this
maximum as the following:
W
∗
1 = max
p∈[pBE1 ,pBE2 −]
W ∗1 (p, σ(p)). (3.19)
Note that the revenue may attain this maximum at several prices on the interval,
which we denote by the following set:
P = argmax
p∈[pBE1 ,pBE2 −]
W ∗1 (p, σ(p)). (3.20)
The other provider is unable to underbid its competition in a profitable fashion.
Hence it opts for any price that doesn’t capture the secondary demand. In the
equilibrium this price must also not give an incentive to the winner to deviate to a
higher price. We next define the lowest price provider 2 can choose for which there
exists an incentive for provider 1 to deviate from P :
pmax , arginf
pˆ≥pBE2
{
max
p∈[pBE1 ,pˆ]
W ∗1 (p, σ(p)) > W
∗
1
}
. (3.21)
If no such price exists, then we simply set pmax = ∞. Then this price effectively
limits the price choice of provider 2 from above. Setting any price above pmax creates
an incentive for provider 1 to deviate, thus disturbing the equilibrium. If provider
2 were to choose a price p2 > p
max, then what follows is that provider 1 raises its
price to this new maximizing price. However, provider 2 would then respond with
underbidding provider 1 as a result of Theorem 3.3.1.
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The second part of the theorem concerns the symmetric case when both providers
have the same break-even price. In that case the unique Nash equilibrium outcome
is defined by both providers charging their break-even prices, unable to capture the
entire market due to profitability constraints.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Nash Equilibria)
(a) If pBE1 < p
BE
2 then one or more Nash equilibria exist and have the strategy profile
(p1, p2) where
p1 ∈ P
p2 ∈ (p1, pmax),
where P is as given by Eq. (3.20) and pmax by Eq. (3.21).
(b) If pBE1 = p
BE
2 then there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium given by the strategy
profile (p1, p2) such that
p1 = p2 = p
BE
1 .
Proof. We will prove the the two parts of Theorem 3.4.1 separately, first when
pBE1 < p
BE
2 and second when p
BE
1 = p
BE
2 . Under each case, we will demonstrate
that the price pairs described in the theorem give the Nash equilibria by proving that
neither provider i = 1, 2 can increase its reward Ri(p1, p2) by employing any other
strategy profile.
Part 1 - pBE1 < p
BE
2 In a given Nash equilibrium the pricing strategy each provider
chooses is given by:
p1 ∈ P
and
p2 ∈ (p1, pmax). (3.22)
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Under these strategies provider 1’s reward is
R1(p1, p2) = W
∗
1 > W
∗
1 (p1, 0),
where W
∗
1 is given by Eq. (3.19) and W
∗
1 (p1, 0) represents the base revenue rate
provider 1 collects from the primary users in the absence of secondary users. Thus
provider 1 collects a positive revenue from capturing the entire secondary market
above its break-even price. On the other hand, provider 2 is unable to attract any
secondary demand and faces the reward:
R2(p1, p2) = W
∗
2 (p2, 0).
We first analyze the possible increases in reward when provider 2 chooses other price
strategies.
Suppose provider 2 chooses any price p′2 < p1. Then provider 2 captures the
secondary demand but since p′2 < p1 < p
BE
2 this is a non-profitable price. Hence
provider 2 choose to implement a lock-out policy which is reflected in the reward:
R2(p1, p
′
2) = W
∗
2 (p
′
2, σ(p
′
2)) = W
∗
2 (p2, 0),
by Theorem 3.2.1. Therefore R2(p1, p
′
2) = R2(p1, p2).
Now suppose provider 2 chooses any price p′2 ≥ pmax, which we have previously
defined in Eq. (3.21). This action does not change the reward of provider 2 as it
remains in a position where it capture no secondary demand. Hence, R1(p1, p
′
2) =
R1(p1, p2).
Having proven provider 2 has no incentive to deviate, we shift our focus to provider
1.
If provider 1 chooses a price p′1 > p2, this results in the loss of the secondary
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demand and its reward becomes R1(p
′
1, p2) = W
∗
1 (p
′
1, 0) = W
∗
1 (p1, 0) < R1(p1, p2).
If provider 1 chooses a price p′1 = p2, it shares the secondary demand with provider
2 and its reward becomes R1(p
′
1, p2) = W
∗
1 (p2, α1σ(p2)). By Theorem 3.3.1 there exists
an  > 0 such that:
W ∗1 (p2, α1σ(p2)) < W
∗
1 (p2 − , σ(p2 − )),
hence R1(p
′
1, p2) < R1(p1, p2).
If provider 1 chooses a price pBE2 ≤ p′1 < p2, this implies through Eq. (3.22) that
p′1 < p
max. By the definition of pmax in Eq. (3.21), for any price p′1 < p
max we have:
W ∗1 (p
′
1, σ(p
′
1)) ≤ W ∗1.
Hence R1(p
′
1, p2) = W
∗
1 (p
′
1, σ(p
′
1)) < R1(p1, p2).
If provider 1 chooses a price p′1 < p
BE
1 , it serves secondary demand at a non-
profitable price and hence faces the reward R1(p
′
1, p2) = W
∗
1 (p
′
1, σ(p
′
1)) = W
∗
1 (p1, 0) <
R1(p1, p2).
Finally, if provider 1 chooses a price p′1 ∈ [pBE1 , pBE2 − ] but p1 /∈ P , from the
way P is defined, the new reward is R1(p′1, p2) = W ∗1 (p′1, σ(p′1)) < W ∗1. Therefore
R1(p
′
1, p2) < R1(p1, p2).
Part 2 - pBE1 = p
BE
2 Since both providers are identical, we will only consider
provider 1. Also, for the sake of notational simplicity we will drop the index on the
break-even price and denote it by pBE. Provider 1, when at the Nash equilibrium,
chooses the price strategy p1 = p
BE and faces the reward R1(p1, p2) = W
∗
1 (p1, 0).
We fix provider 2’s strategy to p2 = p
BE and demonstrate that provider 1’s reward
does not improve by choosing any other action pair.
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If provider 1 chooses a pricing strategy p′1 > p
BE, it faces a reward R1(p
′
1, p2) =
W ∗1 (p1, 0) = R1(p1, p2).
If provider 1 chooses any pricing strategy p′1 < p
BE, by definition of pBE it faces
a reward R1(p
′
1, p2) = W
∗
1 (p1, σ(p1)) = W
∗
1 (p1, 0) = R1(p1, p2).
Because of provider symmetry, the same proof follows for player 2.
Therefore the only Nash equilibrium is given by the price pair pBE1 = p
BE
2 , from
which uniqueness also follows since the break-even price of each provider is unique.
Having shown that under both cases Nash equilibria exist and can not be different
from what is stated in Theorem 3.4.1, we conclude our proof. 
The following two examples aim to illustrate that qualitative differences in the
placement of Nash equilibria are governed by the secondary demand function σ(p).
These examples are based on demand functions commonly used in the economics lit-
erature that are respectively exponentially and linearly decreasing with price (Talluri
and Ryzin, 2004).
Example 3.4.1 Suppose that the secondary demand function follows a negative
exponential demand σ(p) = 10e−0.2p, which indicates sufficiently low price elasticity
of demand so that the revenue rate remains increasing with price. We set the network
parameters for both providers as:
(λ1, C1, K1) = (1, 2, 20), (λ2, C2, K2) = (10, 5, 35),
which, through Eq. (3.9), yield pBE1 = 4.00, p
BE
2 = 19.74. Figure 3·5(a) demonstrates
the low-elasticity property of provider 1’s revenue rate function, W ∗1 (p1, σ(p1)). The
revenue rate is clearly maximized when the price is p1 = 19.74− , at a price slightly
below the other provider’s break-even price.
Example 3.4.2 In this example we consider a linear demand function σ(p) = 10−
0.5p. The network parameters and thus the break-even price are the same as in the
previous example, which we omit. Under this new and faster decreasing demand
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Figure 3·5: Different reward maximizing prices as provided in Exam-
ples 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
function, we plot the revenue rate in Figure 3·5(b). The revenue rate achieves its
maximum at p1 = 15.76 after which it demonstrates high-elasticity and starts to
decrease with price. This results in the revenue maximizing price being less than
pBE2 = 19.74. Therefore, facing such demand provider 1 would lower its price further
below even though its competitor cannot match it without incurring a net loss, which
demonstrates our result stated in Theorem 3.4.1(b).
Comparison with classical Bertrand duopoly. Theorem 3.4.1 essentially asserts
that the equilibrium outcome of competition for secondary demand is a price war.
Price wars are also typical outcomes in the classical Bertrand duopoly, hence it is
worthwhile to put the two settings in perspective. In the Bertrand game, for a given
price, both the revenue and the cost are linear functions of demand. In contrast, in the
present setting neither revenue nor cost of secondary service are linear in secondary
demand, primarily because both quantities rely heavily on blocking probabilities that
are highly nonlinear in the demand. In addition, the Bertrand model precludes any
capacity constraints and assumes that all demand can be satisfied, whereas the model
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of this chapter is centered on a fundamental limitation in capacity. Yet, interestingly,
the equilibrium of the present game resembles (and, depending on the secondary
demand function, may be identical to) the outcome of a Bertrand game in which
marginal cost is constant and equal to the break-even price.
This similarity is a consequence of two nontrivial properties established in the
present chapter: (i) insensitivity of break-even price against secondary demand, and
(ii) Theorem 3.3.1, which indicates that having more secondary demand is always
more favorable provided that secondary service is priced above break-even price. Both
properties, however, rely on the assumption of optimal coordination of secondary
access and does not necessarily extend to arbitrary access policies, as illustrated in
the sequel.
Extension to multiple providers. Equilibrium strategy profiles given in Theo-
rem 3.4.1 can be generalized to an arbitrary number of providers competing for the
secondary demand, each with their own primary users, capacities and primary user
rewards: Consider N such providers and let pBEi continue to represent the break-even
price of provider i. Without any loss of generality, let us re-index the providers if
necessary so that: pBE1 ≤ pBE2 ≤ pBE3 ≤ . . . ≤ pBEN .
Further we define n = max{i : pBEi = pBE1 }. Hence n is the number of providers
that share the lowest break-even price. We generalize the two cases presented in
Theorem 3.4.1:
• If n > 1 then any price profile (p1, p2, · · · , pN) such that
pi = p
BE
1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n
and
pi > p
BE
1 for i = n+ 1, n+ 2, · · · , N.
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is a Nash equilibrium. In each such equilibrium providers 1, 2, · · · , n service the
secondary demand at their break-even prices thereby generating no additional
profit. The secondary demand is split among these providers according to an
arbitrary probability vector [α1, α2, ..., αn−1, αn] where
∑n
i αi = 1, αi > 0, which
has no bearing on equilibrium prices. The remaining N −n providers are not able
to capture any secondary demand.
• If n = 1 then there is a single provider whose break-even price is lower than all
the rest. In equilibrium this provider captures the entire secondary demand at
a strictly profitable price, while the remaining N − 1 providers cannot serve any
secondary demand. In particular Nash equilibria have the form:
p1 ∈ P ,
and
pi ≥ pBEi for i = 2, · · · , N,
and at least one provider j 6= 1 chooses a price such that pj < pmax, where pmax is
defined as in Eq. (3.21), so that there is no incentive for provider 1 to deviate from
P .
Quality of Service. QoS plays an important role wireless services. In this chapter,
QoS is implicitly captured through the implementation of a coordinated access policy.
Under this policy, the QoS experienced by primary users will naturally be higher than
that experienced by secondary users, since the provider reserves a certain part of its
network capacity for the exclusive use of primary users. A possible refinement of the
model is through the introduction of penalties. Specifically, whenever a provider is
unable to accommodate a service request of an incoming user, it would compensate
the blocked user by paying a fee (or giving a discount). If the penalty is imposed only
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when primary users are blocked (secondary access is opportunistic, and therefore has
no associated penalties when blocked), then our results still hold through a similar
analysis.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we analyzed the implementation of coordinated access, for which we
demonstrated that the optimal access policy is of threshold type. We showed that
each provider has a unique break-even price, above which profitability is guaranteed
regardless of the secondary user demand response. We provided an explicit analytical
formula for the break-even price, thus establishing its relationship with the system
parameters (i.e., the primary load, primary reward, and system capacity). The break-
even price of each provider is independent of the system parameters of other providers.
Interestingly, the break-even price is, in general, significantly smaller than the primary
reward. Thus, the break-even price is less than 1% of the primary reward if the
primary load is below 68% and the number of channels C exceeds 32. Even at the
critical load where the primary load is equal to the system capacity (i.e., λ = C), the
break-even price remains below 20% of the primary reward for C ≥ 16.
Next, using the notion of Nash equilibrium, we formalized the possible outcomes
resulting from a non-cooperative game in which optimal coordinated access is im-
plemented by two or more network providers. We explained how the best response
dynamics of each provider reflect a price war, in which each provider is driven into
advertising a price slightly below that of its competitors as long as this price is above
the break-even price. This price war leads to a single provider (that with the lowest
break-even price) capturing the entire secondary spectrum market. Although the de-
mand function does not play a role in determining the identity of the winning provider,
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we showed that is does affects the revenue-maximizing price for that provider and the
placement of the Nash equilibria. In the case of multiple providers sharing the same
lowest break-even price, the game results in a market equilibrium in which none of
the providers make profits.
Chapter 4
Uncoordinated Access
In this chapter we reconsider the question profitable pricing of secondary access and
competition between network providers under an uncoordinated access setting. We
first consider the implementation of such a policy under the stochastic nature of
network traffic which was utilized in the previous chapter. Under the stochastic
model we demonstrate that the break-even price and market outcomes, unlike in the
coordinated access case, highly depend on the specific shape of the secondary demand
function and therefore an analysis is difficult to conduct. We therefore present a
fluid approximation to model network traffic. Using this approximation model, we
establish profitability conditions and equilibrium outcomes. In addition to the break-
even price, uncoordinated access results in a market-sharing price which is a measure
of providers’ willingness to share the secondary demand in equilibrium. We start the
chapter with the uncoordinated access under stochastic traffic.
4.1 Uncoordinated Access with Stochastic Traffic
In this section we consider equilibrium regimes that arise when competing providers
grant uncoordinated access to secondary demand. We shall argue that such equilibria
can be drastically different than those under an optimal coordinated access.
Under uncoordinated access, a provider does not differentiate between primary and
Results presented in this chapter appear in part in (Kavurmacioglu et al., 2014a),(Kavurmacioglu
et al., 2014b),(Kavurmacioglu et al., 2014c).
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secondary users in granting spectrum access requests. In turn, both types of users
experience the same blocking probability. This probability depends on the aggregate
demand and system capacity, and can be computed using standard techniques in
teletraffic. Namely, when provider i serves secondary demand σ, the two blocking
probabilities are
Bi,2(λi, σ, Ai) = Bi,1(λi, σ, Ai) = E(λi + σ,Ci),
where E(λi + σ,C) is the Erlang-B formula.
The revenue rate of provider i, when serving secondary demand σ by charging pi
per admitted request, is then given by
Wˆi(pi, σ) = (1− E(λi + σ,Ci))σpi + (1− E(λi + σ,Ci))λiKi, (4.1)
where the first term corresponds to the reward rate collected from secondary users that
gain admission to the network, while the second term corresponds to the reward rate
collected from the serviced primary users. (Here and in the rest of this section we will
consistently use the symbolˆto indicate the quantities associated with uncoordinated
access.) Once again, for analyses in which we consider a single provider, we will drop
index i from our notation for the sake of simplicity.
4.1.1 Profitability
We recognize Wˆ (p, 0) as the revenue rate of a provider when it does not serve any
secondary demand. Similar to the profitability conditions for the optimal coordinated
access case stated in Theorem 3.2.1, note that
Wˆ (p, σ(p)) ≥ Wˆ (p, 0) (4.2)
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Figure 4·1: Revenue rates under optimal coordinated and uncoordi-
nated access versus secondary demand - network parameters: pi = 30,
λi = 13, Ci = 20 and Ki = 50.
if and only if p ≥ pˆBE, where pˆBE satisfies:
pˆBE =
(E(λ+ σ(pˆBE), C)− E(λ,C))λK
(1− E(λ+ σ(pˆBE), C))σ(pˆBE) . (4.3)
Hence the provider incurs loss and has no incentive to serve the secondary de-
mand at a price below pˆBE. In turn pˆBE is the break-even price of a provider under
uncoordinated access.
It is instructive to compare the break-even prices under uncoordinated access and
optimal coordinated access. Firstly, pˆBE ≥ pBE because if the optimal admission
policy does not yield positive profit from secondary demand then neither does any
other policy. For typical parameters this inequality is strict. Consequently, providers
need to charge a higher price to secondary users in order to avoid a net loss, which
results in the tendency to bid higher prices under uncoordinated access. Secondly,
in contrast to pBE, the break-even price pˆBE for uncoordinated access is given by an
implicit equation that depends on the secondary demand σ(p).
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4.1.2 Market Sharing
While we established in Lemma 3.3.1 that market sharing is not favorable under
optimal coordinated access, these results do not necessarily extend to a case when
uncoordinated access is implemented. As a matter of fact, under an uncoordinated
access implementation, whether the revenue rate increases or decreases by sharing
secondary demand depends on another critical parameter we shall establish later.
Before we get into our analysis, it is insightful to compare how the revenue rates
Wˆ (p, σ) and W ∗(p, σ) behave under uncoordinated and optimal coordinated access
strategies. Figure 4·1 illustrates the two revenue rates for a range of secondary de-
mand σ ,when all other parameters are fixed. When plotting both revenue rates,
the secondary price p is chosen above both break-even prices so that the optimal
revenue rate W ∗(p, σ) is strictly increasing in σ. As a by-product of optimality,
W ∗(p, σ) ≥ Wˆ (p, σ) under all circumstances.
However, Wˆ (p, σ) has an important qualitative difference relative to its optimal
counterpart: It increases for a range of secondary demand σ and decreases afterwards.
This happens because for small σ, secondary users enhance revenue by using the
leftover capacity from primary users, but as σ increases secondary access occurs at an
increasing expense of primary access and that leads to a decline in revenue if primary
users are more valuable (that is, if p < K). This property opens the possibility
that Wˆ (p, ασ) > Wˆ (p, σ), in which case a provider has incentive to share secondary
demand at prices higher than break-even. Consequently, it has a profound impact on
the outcome of a competitive setting.
To formalize this intuition let us define pMS as the solution to the following:
p =
(E(λ+ σ(p), C)− E(λ+ ασ(p), C))λK
(1− E(λ+ σ(p), C))σ(p)− (1− E(λ+ ασ(p)))ασ(p) . (4.4)
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It can be verified directly from Eq. (4.1) that:
Wˆ (p, ασ(p))

> Wˆ (p, σ(p)) for p < pMS
≤ Wˆ (p, σ(p)) for p ≥ pMS.
(4.5)
Thus, only up to the price value pMS, any provider would benefit from a reduction
in its secondary demand. The price pMS can be interpreted as a market sharing
threshold for the provider: Any price above this threshold renders secondary demand
too valuable to share and warrants a price war. Below this threshold, the provider
has an incentive to remain at an equilibrium that reflects market sharing, provided
the price satisfies the initial profitability condition in Eq. (4.2), which translates to
being above the break-even price pˆBE.
4.1.3 Profitable Sharing Interval
In this section, we seek to determine the relationship between the maximum market
sharing price pMS and the break-even price pˆBE. In particular, if one can show that
one price is always greater than the other, this can greatly simplify the results by
ruling out or strictly establishing a preference to share the secondary market before
making a negative profit. We present our results in the next theorem for the special
case of fixed demand (we later present numerical evidence that similar results should
hold for elastic demand):
Lemma 4.1.1 For a fixed secondary demand such that σ(p) = σ, the following price
relationships always hold under an uncoordinated access policy:
pˆBE ≤ pMS < K. (4.6)
Proof.
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a) First, we prove pˆBE ≤ pMS. Through Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) we can rewrite this
inequality in the following form:
1− E(λ+ σ(p), C)
E(λ+ σ(p), C)− E(λ,C) ·
E(λ+ σ(p), C)− E(λ+ ασ(p), C)
1− E(λ+ σ(p), C)− α− αE(λ+ ασ(p), C)≥1. (4.7)
Next, using the well-known recursive equation of the Erlang-B formula (Krishnan,
Sep):
E(λ,C) =
λE(λ,C − 1)
C + λE(λ,C − 1) ,
we can expand Eq. (4.7) and after some algebra and regrouping of the terms, we can
show that the inequality pˆBE ≤ pMS is equivalent to demonstrating that:
α(λ+ σ)E(λ+ σ,C − 1) + (1− α)λE(λ,C − 1) ≥ (λ+ ασ)E(λ+ ασ,C − 1).
(4.8)
Define gC−1(λ) = λ·E(λ,C−1), which represents the traffic loss rate when the arrival
process is Poisson with rate λ. For Eq. (4.8) to hold we need:
αgC−1(λ+ σ) + (1− α)gC−1(λ) ≥ gC−1(λ+ ασ). (4.9)
Once can observe that Eq. (4.9) is by definition the convexity condition on the
traffic loss as a function of the arrival rate, which is proven in (Krishnan, Sep).
Therefore, pˆBE ≤ pMS.
b) We now show that the market sharing price is always less than the primary
reward, i.e., pMS < K. Recalling Eq. (4.4), this is equivalent to the following:
(E(λ+ σ,C)− E(λ+ ασ,Ci))λ
(1− E(λ+ σ,C))σ − (1− E(λ+ ασ))ασ < 1.
After some rearrangement of the terms and substituting gC(λ) for λ ·E(λ,C), the
inequality takes the form:
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gC(λ+ σ)− gC(λ+ ασ) < σ(1− α).
Upon careful observation, this inequality condition holds if one can show that:
g′C(λ) =
dgC(λ)
dλ
< 1. (4.10)
In the paper (Krishnan, Sep), it has been demonstrated that g′C(λ) ≤ 1 for C ≥ 0.
The equality condition stems from the fact that the induction proof starts from C = 0,
for which gC(λ) = λ and hence g
′
C(λ) = 1. If one would start the induction from
C = 1, using the following recursive formulation of gC(λ)
gC(λ) =
λgC−1(λ)
C + λgC−1
, (4.11)
provided in (Krishnan, Sep), one can show that g1(λ) = λ
2/1 +λ. Taking the deriva-
tive with respect to λ,
g′1(λ) =
λ2 + 2λ
λ2 + 2λ+ 1
< 1. (4.12)
Then following the same steps as in (Krishnan, Sep) one can show that g′C(λ) < 1 for
C ≥ 1, which establishes Eq. (4.10). 
Lemma 4.1.1 establishes a fundamental relationship between the break-even and
market sharing prices and the primary reward K, thus proving the existence of a
profitable market sharing price interval. This interval plays a critical role in defining
the market outcomes, as we shall demonstrate in the next section.
4.1.4 Equilibrium
Competitive equilibria under uncoordinated access can now be determined depending
on the critical price values pˆBEi and p
MS
i of all providers i. Figure 4·2 illustrates a
particular placement of these parameters for two providers. In the illustrated setting,
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Figure 4·2: Point (A) represents the Nash equilibrium under optimal
coordinated access, and the continuum of points in (B) is the set of
Nash equilibria under uncoordinated access.
the market sharing intervals [pˆBE1 , p
MS
1 ] and [pˆ
BE
2 , p
MS
2 ] have a non-empty intersec-
tion; therefore there exist common price values that are above break-even values and
acceptable for market sharing for both providers. In turn, there is a continuum of
equilibria strictly above the break-even prices.
We conclude this section with a numerical example concerning a symmetric set-
ting.
Example 4.1.1 We consider two network providers with identical parameters: Pri-
mary arrival rate λi = 13, capacity Ci = 20, and revenue collected per serviced
primary user Ki = 50. We continue to assume inelastic secondary demand whose
value is chosen to be σ = 20. We assume that secondary demand splits equally in the
case of equal prices, that is, α1 = α2 = 0.5.
The break-even price for coordinated access is computed as 0.91; hence by The-
orem 3.4.1 the unique price equilibrium under coordinated access is p1 = p2 = 0.91
and no provider profits from secondary demand.
The break-even price for uncoordinated access is pˆBEi = 23.46 and the market
sharing threshold is pMSi = 34.11. Hence, any price profile (p, p) where p lies in the
interval [23.46, 34.11] constitutes a competitive equilibrium. For example, if provider
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Access Policy Equilibrium price Equilibrium profit
Coordinated p1 = p2 = 0.91 P1 = P2 = 0
Uncoordinated 23.46 ≤ pˆ1 = pˆ2 ≤ 34.11 0 ≤ Pˆ1 = Pˆ2 ≤ 121.54
Table 4.1: Equilibrium prices and resulting profits for the setting
considered in Example 4.1.1.
−i adopts the secondary price p−i = 30 then
Ri(p1, p2) =
 Wˆi(pi, σ) = 74.66 if pi = 29.99Wˆi(pi, 0.5σ) = 90.01 if pi = 30
Wˆi(pi, 0) = 0 if pi > 30,
In particular pi = 30 is the best response of provider i; and so the price profile
(30, 30) is a Nash equilibrium. A comparison of possible equilibria and associated
profits under both access strategies is given in Table 4.1. It is worth noting that in
the coordinated access policy, the price war drives the profits of both provider to zero
by lowering the prices to the break-even price, which is the same for each provider.
On the other hand, uncoordinated access gives a range of prices yielding positive
profits in the sharing interval. Note that profit from primary users is not included in
either case.
Interestingly, an uncoordinated access policy, which is sub-optimal to implement
for a provider in isolation, results in competitive equilibria in which all providers are
strictly better off than resorting to their optimal individual policies.
Example 4.1.2 This time, we consider an elastic demand to demonstrate that our
results extend beyond inelastic secondary demand. Once again there are two network
providers with identical parameters: Primary arrival rate λi = 30, capacity Ci = 50,
and revenue collected per serviced primary user Ki = 50. We assume a secondary
demand that is exponentially decreasing with the price σ(p) = 80e−0.02p. We assume
that secondary demand splits equally in the case of equal prices, that is, α1 = α2 =
0.5.
The break-even price for coordinated access is computed as 0.01; hence by The-
orem 3.4.1 the unique price equilibrium under coordinated access is p1 = p2 = 0.01
and no provider profits from secondary demand.
The break-even price for uncoordinated access is pˆBEi = 20.06 and the market
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sharing threshold is pMSi = 33.39. Hence, any price profile (p, p) where p lies in the
interval [20.06, 33.39] constitutes a competitive equilibrium. The same arguments
discussed within Example 4.1.1 also apply here.
4.2 Fluid Approximation Model
In the previous section we have shown that the analysis of profitability and market
equilibrium under stochastic traffic is highly dependent on the shape of the secondary
demand function. In this section we relax the stochastic nature of the traffic and
assume a fluid approximation model. We start with the description of the fluid
model.
Consider two spectrum providers, where each provider i has a capacity Ci and
a primary demand of volume λi, which generates a revenue of Ki units per service.
These providers compete for a stream of secondary demand, whose volume depends
of their pricing of secondary service as illustrated in Figure 4·31. We assume a traffic
model where if provider i receives a total demand of volume λi, then it can accommo-
date the volume min(Ci, λi). The excess demand max(λi − Ci, 0) does not generate
any revenue for the provider.
The total demand for provider i consists of its primary demand λi and, depending
on its pricing and the pricing of its competitor, a secondary demand σi. We shall
assume that the two demand types access the capacity in an uncoordinated fashion,
as suggested by documentation on private commons (Buddhikot, 2007)2. In this
context, primary users could be viewed as high paying legacy users rather than users
with higher priority. Specifically, the two types of demand share capacity on equal
1In order to keep the model generic, we shall not adopt a particular choice of units for capacity
and demand at this point. Rather, we provide a discussion of possible choices at the end of this
section.
2While the model considered in this chapter is applicable in Private Commons, it does not
necessarily represent the only way to implement it.
60
 
λ1 λ2 σ(p) 
C2 C1 
Figure 4·3: Market model: Two providers i = 1, 2, each with capac-
ity Ci and fixed primary demand λi, compete for secondary demand
stipulated by a general function of price p, σ(p).
basis, such that if the demand of provider i is composed of two types with respective
volumes λi and σi, then the overflow volume of each type is proportional to the
intensity of demand of that type. That is, in view of our previous assumption, a
fraction min
(
1, Ci
λi+σi
)
of each type of demand is actually accommodated. The steady-
state primary and secondary demands, λi and σi, and the overflow assumption are
consistent with fluid models. Such models have widely been used in the literature to
characterize network traffic at the flow level (Kelly and Williams, 2004).
We denote the price that provider i charges per unit of serviced secondary demand
by pi. The volume of the secondary demand is assumed to be determined by the
minimum price min(p1, p2) stipulated by the two providers. Specifically, the volume of
secondary demand is σ(min(p1, p2)), where σ(·) is the demand function. We make the
mild assumption that this function is differentiable and non-increasing ( ∂
∂p
σ(p) ≤ 0).
We shall also assume that there exists a positive demand when the service is offered
for free (σ(0) > 0) and the demand eventually becomes zero as the price becomes
arbitrarily high ( lim
p→∞
σ(p) = 0).
It is assumed that the secondary demand is attracted to the provider that charges
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the lowest price. This behavior can be explained by price aversion, a concept em-
ployed in marketing management (Tellis and Gaeth, 1990). In the case when both
providers charge the same price, the resulting secondary demand splits between the
two providers according to an arbitrary but fixed probability vector α = [α1, α2] such
that α1+α2 = 1 and αi > 0, i = 1, 2 . Namely, in that case, each provider i receives a
secondary demand of volume αiσ(pi). We will relax this assumption in Section 4.2.3,
where instead of being randomly assigned the secondary demand will be split between
the providers according to the accommodation levels.
If provider i receives a secondary demand of volume σ(pi), its overall revenue is
given by:
Wi(pi, σ(pi))
4
= piσ(pi) min
1, Ci
λi + σ(pi)
+Kiλi min
1, Ci
λi + σ(pi)
 . (4.13)
In this case, the secondary profit (i.e., increment in revenue from secondary access)
of the provider is:
Πi(pi, σ(pi))
4
= Wi(pi, σ(pi))−Wi(0, 0). (4.14)
Since the secondary demand that a provider receives depends on the prices of
both providers, so does the profit of the provider. We define the reward Ri(pi, p−i) of
provider i as its profit when it charges secondary access pi and its competitor charges
p−i units. Namely,
Ri(pi, p−i)
4
=

Πi(pi, σ(pi)) if pi < p−i
Πi(pi, αiσ(pi)) if pi = p−i
Πi(pi, 0) if pi > p−i.
In the interest of space, the discussion of the fluid model in this dissertation is
limited to the case when each provider’s network is underloaded prior to inclusion
of any secondary demand, that is λi < Ci, but can be overloaded for low enough
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prices, that is λi+σ(0) > Ci. Though the omitted cases warrant their own respective
analyses, those are arguably less challenging and practical. For instance, consider the
case when the maximum possible total demand does not exceed the network capacity
(i.e., λi + σ(0) ≤ Ci). Since we assume that the secondary demand is non-increasing
with price pi advertised by the provider, the maximum secondary demand is given
by σ(0). If the maximum secondary demand generated by a zero price value does
not exceed provider i’s capacity such that λi + σ(0) ≤ Ci then it is also true that
λi + σ(pi) ≤ Ci for all price values pi ≥ 0. Then the network can accommodate
the entire secondary demand at any price without losing any revenue collected from
primary traffic.
On the other hand, if the primary demand already exceeds the capacity (i.e.,
λi ≥ Ci), the network provider is already having difficulties in serving the primary
traffic and is incurring an opportunity cost of the unserviced traffic volume. Then the
revenue brought in by secondary demand would need to match or exceed the revenue
per serviced primary demand (i.e., pi ≥ Ki) in order to have the network provider
profitably replace some of its original traffic.
Discussion We provide next a possible interpretation of our model. The service
capacity Ci can represent the number of sub-carriers in an OFDM modulation scheme
used in LTE or the number of radio channels3 available for assignment for voice
or data traffic in common 3G standards (Paul et al., 2011). The steady primary
and secondary demands, λi and σ(p), and the overflow assumption are consistent
with fluid models (Anick et al., 1982). Such models have widely been used in the
literature to characterize network traffic at the flow level (Fred et al., 2001; Kelly and
Williams, 2004; Hassidim et al., 2013). This assumption is substantiated by traffic
3This radio channel refers to any radio resource allocated to the user such as code, frequency or
time slot.
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measurements in cellular networks, which show that mean arrival rates do not show
significant variations over the course of an hour (Paul et al., 2011; Willkomm et al.,
2008). Obviously, specific values of λi and σ(p) depend on the hour of the day or day
of the week.
4.2.1 Characteristic Prices and Market Sharing Interval
In this section we present two characteristic prices and demand-invariant price rela-
tionships in a secondary spectrum markets. This section focuses on the viewpoint of
a single provider. Therefore for simplicity, we omit the use of index i from of our
notation throughout this section.
We define the break-even price pBE(α) as the price at which the profit of a
provider is zero when it attracts a fraction 0 < α ≤ 1 of the total demand, namely
Π(pBE, ασ(pBE)) = 0. We start off by providing a formal definition of a break-even
price:
Definition 4.2.1 (Break-Even Price) A price pBE(α) ≥ 0 is called a break-even
price if it satisfies the following conditions:
Π(pBE, ασ(pBE)) = 0 and ασ(pBE) > 0.
Note that the latter condition in the above definition is to rule out any price that
does not generate any secondary demand.
We next define the market sharing price pMS(α), that asserts whether a provider
finds it desirable to share the secondary demand or not. Specifically, let
∆W (p) , W (p, ασ(p))−W (p, σ(p)).
Definition 4.2.2 (Market Sharing Price) A price pMS(α) ≥ 0 is called a market
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sharing price if the following is true:
∆W (p) = 0 for p = pMS(α).
These two prices characterize two important incentives for a network provider. We
will show that the break-even price determines provider profitability, where any price
set greater is guaranteed to result in a positive profit. We will also establish that,
analogous to the relationship between the break-even price and provider profitability,
a provider finds it undesirable to share the secondary demand at prices above the
market sharing price, whereas the opposite is true for prices below the market sharing
price. Having defined the break-even and market sharing prices, we can proceed with
stating our main results in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.1 (Market Sharing Interval) For any secondary demand function,
satisfying the assumptions described in Section 4.2 and for all values of α : 0 < α ≤ 1,
there exists a price interval
(P) ≡ (pBE(α), pMS(α)),
such that for all p ∈ (P):
1. Π(p, σ(p)) > 0,
2. Π(p, ασ(p)) > Π(p, σ(p)).
Theorem 4.2.1 states that no matter the specific shape of a secondary demand
function, the existence of the price interval (P) at which a network provider is prof-
itable and finds it preferable to share the secondary demand is guaranteed. In order
to prove Theorem 4.2.1 we will first provide formulations for break-even and market
sharing prices in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.1 respectively. Afterwards, we bring the proof
of Theorem 4.2.1 in Section 4.2.1.
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Profitability and Break-Even Price
In this section we seek to analyze a provider’s profit and the resulting break-even
price. Our result applies both to the cases when a network provider serves the entire
secondary demand (i.e., α = 1) and when it shares the market with another provider
(i.e, α < 1).
Since a break-even price is a measure of a provider’s competitive ability in a price
war, characterizing this price is important. The following lemma restricts the price
interval on which a break-even price when the provider captures the entire secondary
demand (i.e., monopoly) lies:
Lemma 4.2.1 For a given α such that λ+ασ(0) > C, there exists a price p¯α, which
is the minimum price that satisfies ασ(p) = C−λ. Then, any break-even price pBE(α)
satisfies the following inequality:
1. pBE(α) ≤ p¯α for any demand function σ(p).
2.
λ+ ασ(pBE(α)) ≥ C. (4.15)
Proof.The existence of p¯α follows from the assumption λ + ασ(0) > C and that
the demand is non-increasing with the limit lim
p→∞
σ(p) = 0.
(1) Let p′ be such a price that ασ(p′) + λ ≤ C. Since we know that secondary
demand is non-increasing in p it also follows that p′ must satisfy the following in-
equality: p′ ≥ p¯α. We know that setting price equal to p′ results in a non-negative
profit since by Eq.’s (4.13) and (4.14) we have that:
Π(p′, ασ(p′)) = ασ(p′)p′ ≥ 0.
Given that any price greater than or equal p¯α yields a non-negative profit for a
provider, we can conclude that p¯α is an upper bound on the break-even price pBE(α)
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(i.e., pBE(α) ≤ p¯α).
(2) From part 1 of our proof we know that:
pBE(α) ≤ p¯α.
Then, through our assumption that the secondary demand is non-increasing in p, the
following is also true:
ασ(pBE(α)) ≥ ασ(p¯α). (4.16)
Thus, from Eq. (4.16) and the definition of p¯α we obtain: λ+ ασ(pBE(α)) ≥ C. 
An intuitive explanation to Lemma 4.2.1 is that for all prices p such that λ +
ασ(p) < C, the overflow of either type of demand is zero. Thus, there is no associated
penalty with serving additional secondary demand. However, once the excess demand
becomes positive, a provider observes a trade-off between the revenue brought in by
the secondary demand versus the potential revenue lost from the unserviced primary
demand. The break-even price reflects the price at which both sides of this trade-off
are equal.
Lemma 4.2.1 demonstrates that for all such values of α, including the monopolistic
case when α = 1, we can limit our analysis to those prices that satisfy (4.15). At these
prices the fraction of both types of demand being accommodated is C/(λ + ασ(p)).
Then, we can remove the min operators from Eq. (4.13) and simplify Eq. (4.14) for
the profit as follows:
Π(p, ασ(p)) = ασ(p)p · C
λ+ ασ(p)
+ λK
(
C
λ+ ασ(p)
− 1
)
. (4.17)
The following theorem, leveraging our previous results from Lemma 4.2.1 and
Eq. (4.17), provides an equation that allows the computation of the break-even price
pBE(α) for the aforementioned values of α. The theorem also establishes the unique-
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ness of this price and the region of profitable prices.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Break-Even Price)
1. For a given 0 < α ≤ 1, such that λ+ ασ(0) > C:
(a) A break-even price pBE(α) is a solution to the following equation4:
p =
(ασ(p) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(p)
. (4.18)
(b) The break-even price pBE(α) is unique.
(c) The profit of a provider is such that:
Π(p, ασ(p)) > 0 if p > pBE(α)
Π(p, ασ(p)) < 0 if p < pBE(α).
2. For a given 0 < α < 1, such that λ + ασ(0) ≤ C, the break-even price pBE(α)
is 0.
Proof. (1) (a) We know that at a break-even price the profit is given by Eq.
(4.17). In order to ensure Π(p, ασ(p)) = 0, it can be verified through simple algebra
that a price p needs to satisfy the following equation:
p =
(ασ(p) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(p)
.
Furthermore, we know that at price pBE(α), secondary demand will be positive
by combining inequality (4.16) and the fact that λ < C:
σ(pBE(α)) ≥ σ(p¯) = C − λ > 0.
(b) We will proceed by demonstrating that the left hand side of Eq. (4.18) is
strictly increasing with respect to p and the right hand side is non-increasing with
4This implicit equation can be solved with well-established fixed point iterations, such as Newton’s
Method.
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respect to p, hence meaning that this equality only holds at a single value of p. Since
the left hand side of Eq. (4.18) is p itself, we only need to prove that the right hand
side is non-increasing. Under the assumption that σ(p) is a differentiable and non-
increasing function of p, taking the derivative of the right hand side with respect to
p yields:
∂
∂p
(
(ασ(p) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(p)
)
=
(
1
ασ(p)
− λ+ ασ(p)− C
α2σ2(p)
)
ασ′(p)
(
λK
C
)
=
(
C − λ
α2σ2(p)
)
ασ′(p)
(
λK
C
)
≤ 0. (4.19)
Eq. (4.19) holds because λ < C and σ′(pBE(α)) ≤ 0.
We also know that the lhs of Eq. (4.18) is continuous in p, which follows from the
differentiability of the secondary demand σ(p). Therefore, there can only be at most
one solution for pBE(α) that satisfies Eq. (4.18).
(c) From Eq. (4.17), it can verified that in order for Π(p, ασ(p)) > 0 to hold, p
needs to satisfy the following inequality:
p >
(ασ(p) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(p)
.
In part (b) of our proof, we have demonstrated that the right hand side of Eq. (4.18)
is non-increasing with respect to p. Therefore for p′ > pBE(α):
(ασ(pBE(α)) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(pBE(α))
≥ (ασ(p
′) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(p′)
.
Then, since pBE(α) is the only value that satisfies Eq. (4.18),
p′ > pBE(α) =
(ασ(pBE(α)) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(pBE(α))
≥ (ασ(p
′) + λ− C)λK
Cασ(′p)
.
To show that Π(p′, ασ(p′)) < 0 when p′ < pBE(α), the same argument follows in the
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reverse direction.
(2) For a given 0 < α < 1, such that λ + ασ(0) ≤ C, Eq. (4.14) simplifies to the
following:
Π(p, ασ(p)) = pασ(p).
Since σ(0) > 0 by assumption, the only price that satisfies both equations provided
Definition 4.2.1 is p = 0. 
In the next lemma, we establish a useful bound on the break-even price pBE(1).
Lemma 4.2.2 The break-even price when not sharing the secondary demand ( i.e.,
α = 1) is strictly smaller than the revenue generated by primary demand:
pBE(1) < K.
Proof. We can check this claim by taking a look at the right hand side of Eq.
(4.18):
(σ(p) + λ− C)λK
Cσ(p)
.
In order for the claim to hold, we need (σ(p) + λ− C)λ < Cσ(p), which can be
rewritten as: λ(λ + σ(p)) < C(λ + σ(p)). This is true under our initial assumption
λ < C. 
In general, there is no explicit expression for the break-even price for general
demand functions. However, it allows us to characterize two distinct price regimes by
identifying whether or not a price p generates a profit for the provider for any amount
of secondary demand. We next provide an example with a simple demand function,
where obtaining an explicit expression is rather straightforward.
Example 4.2.1 We illustrate the relationship between the break-even price when α =
1 (i.e., one provider captures the entire secondary demand) and network parameters
under a constant elasticity secondary demand function, σ(p) = σ0
p
, where σ0 > 0 is a
constant.
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Figure 4·4: Market sharing revenue change regions in Theorem 4.2.3
with respect to the market sharing price pMS(α).
Under this given demand we can simplify Eq. (4.18) and obtain the following
explicit formula:
pBE(1) =
σ0λK
Cσ0 + λK(C − λ) . (4.20)
We have effectively formulated and characterized the unique break-even price
that determines a network provider’s profitability. However, profitability alone is
not enough to determine a market outcome. As was explained in the network model
section, matching prices affects the reward a provider faces in a non-linear fashion.
In the next section, we take into account the results of a provider choosing to share
the market.
Market Sharing
We now turn our attention to the effects market sharing has on a provider’s revenue.
In the next theorem, we present our result on how market sharing affects a provider’s
profit. The theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of the market sharing
price pMS(α) and provides an implicit equation to compute it. It also states that
increased profit is achieved if and only if p < pMS(α).
Theorem 4.2.3 (Market Sharing Price) For any network provider there exists
a unique market sharing price pMS(α), which satisfies the following:
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1. If λ+ ασ(K) ≤ C, pMS(α) is the solution to:
p =
(λ+ σ(p)− C)λK
(C − α(λ+ σ(p)))σ(p). (4.21)
2. If λ+ ασ(K) > C,
pMS(α) = K. (4.22)
and for any given pMS(α) the following is true:
∆W (p) > 0 for p < pMS(α), (4.23)
∆W (p) < 0 for p > pMS(α). (4.24)
Before we prove Theorem 4.2.3, we first establish several useful results that will
later facilitate our proof. Since the general revenue function of a provider involves
min operators, we need to make use of some auxiliary prices that will simplify the
expressions of W (p, σ(p)) and W (p, ασ(p)). In Lemma 4.2.1 we had already defined
p¯α to be an auxiliary price that satisfies the equality λ+ ασ(p¯α) = C. In this section
we provide another such auxiliary price to simplify our analysis. We let p¯ denote the
price that satisfies the following equation:
λ+ σ(p¯) = C. (4.25)
Since we assume that the secondary demand σ(p) is non-increasing in p for all 0 <
α < 1 it follows that p¯α < p¯, which is illustrated for a generic demand function in
Figure 4·5.
By defining these prices we have effectively divided prices into three separate
regions, i.e. [0, p¯α), [p¯α, p¯), [p¯,∞), in each of which we have a simplified revenue
function. Now, we can start our analysis on how the revenue changes depending on
which region a given price value p falls in.
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a) We first consider the price region {p : p ≥ p¯}. Note that the price inequality
corresponds to when the total demand under price p does not exceed the provider’s
service capacity. In the following lemma we establish that in this region, it is never
optimal for a provider to choose market sharing.
Lemma 4.2.3 Assume p ≥ p¯, then
∆W (p) < 0. (4.26)
Proof. Note that our assumption p ≥ p¯ is equivalent to stating that λ+σ(p) < C.
Since p¯ > p¯α, it is also true that p > p¯α. Then, the total arrival under market
sharing is also less than provider i capacity (i.e., λ+ασ(p) < C). Simplifying Eq.
(4.13) under these assumptions, we get:
∆W = W (p, ασ(p))−W (p, σ(p))
=
(
ασ(p)p+ λK
)
−
(
σ(p)p+ λK
)
= ασ(p)p− σ(p)p < 0.
Therefore we conclude that Eq. (4.26) holds. 
b) Next, we cover the price region {p : p < p¯α}. Since price values need to be non-
negative, we do not consider the case p¯α = 0. In this price interval, there are two
cases two consider. If the value of K happens to be in this region, then the revenue
change is positive for price values below K and negative for price values above K.
If K does not fall in this price interval, then the revenue change is always positive
and thus a provider will always find it desirable to share the market. We formalize
these results in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2.4 Assume p¯α > 0 and p < p¯α, then
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Figure 4·5: An illustration of the prices p¯ and p¯α under a generic
secondary demand.
(a) If p¯α ≥ K:
∆W (p) > 0 if p < K; (4.27)
∆W (p) = 0 if p = K; (4.28)
∆W (p) < 0 if p > K. (4.29)
(b) If p¯α < K:
∆W (p) > 0 ∀p < p¯α. (4.30)
Proof. Note that our assumption p < p¯α is equivalent to stating that:
λ+ ασ(p) ≥ C.
Since p¯α < p¯, it must also be true that p < p¯. Then the combined demand
without market sharing is greater than the provider’s capacity (i.e., λ+σ(p) ≥ C).
Simplifying Eq. (4.13) under these assumptions, we obtain:
∆W = W (p, ασ(p))−W (p, σ(p))
=
ασ(p)pC
ασ(p) + λ
+
λKC
ασ(p) + λ
− σ(p)pC
σ(p) + λ
− λKC
σ(p) + λ
.
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After rearrangement we get:
∆W =
(1− α)σ(p)λC
(ασ(p) + λ)(σ(p) + λ)
(K − p). (4.31)
Eq. (4.31) only takes on the value zero when p = K. Additionally for price values
p < K, ∆W is positive and for p > K, ∆W is negative. 
Remark 4.2.1 Lemma 4.2.4 considers prices for which the reduced secondary
demand, when combined with the primary demand, exceeds the capacity of a
provider. In that case, this provider can increase its revenue at prices up to K if
p¯α ≥ K or all prices p if p¯α < K, by choosing to share the market with another
provider. On the other hand, if p¯α ≥ K, choosing to share the market decreases
the revenue at prices greater than K.
c) Finally, we cover the price region between the regions covered in parts a) and b),
such that {p : p¯α ≤ p < p¯}. Note that these are price values such that the combined
demand of the primary and secondary types exceed the service capacity without
market sharing and do not exceed the service capacity with market sharing. Once
again, similar to the previous case, the revenue change depends on the relationship
between K and how this price interval is defined. If K ≥ p¯α, then the market
sharing price lies on this interval and the revenue change is negative for price
values above and positive for price values below. Otherwise, the revenue change is
always in the negative direction and market sharing is not desirable. We present
the following lemma in this light:
Lemma 4.2.5 Assume p¯α ≤ p < p¯. Then,
1) If p¯α ≤ K:
∆W (p) > 0 if p < pMS(α);
∆W (p) ≤ 0 if p ≥ pMS(α), (4.32)
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where pMS(α) denotes the solution to the following equation:
p =
(λ+ σ(p)− C)λK
(C − α(λ+ σ(p)))σ(p) . (4.33)
2) If p¯α > K:
∆W (p) < 0. (4.34)
Proof. Note that p¯α ≤ p < p¯ is equivalent to stating that λ + σ(p) > C and
λ+ ασ(p) ≤ C. Under these conditions the revenue change function becomes:
∆W (p) =
(
ασ(p)p+ λK
)
−
(
σ(p)p
C
λ+ σ(p)
+ λK
C
λ+ σ(p)
)
.
Regrouping yields:
∆W (p) =
(
α(λ+ σ(p))− C
λ+ σ(p)
σ(p)p
)
+
(
λ+ σ(p)− C
λ+ σ(p)
λK
)
.
(1) Noting that α(λ + σ(p)) < C, it can be verified that ∆W (p) = 0 is satisfied
by the solution of the following implicit equation:
p =
(λ+ σ(p)− C)λK
(C − α(λ+ σ(p)))σ(p) . (4.35)
Furthermore, one can check that Eq. (4.35) is satisfied by a unique price p. Mul-
tiplying both sides of Eq. (4.35) with the first term in the denominator we obtain:
(C − α(λ+ σ(p)))p = (λ+ σ(p)− C)λK
σ(p)
. (4.36)
Taking the derivative of the left hand side of Eq. (4.36) we get:
∂
∂p
(C − α(λ+ σ(p)))p = (C − α(λ+ σ(p)))− ασ′(p)p > 0.
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Taking the derivative of the right hand of Eq. (4.36) side yields:
(λ+ σ(p)− C)λK
σ(p)
=
(
1
σ(p)
− λ+ σ(p)− C
σ2(p)
)
σ′(p)λK =
(
C − λ
σ2(p)
)
σ′(p)λK ≤ 0.
One side of the equation is strictly increasing with p, while the other is non-
increasing in p. Since both sides are continuous in p, we conclude that equality
(4.35) holds for a unique value of p.
If p¯α ≤ K, Lemma 4.2.4 states that ∆W (p) > 0 for price values p < p¯α. By Lemma
4.2.3 we have ∆W (p) < 0 for p ≥ p¯. Therefore, it must be that pMS(α) ∈ [p¯α, p¯).
Since ∆W (p) = 0 only when p = pMS(α), by continuity of revenue it follows that
∆W (p) > 0 for all p < pMS(α) and ∆W (p) < 0 for all p > pMS(α).
(2) In the previous part of our proof we have demonstrated that on the price
interval [p¯α, p¯], the only possible price that sets ∆W (p) = 0 is given by:
p =
(λ+ σ(p)− C)λK
(C − α(λ+ σ(p)))σ(p) . (4.37)
We will show that if p¯α > K, the solution to Eq. (4.37) lies outside the price
interval [p¯α, p¯). Let p∗ denote a particular solution to Eq. (4.37). Assume p∗ ∈
[p¯α, p¯), which means that p∗ > K. Taking the ratio of p
∗
K
and substituting the
right hand side of Eq. (4.37) for p∗ yields:
(λ+ σ(p∗)− C)λ
(C − α(λ+ σ(p∗)))σ(p∗) > 1. (4.38)
After some rearrangement we get:
λ(λ+ σ(p∗)) > C(λ+ σ(p∗))− ασ(p∗)(λ+ σ(p∗)),
λ > C − ασ(p∗). (4.39)
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which is a contradiction to our initial assumption p∗ ∈ [p¯α, p¯]. Therefore, no value
of p yields ∆W (p) = 0 on the price interval [p¯α, p¯]. Additionally, since p¯α > K,
Lemma 4.2.4 states that ∆W (p¯α) < 0. Due to the continuity of the revenue W (p)
and the fact that there are no zero crossings in this interval, it must also be true
that ∆W (p) < 0 for p ∈ [p¯α, p¯]. 
Having analyzed how the revenue changes under market sharing for the three price
intervals we have defined, we can finally move on to proving Theorem 4.2.3:
Proof of Theorem 4.2.3
1. Case 1 - λ+ασ(K) ≤ C : By the way we have defined p¯α, this case is equivalent
to stating that p¯α ≤ K. Then by Lemma 4.2.3 and Lemma 4.2.4 we have that:
∆W (p) < 0 for p ≥ p¯, (4.40)
∆W (p) > 0 for p < p¯α. (4.41)
Therefore the market sharing price pMS(α) must lie on the price interval [p¯α, p¯).
Lemma 4.2.5 states that pMS(α) satisfies Eq. (4.33) such that ∆W (pMS(α)) = 0
and for p ∈ [p¯α, p¯):
∆W (p) < 0 if p > pMS(α), (4.42)
∆W (p) > 0 if p < pMS(α). (4.43)
Combining Eq.’s (4.40) to (4.43) we obtain the results stated in the proposition.
2. Case 2- λ+ασ(K) > C: By the way we have defined p¯α, this case is equivalent
to stating that p¯α > K. Then by Lemma 4.2.3 and Lemma 4.2.5 we have that:
∆W (p) < 0 for p ≥ p¯α. (4.44)
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Therefore the market sharing price pMS(α) must belong to the price interval
[0, p¯α). Lemma 4.2.4 states that the revenue change is equal to zero when
p = K, therefore we conclude that the market sharing price pMS(α) = K.
Additionally, we have that:
∆W (p) < 0 if p > pMS(α), (4.45)
∆W (p) > 0 if p < pMS(α). (4.46)
Combining Eq.’s (4.44) to (4.46) we obtain the results stated in the theorem.

Theorem 4.2.3 yields a rather non-straightforward result such that for any network
provider there exists a unique price which acts as a threshold value: market sharing at
all prices greater than this threshold results in a profit decrease, while at prices below
this threshold the network provider is guaranteed a profit increase by decreasing its
secondary demand. In this way, it serves a similar function to that of the break-even
price: It further divides the price ranges into two regimes but this time by identifying
when serving the reduced secondary demand generates more profit that serving the
full demand.
In the next lemma, we establish an upper bound on the market sharing price,
similar to what we did in Lemma 4.2.2.
Lemma 4.2.6 The market sharing price is less than or equal to the revenue generated
by primary demand:
pMS(α) ≤ K.
Proof. The inequality holds when pMSi (α) = Ki. When p
MS
i (α) is given by the
solution to the implicit equation in Eq. (4.33), we prove it by showing the following:
pMSi =
(λi + σ(p
MS
i (α))− Ci)λiKi
(Ci − αi(λi + σ(pMSi (α))))σ(pMSi (α))
≤ Ki.
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After some simple algebra and regrouping of terms we get:
λi ≤ Ci − αiσ(pMSi (α)).
Note that if pMSi (α) is given by the solution to the implicit equation in Eq. (4.33),
by Lemma 4.2.5 it also follows that pMSi (α) ∈ [p¯αi , p¯i). From the way we have defined
p¯αi in Lemma 4.2.1 we conclude that λ+ ασ(p
MS
i (α)) ≤ C. 
Example 4.2.2 We illustrate the relationship between the market sharing price and
network parameters under the same constant elasticity secondary demand function
we used before, σ(p) = σ0/p.
Under this given demand and assuming σ0 ≤ (C−λ)K/α such that λ+ασ(K) ≤
C, we obtain from Eq. (4.21) the following explicit formula for the market sharing
price:
pMS(α) =
λKσ0 + ασ
2
0
σ0(C − αλ) + λK(C − λ) . (4.47)
If σ0 > (C − λ)K/α, then pMS(α) = K by Eq. (4.22).
Theorems 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 provide implicit equations for the break-even price
pBE(α) and market sharing price pMS(α) that depend on the demand function σ(p).
Strikingly, one can show through careful analysis that the ratio of pBE(α) to pMS(α)
is strictly smaller than 1 for any demand function.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
(1) If pBE(α) > 0:
(a) Assume pMS(α) = K. In Lemma 4.2.2 we have established that pBE(1) < K.
Let us rearrange Eq. (4.18) as follows:
p =
λK
C
− λK(C − λ)
Cασ(p)
One can observe that the right hand side of Eq. (4.18) is increasing with α since
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λ < C. Therefore, the solution to the implicit equation that yields the break-even
price is increasing with α. Hence, we have
pBE(α) < pBE(1) ∀α ∈ [0, 1) (4.48)
Combining Eq. (4.48) with the results of Lemma 4.2.2 we conclude that pBE(α) < K.
(b) Assume pMS(α) is given by the solution to the implicit equation in Eq. (4.33).
We will prove the inequality by contradiction. Assume:
pMS(α) ≤ pBE(1).
Since secondary demand is non-increasing in p it follows that σ(pMS(α)) ≥ σ(pBE(1)).
Taking the ratio between Eq. (4.18) and Eq. (4.33) yields:
pBE(1)
pMS(α)
=
(σ(pBE(1)) + λ− C)σ(pMS(α))
(σ(pMS(α)) + λ− C)σ(pBE(1)) ·
(C − α(λ+ σ(pMS(α)))
C
. (4.49)
The first fraction in Eq. (4.49) is less than or equal to 1 while the second is strictly less
than 1. Furthermore, we know that both fractions must be positive since σ(pBE(1)) ≥
C − λ by Lemma 4.2.1 and pMS(α) < p¯. We have:
pBE(1) < pMS(α), (4.50)
which contradicts our initial assumption that pMS(α) ≤ pBE(1). Hence, it must be
true that pMS(α) > pBE(1). In Eq. (4.48) we have established that pBE(α) < pBE(1)
for α < 1. Hence it is true for all values of α ∈ (0, 1] that pMS(α) > pBE(α).
(2) If pBE(α) = 0, we can show that the market sharing price is strictly greater
than zero in both cases. pMS(α) = K is self-explanatory and by Eq. (4.33), we
conclude pMS(α) > 0 as σ(pMS(α)) + λ− C > 0.
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4.2.2 Duopoly Competition
In the previous sections we have identified a provider’s competitive ability in a price
war through establishing the break-even price and its incentive to share the market
through the market sharing price. However, spectrum markets do not consist of a
single provider, but rather several providers competing with each other. Therefore,
our previous results, while being important, are not enough to determine the outcome
of a secondary spectrum market. In this section, we consider the simplest oligopoly
possible, a duopoly where two providers compete to enhance their profits by first
capturing and then serving the secondary demand. To identify a market equilibrium,
we utilize the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) from game theory. Since NE are
classically determined by best response functions, we will first seek to establish the best
response dynamics of provider i to a fixed competitor price p−i, where the notation
−i signifies the competing provider.
Definition 4.2.3 (Best Response) Given two providers, provider i’s best response
to competitor’s pricing decision p−i is the payoff maximizing strategy such that:
pBRi (p−i) = arg max
pi
Ri(pi, p−i). (4.51)
Definition 4.2.4 (Nash Equilibrium) A pricing strategy profile (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) if and only if both prices are a best response to each other such that:
p∗1 = p
BR
1 (p
∗
2) and p
∗
2 = p
BR
2 (p
∗
1). (4.52)
Facing a competitor price p−i, the strategies available to provider i consist of either
matching this price and sharing the secondary demand or not matching it and trying
to capture all of the secondary demand. While setting the price below or above the
competitor’s price follows a rather straightforward approach, the case of matching
the competitor’s price requires a more detailed analysis due to the discontinuity in
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the profit function. The next lemma states that if it is possible to increase the profit
by capturing all of the secondary demand σ(pi) at a certain price pi, then it is also
desirable to capture the secondary demand at a slightly lower price p′i < pi. We will
then utilize this result in establishing provider i’s best response for prices pi > p
MS
i (α).
Lemma 4.2.7 For any pi such that ∆Wi(pi) < 0 holds, there exists a price p
′
i such
that pMSi (α) < p
′
i < pi and
Wi(p
′
i, σ(p
′
i)) > Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)). (4.53)
Proof. Since we know that Wi(x, σ(x)) is differentiable in x, we can always a
pick a price qi < pi such that on the interval [qi, pi), the function Wi(x, σ(x)) is either
monotonically increasing, constant or monotonically decreasing with respect to x5.
We break our proof into two cases:
(1) Assume that for a given qi such that qi < pi, the following is true for any pˆi ∈
[qi, pi):
Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi)) ≥ Wi(pi, σ(pi)).
Then it follows by our assumption ∆Wi(pi) < 0 that Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi)) > Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)),
and p′i = pˆi.
(2) Assume for a given qi such that qi < pi, the following is true for all pˆi ∈ [qi, pi):
Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi)) < Wi(pi, σ(pi)). (4.54)
Then by the definition of continuity, the following can be stated for Wi(pi, σ(pi)):
∀ > 0, ∃δ(, pi) > 0 s.t. if |pi − pˆi| < δ then
|Wi(pi, σ(pi))−Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi))| < .
5It should be noted that differentiability is not a necessary condition for this statement; local
monotonocity of Wi(x, σ(x)) would suffice. However, as we need differentiability elsewhere in the
chapter, we simply use it here as well.
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Figure 4·6: Best response of network provider i: a) When the com-
petitor price is below pBEi , the provider sets its price to p
BE
i ; b) When
the competitor price is within the market sharing interval, the provider
matches the price; c) When the competitor price is above pMSi , the
provider sets its price slightly lower.
Making use of Eq. (4.54) and our assumption that pˆi ∈ [qi, pi), we can remove the
absolute value from the previous equation and simplify it to:
Wi(pi, σ(pi))−Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi)) < . (4.55)
Taking  = Wi(pi, σ(pi)) −Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)) and cancelling the terms Wi(pi, σ(pi)) on
both sides of the inequality (4.55) we obtain:
−Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi)) < −Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)),
Wi(pˆi, σ(pˆi)) > Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)),
and p′i = pˆ. 
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The next theorem presents provider i’s best response, which we shall utilize later
to determine NE.
Theorem 4.2.4 (Best Response) Provider i best response to its competing provid-
er’s pricing decision p−i is:
pBRi (p−i) =
{
pmi (p−i) for p−i > p
MS
i (α)
p−i for pBEi (αi) ≤ p−i ≤ pMSi (α)
pBEi for p−i < p
BE
i (αi),
where pmi (p−i) < p−i satisfies Eq. (4.53) in Lemma 4.2.7 to the optimality such that
Wi(p
m
i , σ(p
m
i )) = max
pi∈(pMSi (α),p−i)
Wi(pi, σ(pi)). (4.56)
Remark 4.2.2 The exact value of pmi (p−i) depends on where the revenue is being
maximized over the interval (pMSi (α), p−i). If the revenue is monotonically increasing
up until p−i, we can simplify Eq. (4.56) to the following:
pmi (p−i) = p−i − ,
where  is a sufficiently small discretization step, which is used when working with con-
tinuous prices. This assumption is a well-known approach used in game theory (Os-
bourne, 2004) because otherwise, a best response does not technically exist. On the
other hand, it is possible that provider i’s revenue attains a maximum at a lower price
point, in which case pmi (p−i) is as given in Eq. (4.56) and its exact value depends on
the price elasticity of secondary demand.
Proof. We will consider each price condition described in Theorem 4.2.3 sepa-
rately.
(1) In the first price condition, such that ∆Wi(p−i) < 0, provider i can either
choose to match, lower or increase its price. Lowering the price such that p′i < p−i is
clearly better than price matching (pi = p−i) since we have demonstrated in Lemma
4.2.7 that:
Wi(p
′
i, σ(p
′
i)) > Wi(p−i, αiσ(p−i)).
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Lowering the price to p′i is also better than increasing the price to pi > p−i since the
following is true:
Wi(p
′
i, σ(p
′
i)) > 0 = Wi(pi, p−i), for all pi > p−i.
Hence, lowering the price to p′i is the best response of provider i.
(2) In the second competitor price condition such that pBEi (αi) ≤ p−i ≤ pMSi (α),
we know that the following holds:
∆Wi(p−i) = Wi(p−i, αiσ(p−i))−Wi(p−i, σ(p−i)) ≥ 0. (4.57)
Selecting a price above the competitor’s price such that pi > p−i does not attract any
secondary demand and therefore yields a profit of zero. Thus matching p−i is better
than increasing the price to pi > p−i:
Πi(pi, 0) = 0 ≤ Πi(p−i, αiσ(p−i)), ∀pi > p−i.
Next, we compare matching the price at p−i to lowering the price to any price
{pi : pi < p−i}. We seek to find the price that maximizes the revenue function
Wi(pi, σ(pi)) on the interval [0, p−i]. We know from Lemmas 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 that
pMSi (α) < p¯. Hence any price p on the interval [0, p−i] where p−i < p
MS
i (α) satisfies
λi + σ(p) > Ci. Simplifying Eq. (4.13) and by taking the derivative with respect to
pi we can show that:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, σ(pi)) =
∂
∂pi
(
σ(pi)pi
Ci
λi + σ(pi)
+ λiKi
Ci
λi + σ(pi)
)
= (σ(pi) + σ
′(pi)pi)
Ci
λi + σ(pi)
− σ′(pi)σ(pi)pi Ci
(λi + σ(pi))2
− σ′(pi)λiKi Ci
(λi + σ(pi))2
.
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Regrouping the terms yields:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, σ(pi)) = σ(pi)
Ci
λi + σ(pi)
+ λiCiσ
′(pi)
pi −Ki
(λi + σ(pi))2
> 0,
for pi ≤ Ki since σ′(pi) ≤ 0.
We also know from Lemma 4.2.6 that pMSi (α) ≤ Ki. Therefore, the revenue
maximizing price (which is also profit maximizing) is given by pi = p−i such that for
all 0 ≤ pi ≤ p−i:
Wi(p−i, σ(p−i)) ≥ Wi(pi, σ(pi)).
By Equation (4.57), it follows that for all pBEi (αi) ≤ pi ≤ p−i, which demonstrates
that matching the price at p−i is better than lowering it to any pi < p−i:
Wi(p−i, αiσ(p−i) ≥ Wi(pi, σ(pi)).
Hence, we conclude that pBRi (p−i) = pi.
(3) Lastly, we consider the case when p−i < pBEi . Fortunately, this case can be
quickly analyzed through the definition of the break-even price. If provider i chooses
to match or lower its price by definition of the break-even price we have that:
Πi(pi, p−i) < 0, for all pi ≤ p−i.
At any price pi > p−i provider i profit will be zero. However setting the price to pBEi
prevents the other provider from increasing its price further, thus we establish it as
the best response. 
Theorem 4.2.4 establishes that for any network provider, a price interval, in which
market sharing is the best response, is guaranteed to exist. Above this price inter-
val, a provider will lower its price below the competitor’s price, as in a typical price
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Figure 4·7: Illustration of the two possible types of market outcomes.
war. Below this price interval, profitability conditions from Section 4.2.1 are violated.
While this interval is guaranteed to exist, whether the market equilibrium is estab-
lished in this interval warrants further analysis. In the next theorem, we determine
the different market outcomes by providing the resulting NE from the best response
functions of the two providers.
Theorem 4.2.5 (Nash Equilibrium) In a market with two network providers, a
pricing strategy profile (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a NE such that:
1. If max(pBE1 (α1), p
BE
2 (α2)) ≤ min(pMS1 , pMS2 ), then p∗1 = p∗2, and for i = 1, 2
p∗i ∈[max(pBE1 (α1), pBE2 (α2)),min(pMS1 (α1), pMS2 (α2))].
2. If max(pBE1 (α1), p
BE
2 (α2)) > min(p
MS
1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α1)) and without loss of gener-
ality pBE2 (α2) < p
BE
1 (α1)
p∗1 = p
BE
1 (α1) and p
∗
2 = p
m
2 (p
BE
1 (α1)).
where pmi (p−i) < p−i is defined as in Theorem 4.2.4.
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Proof. (1) Without loss of generality, assume that pBE1 (α1) < p
BE
2 (α2). Now
suppose pMS1 (α1) > p
MS
2 (α2), such that we have the following relationship between
the break-even and market sharing prices:
pBE1 (α1) < p
BE
2 (α2) < p
MS
2 (α2) < p
MS
1 (α1).
We will establish NE by determining when p∗1 = p
BR
1 (p
BR
2 (p
∗
1)). In order to do so we
first give provider 2’s best response:
pBR2 (p
∗
1) =

pBE2 (α2) for p
∗
1 < p
BE
2 (α2)
p∗1 for p
BE
2 (α2) ≤ p∗1 ≤ pMS2 (α2)
pm2 (p
∗
1) for p
∗
1 > p
MS
2 (α2),
(4.58)
where pm2 (p
∗
1) satisies Eq. (4.56) in Theorem 4.2.4.
We can now formulate provider 1’s best response to provider 2’s best response:
pBR1 (p
BR
2 (p
∗
1)) =

pBE1 (α1) for p
∗
1 < p
BE
1 (α1)
pBE2 (α2) for p
BE
1 (α1) ≤ p∗1 < pBE2 (α2)
p∗1 for p
BE
2 (α2) ≤ p∗1 ≤ pMS2 (α2)
pm2 (p
∗
1) for p
MS
2 (α2) < p
∗
1 ≤ pMS1 (α1)
pm1 (p
∗
2) for p
∗
1 > p
MS
1 (α1).
(4.59)
Therefore the only price interval where
p∗1 = p
BR
1 (p
BR
2 (p
∗
1))
can be satisfied is [pBE2 (α2), p
MS
2 (α2)] and from Eq. (4.58) in this interval we have
that p∗2 = p
∗
1, hence giving us the NE. The other case where p
MS
1 (α1) ≤ pMS2 (α2) can
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be proven following the same argument.
(2) Suppose that pBE1 (α1) > p
MS
2 (α2). Then, by Theorem 4.2.1, we also know
the following relationship between the break-even and market sharing prices of both
providers:
pBE2 (α2) < p
MS
2 (α2) < p
BE
1 (α1) < p
MS
1 (α1).
This time we will establish NE by determining when p∗2 = p
BR
2 (p
BR
1 (p
∗
2)). In order to
do so we first give provider 1’s best response:
pBR1 (p
∗
2) =

pBE1 (α1) for p
∗
1 < p
BE
1 (α1)
p∗2 for p
BE
1 (α1) ≤ p∗2 ≤ pMS1 (α1)
pm1 (p
∗
2) for p
∗
2 > p
MS
1 (α1).
(4.60)
We can now formulate provider 2’s best response to provider 1’s best response:
pBR2 (p
BR
1 (p
∗
2)) =

pBE2 (α2) for p
∗
2 < p
BE
2 (α2)
pBE1 (α1) for p
BE
2 (α2) ≤ p∗2 ≤ pMS2 (α2)
pm2 (p
BE
1 (α1)) for p
MS
2 (α2) < p
∗
2 < p
BE
1 (α1)
pm2 (p
∗
2) for p
BE
1 (α1) ≤ p∗2 ≤ pMS1 (α1)
pm2 (p
m
1 (p
∗
2)) for p
∗
2 > p
MS
1 (α1).
(4.61)
A careful look yields the result that the only time p∗2 = p
BR
2 (p
BR
1 (p
∗
2)) is possible when
p∗2 = p
m
2 (p
BE
1 (α1)), given in the third pricing interval in Eq. (4.61). From Eq. (4.60)
we have that
p∗1 = p
BR
1 (p
m
2 (p
BE
1 (α1))) = p
BE
1 (α1), (4.62)
thus completing the pricing strategy profile of the only NE possible in this case. Note
that since pBE1 (α1) > p
MS
2 (α2), it follows from Theorem 4.2.1 that p
BE
1 (α1) > p
BE
2 (1).
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Since  can be chosen arbitrarily small, we can extend this result to pBE1 (α1) −  >
pBE2 (1), therefore provider 2 is profitable at this NE as a monopoly. We can use the
same argument to prove the case when pBE1 (α1) ≤ pMS2 (α2). 
Next, we discuss the implications of Theorem 4.2.5 and provide examples that
illustrate our results:
Interpretation of the NE. As stated in Theorem 4.2.5, the exact price profiles
that give the NE depend on the relationship between the market sharing intervals of
the two providers. If two price intervals overlap, as illustrated in part (a) of Fig. 4·7,
any equal price pair in that interval will give us a NE. As a result, two providers share
the market and set their prices at a value above their respective break-even prices
but always less than the smaller of the two market sharing prices, a value which is
guaranteed to be no greater than Ki, the primary reward collected by provider i.
On the other hand, if the market sharing price intervals of the two providers do
not intersect, as illustrated in part (b) of Fig. 4·7, the market outcome is the same as
the result of a price war, where the provider with the lower break-even price captures
all of the secondary demand by pricing slightly below its competitor’s break-even
price. The losing provider cannot match this price without making a negative profit.
In this case, even though both providers find it desirable to go into market sharing as
the prices approach their break-even prices, the gap between the two market sharing
intervals does not allow them to converge to a market sharing point.
Examples. In the following two examples, we seek to illustrate different market
outcomes depending on the placement of the market sharing intervals on the price
line. In the first example, we will use a constant elasticity demand function as in our
previous examples. In the second example, we will use an exponentially decreasing de-
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mand to illustrate the fact that our results hold over general demand functions. Both
types of demand functions are commonly used in the economics literature (Talluri
and Ryzin, 2004).
Example 4.2.3 Suppose the secondary demand is given by σ(p) = 20/p. We con-
sider two network providers whose parameters are:
(λ1, C1, K1, α1) = (6, 10, 4, 0.5) and (λ2, C2, K2, α2) = (5, 10, 4, 0.5).
Given these parameters it follows that λi + αiσ(0) > Ci and λi + αiσ(K) < Ci for
i = 1, 2. Under these conditions, by making use of the explicit formulas provided
in Eqs. (4.20) (substituting σ(p) with ασ(p)) and (4.47), we obtain the following
break-even and market sharing prices of both providers:
pBE1 (0.5) = 1.225, p
MS
1 (0.5) = 2.881,
pBE2 (0.5) = 1.000, p
MS
2 (0.5) = 2.400.
Clearly pBE1 (0.5) > p
BE
2 (0.5) and p
MS
2 (0.5) < p
MS
1 (0.5). Furthermore, it is also true
that pBE1 (0.5) < p
MS
2 (0.5). Therefore, both providers’ market sharing price intervals
are overlapping. Then, part one of Theorem 4.2.5 states that all NE price profiles
(p∗1, p
∗
2) have the form: p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 ∈ and lie in the price interval [1.225, 2.400].
Example 4.2.4 In this example we consider an exponentially decreasing secondary
demand given by σ(p) = 20e−0.2p. This time we consider two similarly loaded
providers with significantly different primary rewards. We choose the network pa-
rameters of these providers as such:
(λ1, C1, K1, α1) = (6, 10, 6, 0.5) and (λ2, C2, K2, α2) = (8, 10, 14, 0.5).
Notice that this time provider 2 has a higher primary demand and a higher associated
reward collected. Once again, network parameters and the secondary demand satisfy
λi + αiσ(0) > Ci and λi + αiσ(K) < Ci for i = 1, 2. Solving for the Eq. (4.18) in
Theorem 4.2.2 and Eq. (4.21) in Theorem 4.2.3, we obtain the following break-even
92
and market sharing prices of both providers:
pBE1 (0.5) = 2.098, p
MS
1 (0.5) = 4.984,
pBE2 (0.5) = 5.050, p
MS
2 (0.5) = 9.241.
Clearly pBE1 (0.5) < p
BE
2 (0.5) and p
MS
2 (0.5) > p
MS
1 (0.5). However, this time
pBE2 (0.5) > p
MS
1 (0.5). Therefore, the market sharing price intervals of the two
providers do not intersect. As a result, these two providers will go into a price war
and provider 1, having the lower break-even price will be the winner. In this light,
part 2 of Theorem 4.2.5 states that the NE is given byp∗1 = 5.050−  and p∗2 = 5.050.
Best Response Dynamics. While Theorem 4.2.5 states that the NE exist and
gives the pricing profiles of such, depending on the initial conditions one might never
reach that equilibrium if best response dynamics change the prices in a different
direction. In our case, the convergence to the NE is guaranteed from the way best
response dynamics work. In both cases, for any price above the described NE prices,
the best response dynamics lowers the price as each provider tries to capture the
secondary demand by setting their price lower than the competitor’s. For any prices
below the NE, since this yields a negative profit for at least one provider, the best
response dynamics now work to increase the prices to the break-even price of each
provider, which in turn fall in the range of the NE given by Theorem 4.2.5.
Payoff Dominant Strategy Refinement. In part (1) of Theorem 4.2.5 we iden-
tified a price range in which all possible NE could lie. While all price pairs are viable
NE , it is desirable to be able to characterize the market outcome through a single
price pair. A possible refinement of the case when facing multiple NE is through the
consideration of Payoff Dominant Strategy (PDS) equilibrium:
Definition 4.2.5 Let S denote the set of price pairs {(p∗1, p∗2) : p∗1 = p∗2} that give the
NE in part (1) of Theorem 4.2.5. Then, the PDS equilibrium (pD1 , p
D
2 ) is a NE with
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the following refinement condition:
Ri(p
D
1 , p
D
2 ) = max
(p1,p2)∈S
Ri(p1, p2) for i = 1, 2,
In other words, when multiple NE are present, a PDS yields the maximum possible
payoff for both providers (Straub, 1995). Using this condition we can identify the PDS
equilibrium (pD1 , p
D
2 ) ∈ S. Since the prices in S are equal, we know from Eq. (3.2) that
the payoff is equal to the profit under reduced demand. (Ri(p1, p2) = Πi(pi, αiσ(pi))).
If σ′(p) < 0, let pˆ denote the solution to:
p = −σ(p)/σ′(p). (4.63)
Otherwise we set pˆ =∞. Note that Eq. (4.63) corresponds to the price elasticity of
demand. Through careful analysis, we can state the following:
Theorem 4.2.6 For relatively inelastic demand such that pˆ >
max(pMS1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)), there exists a unique PDS equilibrium (p
D
1 , p
D
2 ) given
by:
pD1 = p
D
2 = min(p
MS
1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)) (4.64)
Proof. Combining Lemmas 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and Theorem 4.2.3 we know the following:
(i) If pMSi is given by Eq. (4.21), then p¯
αi
i ≤ pMSi (αi) < p¯i.
(ii) If pMSi (αi) = Ki, then p
MS
i < p¯
αi
i .
Therefore, we need to consider two different formulations of the profit Πi(pi, αiσ(pi)).
One can observe from Eq. (4.14) that:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)) =
∂
∂pi
Πi(pi, αiσ(pi)).
Therefore, we will use the derivative of revenue with respect to price in our calculations
instead of profit.
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Case 1 - pi < p¯
αi
i
The price condition is equivalent to stating that λi + αiσ(p) > Ci. Simplifying
Eq. (4.13) and by taking the derivative with respect to pi we can show that:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)) =
∂
∂pi
(
αiσ(pi)pi
Ci
λi + αiσ(pi)
+ λiKi
Ci
λi + αiσ(pi)
)
= αi(σ(pi) + σ
′(pi)pi)
Ci
λi + αiσ(pi)
− αiσ(pi)pi Ciαiσ
′(pi)
(λi + αiσ(pi))2
− λiKi Ciαiσ
′(pi)
(λi + αiσ(pi))2
.
Regrouping the terms yields:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)) = αiσ(pi)
Ci
λi + αiσ(pi)
+ λiCiαiσ
′(pi)
pi −Ki
(λi + αiσ(pi))2
> 0, (4.65)
for pi ≤ Ki since σ′(pi) ≤ 0.
Case 2 - pi ≥ p¯αii
Simplifying Eq. (4.13) and by taking the derivative with respect to pi we can show
that:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, αiσ(pi)) =
∂
∂pi
(αiσ(pi)pi + λiKi)
= αi (σ(pi) + σ
′(pi)pi) .
If σ′(pi) = 0, then ∂∂piWi(pi, αiσ(pi)) > 0 for all pi ≥ p¯
αi
i . On the other hand, if
σ′(pi) < 0 we have the following:
∂
∂pi
Wi(pi, αiσ(pi))

> 0 if pi < pˆ
= 0 if pi = pˆ
< 0 if pi > pˆ,
(4.66)
where pˆ denotes the solution to:
p = −σ(p)/σ′(p).
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Note that pˆ is the same for both providers. Now we consider the cases (pMS1 (α1) =
K1, p
MS
2 (α2) = K2), (p
MS
i (αi) = Ki, p
MS
−i = g−i(p−i)) and (p
MS
1 = g1(p1), p
MS
2 =
g2(p2)) separately, where gi(pi) represents the right hand side of Eq. (4.21).
1. Assume pMS1 (α1) = K1, p
MS
2 (α2) = K2. Recalling condition (ii) in the beginning
of our proof, we have:
pMSi (αi) < p¯
αi
i , for i = 1, 2. (4.67)
From Eq. (4.65) we know that for p < p¯αii the profit is increasing on the interval
[0, Ki]. Therefore, both providers obtain their maximum revenue rates at their
respective market sharing prices. Then, the PDS equilibrium is:
pD1 = p
D
2 = min(K1, K2) = min(p
MS
1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)). (4.68)
2. Assume pMS1 (α1) = K1, p
MS
2 (α2) = g2(p2). From Eq. (4.65) we know that
provider 1’s payoff is maximized at K1. Recalling condition (i), we have
pMS2 (α2) > p¯
α2
2 . Then from Eq. (4.66) we know that provider 2’s payoff is
increasing until pˆ. Since we assume that pˆ > pMS2 (α2), and we consider price
strategy profiles that are upper bounded by min(pMS1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)), the PDS
equilibrium is given by:
pD1 = p
D
2 = min(p
MS
1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)). (4.69)
3. pMS1 (α1) = g1(p1), p
MS
2 (α2) = g2(p2). From Eq. (4.66) we conclude that both
providers’ profits are increasing until pˆ. Once again recalling our assumption
that
pˆ > max(pMS1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2))
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and the upper bound min(pMS1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)) on S, we conclude that the PDS
equilibrium is given by:
pD1 = p
D
2 = min(p
MS
1 (α1), p
MS
2 (α2)). (4.70)

4.2.3 Quality of Service Extension
In our model we have made the assumption that secondary users always choose the
lowest price advertised and when the prices are the same arriving secondary traffic
randomly choose a provider. While we have argued that price aversion might be a
possible explanation for choosing the lower price, Quality of Service (QoS) might also
have an impact on the customer’s decision process. In this subsection we extend our
model to take QoS into consideration.
We consider a simple QoS performance metric: the acceptance rate of the incoming
traffic. Then we extend our model as follows: When both providers charge the same
price and the secondary demand at this price is sufficiently large that the total demand
in the market exceeds the total capacity (i.e., λ1 + λ2 + σ(p) > C1 + C2), secondary
demand is split between the two providers according to a vector α = [α1, α2] such
that α1 + α2 = 1, α1, α2 > 0 and satisfying the following equality:
C1
λ1 + α1σ(p)
=
C2
λ2 + α2σ(p)
. (4.71)
Namely, instead of randomly choosing a provider, secondary demand distributes it-
self in a fashion that the accommodation level it faces is homogeneous across both
providers. In the case of two providers, let α1 = α and α2 = 1 − α. Then we can
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obtain an explicit expression for α:
α =
C1(λ2 + σ(p))− C2λ1
(C1 + C2)σ(p)
. (4.72)
and substituting Eq. (4.72) for α in ασ(p) we obtain:
ασ(p) = β1 + γ1σ(p), (4.73)
where βi =
Ciλ−i−C−iλi
Ci+C−i
and γi =
Ci
Ci+C−i
for i = 1, 2.
Under this new model, the previous results stated in our theorems still hold. Since
we consider all values of α ∈ (0, 1], we can simply replace ασ(p) in our equations with
Eq. (4.73). We illustrate this result in the following example and extend our analysis
afterwards.
Example 4.2.5 Suppose the secondary demand is given by σ(p) = 30e−10p. We
consider two network providers whose parameters are:
(λ1, C1, K1) = (10, 20, 1) and (λ2, C2, K2) = (8, 10, 1).
Suppose that secondary demand is split between the providers in a way that satisfies
Eq. (4.71). Then, using Eq. (4.73), we have the following reduced demand functions:
α1σ(p) = 2σ(p)/3 + 2 and α2σ(p) = σ(p)/3− 2.
Observe that α1σ(p) + α2σ(p) = σ(p). We can check that λi + αiσ(0) > Ci and
λi + αiσ(K) < Ci for i = 1, 2. Under these conditions, we need to use Eq. (4.18)
for calculating the break-even price and (4.21) for the market sharing price for both
providers. Doing the necessary calculations, one finds:
pBE1 = 0.184, p
MS
1 = 0.529,
pBE2 = 0.317, p
MS
2 = 0.417.
Clearly pBE1 < p
BE
2 and p
MS
1 > p
MS
2 . Thus, providers 2’s market sharing interval is
a subset of provider 1’s. Then, part one of Theorem 4.2.5 states that all NE price
profiles (p∗1, p
∗
2) have the form p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 and lie in the price interval [0.162, 0.235].
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Previous results under Quality of Service (QoS) Extension. Here we revisit
our previous proofs for each theorem to demonstrate that they still hold under the
QoS extension we have provided.
Before we begin our proof of Theorem 4.2.2 we need to revisit the two prices we
have created before: p¯ and p¯α. By definition p¯ is the same, while substituting Eq.
(4.72) for α we get the new following relationship:
λ1 + α1σ(p¯
α) = C1 ⇐⇒ λ1 + λ2 + σ(p¯α) = C1 + C2. (4.74)
Therefore, our previous result pBE(α) ≤ p¯α from Lemma 4.2.1 is equivalent to the
following:
λ1 + λ2 + σ(p
BE(α)) ≥ C1 + C2 (4.75)
Proof of Theorem 4.2.2 revisited
Parts 1 & 3 of the proof remain unchanged. The following is a revision of part 2
in our proof:
(2) Let us rearrange the terms in Eq. (4.18) and reintroduce index i to get the
following:
Ci
λiK
p− 1 = λi − Ci
αiσ(p)
. (4.76)
We will proceed by demonstrating that the left hand side of Eq. (4.76) is strictly
increasing with respect to p and the right hand side is non-increasing with respect to
p, hence meaning that this equality only holds at a single value of p. Since the left
hand side of Eq. (4.18) linearly increasing in p, we only need to prove that the right
hand side is non-increasing. Under the assumption that σ(p) is a differentiable and
non-increasing function of p, substituting
αiσ(p) = βi + γiσ(p), (4.77)
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and taking the derivative of the right hand side with respect to p yields:
∂
∂p
(
λi − Ci
βi + γiσ(p)
)
= γi
Ci − λi
(βi + γiσ(p))2
σ′(p) ≤ 0. (4.78)
Eq. (4.78) holds because λi < Ci and σ
′(p) ≤ 0. Therefore, there can only be at most
one solution for pBE(α) that satisfies Eq. (4.18). 
Before we revisit the proof of Theorem 4.2.3, we need to revisit the three lemmas
used in its proof. Observe that under the QoS extension, Lemmas 4.2.3 and 4.2.5
remain unchanged. However, we need to revisit the price values where p : p < p¯α,
and revise the corresponding Lemma 4.2.4 as follows:
Lemma 4.2.8 Assume p¯α > 0 and p < p¯α, then
1. If p¯α ≥ K:
∆Wi(p) > 0 if p < K; (4.79)
∆Wi(p) = 0 if p = K; (4.80)
∆Wi(p) < 0 if p > K. (4.81)
2. If p¯α < K:
∆W (p) > 0 ∀p < p¯α. (4.82)
Proof. Note that our assumption p < p¯α is equivalent to stating that:
λ1 + λ2 + σ(p) > C1 + C2
Since p¯α < p¯, it must also be true that p < p¯. Then the combined demand with-
out market sharing is greater than the provider’s capacity (i.e., λi + σ(p) ≥ Ci).
Simplifying Eq. (4.13) under these assumptions, we obtain:
∆Wi = Wi(p, αiσ(p))−Wi(p, σ(p))
=
αiσ(p)pCi
αiσ(p) + λi
+
λiKCi
αiσ(p) + λi
− σ(p)pCi
σ(p) + λi
− λiKCi
σ(p) + λi
.
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After rearrangement and substituting αiσ(p) with βi + γiσ(p) we get:
∆Wi =
(β−i + γ−i)σ(p))σ(p)λiCi
((βi + γi)σ(p) + λ)(σ(p) + λ)
(K − p). (4.83)
Eq. (4.83) only takes on the value zero when p = K. Additionally for price values
p < K, ∆Wi is positive and for p > K, ∆Wi is negative. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.3 revisited.
From the way we have defined the new distribution vector α in Eq. (4.72), our
model does not extend to prices are greater than p¯α as the total demand does not
exceed the total market capacity, and can be fully accommodated. Therefore, we
keep our assumption of the random splitting of the secondary demand for these price
values.
We have observed that lemmas 4.2.3 and 4.2.5 remain unchanged while the results
of Lemma 4.2.8 and Lemma 4.2.4 are equivalent. As the proof of Theorem 4.2.3 fol-
lows from these three lemmas, we conclude it holds under the QoS extension as well. 
Having demonstrated that the main results stated in Theorems 4.2.2 and 4.2.3
hold under the extended model, we revisit Theorem 4.2.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1 revisited.
The only part of the proof we need to revisit is for prices p < p¯α. If the market
sharing and the break-even prices are in the price range [0, p¯α), then from Lemma
4.2.4 we conclude that pMS(α) = K. Further, by substituting the right hand side
of Eq. (4.72) for α in Eq. (4.18), we can demonstrate that pBE(α) is given by the
solution to the following equation:
p =
(λ1 + λ2 + σ(p)− C1 − C2)λ1K
C1(λ2 + σ(p))− C2λ1 .
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Then we need to demonstrate that:
(λ1 + λ2 + σ(p)− C1 − C2)λ1K
C1(λ2 + σ(p))− C2λ1 < K.
After rearranging and collecting the terms we obtain the following:
λ1(λ1 + λ2 + σ(p))− C2λ1 < C1(λ1 + λ2 + σ(p))− C2λ1,
which is true for since λ1 < C1 in our initial assumptions. 
The results stated in the duopoly competition, once the break-even and market
sharing prices are determined, do not depend on the specific value αi takes. The
results stated Lemma 4.2.7 depends of continuity of the price pi and the sign of
the revenue change ∆Wi(pi). The proof Theorem 4.2.4 builds on Lemma 4.2.7 and
utilities the revenue rate without sharing (Wi(pi, σ(pi))). The proof of Theorem 4.2.5
is based on the game theoretic interpretation of the results stated in Theorem 4.2.4.
All of these results hold as long as αi takes on a value in the interval [0, 1), which our
extended model does not violate.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we showed that the market dynamics fundamentally differ when
providers implement uncoordinated access. We demonstrated that the break-even
price is no longer insensitive to the secondary demand and market sharing becomes a
possible best response. It is worth noting that even though a provider i might find it
desirable to share the market, it would still go into a price war for price values higher
than its market sharing price pMSi , thus preventing convergence to an arbitrarily high
price for secondary access. The possible market outcomes under an uncoordinated
access policy become complex when the number of providers increases, but deserve
102
further study, since they may result in a larger number of providers joining the market
and higher revenues than possible under an optimal coordinated access policy.
To address this complexity, we next focused on an uncoordinated access regime for
secondary spectrum detailed under private commons using a demand overflow model.
Similar to the previous part, using the notions of best response and Nash equilib-
rium, we show the emergence of two markedly different possible market outcomes,
depending on the secondary demand function σ(p) and the network parameters of
each provider (i.e, the service capacity C, primary demand λ, and primary reward
K).
If the market sharing price intervals of the two providers intersect, as described in
part one of Theorem 4.2.5, then the providers converge to a price profile where they
will share the market. All prices falling between the maximum break-even price and
minimum market sharing price among the two providers are possible Nash equilibria.
On the other hand, if the market sharing price intervals do not intersect, as described
in part two of Theorem 4.2.5, then the Nash equilibrium reflects a price war wherein
the winning provider sets its price slightly below the break-even price of its competitor
and gets all the profit.
Since market outcomes are determined by break-even and market sharing prices,
we carefully analyzed these two crucial parameters. We demonstrated existence and
uniqueness of these prices for each provider, under general demand functions. We
further provided implicit formulas to compute both of these prices as a function of
the system parameters.
Chapter 5
Carrier Aggregation
We now switch our focus from the pricing aspect of secondary spectrum markets
and consider the impact of how network capacity impacts the market equilibrium
presented in previous chapters. So far, our assumption has been that the primary
user traffic and the capacity with which a provider has been serving that customer pool
is fixed. This led to the formulation of different price thresholds which had a direct
impact on the outcome of the competition. Particularly, the break-even price under
a coordinated access regime is directly linked to the Erlang-B formula and this price
also determines who wins the price war between the providers. Therefore, increasing
network capacity is one strategy a network provider might follow in an effort to gain
an edge over its competition. In this chapter, instead of specifically consider secondary
spectrum markets we will first present a general framework for network dimensioning
and later demonstrate how it can be utilized to answer questions related to secondary
markets. We start with the description of the model:
5.1 Network Model
In this section, we introduce the network model considered and the accompanying
notation. We consider a small provider with a finite capacity C > 1, which consists
of the number of carriers in the spectrum owned by the provider. For example, in an
Results presented in this chapter appear in part in (Kavurmacioglu and Starobinski,
2015a),(Kavurmacioglu and Starobinski, 2015b).
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Figure 5·1: Illustration of sessions and flows. Each session consists of
one or more flows separated by idle periods.
LTE network configuration, these carriers could be interpreted as the resource blocks.
To realistically model network traffic, such as web browsing and streaming ap-
plications, we assume that the user demand consists of a sequence of independent
session arrivals that follow a Poisson process with rate λ > 0 (Bonald, 2006b). A
session consists of a combination of arbitrarily distributed and possibly correlated
flows, generated by the same user or application. Each session consists of “on” and
“off” periods within, where an “on” period means that a flow is generating traffic.
Figure 5·1 provides an illustration of sessions and flows. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the total “on” time within an individual session follows a general
probability distribution and has a mean equal to one, independently of other requests
and arrival times. Each flow has a peak rate that corresponds to the capacity of a
carrier. If an arriving flow finds all the carriers busy, it is lost, but the rest of the
session proceeds as normal. Note that standard voice calls are a special case of this
model, for which a session consists of a single flow.
Under the above statistical assumptions, the probability that a flow is lost
(blocked), is given by the Erlang-B formula (Bonald, 2006a)(p.279):
E(λ,C) =
λC/C!∑C
k=0 λ
k/k!
. (5.1)
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The above formula is insensitive to all traffic characteristics, except for the mean
number of session arrivals per time unit λ.
The provider finds itself in the same competitive spectrum market as a larger
network provider that has similar network parameters, but scaled by a multiplicative
factor n > 1 (i.e., its session arrival rate is λn and capacity Cn). We refer to the
parameter n as the scaling factor.
The objective of the smaller provider is to meet the quality of service (QoS) of the
larger provider, given by its Erlang blocking probability formula. This can be achieved
through making use of the spectrum set aside and implementing carrier aggregation.
Our goal is to identify the optimal level of carrier aggregation and investigate how it
changes with the network parameters λ and C and the scaling factor n.
5.2 Quality-Driven Approximation of Erlang-B Formula
The Erlang-B formula given by Eq. (5.1) does not easily yield itself to analysis due
to the summand and the factorial functions. Therefore, we seek an approximation
of the Erlang-B formula that is more tractable. One such approximation is obtained
through the consideration of a quality driven (QD) regime, characterized by C →∞,
λ→∞ and the following relationship:
C = λ(1 + γ), (5.2)
where γ > 0 is a constant representing the service grade. In a QD regime, the provider
positions itself in terms of capacity with respect to its load so that it offers a high
quality service (e.g., low probability of blocking or waiting).
The approximation that we will obtain under the QD regime works well for large
values of C. Moreover, the approximation is asymptotically exact since the underly-
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ing stochastic process, when properly normalized, weakly converges to an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck diffusion process as C → ∞ (Iglehart, 1965). Before we establish the
QD approximation to the Erlang-B formula, it is beneficial to recall the following
fundamental inequality of the logarithm function:
x− 1 ≥ ln(x) ≥ 1− 1
x
, x > 0,
which we can rewrite as:
x ≥ ln(1 + x) ≥ x
1 + x
, x > 0. (5.3)
Under the QD regime we propose the following asymptotically exact approxima-
tion to the Erlang-B, which we will use in the rest of the chapter:
Lemma 5.2.1 Under a QD regime such that C = λ(1 + γ), the Erlang-B formula
satisfies:
lim
λ→∞
E(λ,C)(√
2ΠC(1 + γ)Ce−λγ
)−1 = 1.
Proof. We first establish a relationship between the delay probability formula
(Erlang-C) given by:
Ec(λ,C) =
λC
C!
C
C−λ∑C−1
k=0
λk
k!
+ λ
C
C!
C
C−λ
,
and the Erlang-B formula. From the relationship between Erlang-B and Erlang-C
provided in (Zeng, 2003), it can be shown that:
E(λ,C) =
(1− ρ)Ec(λ,C)
1− ρEc(λ,C) , (5.4)
where ρ = λ/C = 1
1+γ
in a QD regime. Using the results provided in Section 16
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of (Zeltyn, 2004) for the analysis of queuing systems in the QD regime we obtain:
Ec(λ,C) =
eλγ + o(1/λ)√
2ΠCγ(1 + γ)C−1 + eλγ + o(1/λ)
. (5.5)
Substituting Eq. (5.5) for Ec(λ,C) and Eq. (5.2) for C into Eq. (5.4) we get:
E(λ,C) =
1 + o(1/λ)
g(λ, γ) + 1 + o(1/λ)
,
where g(λ, γ) =
√
2piλ(1 + γ)
(
(1 + γ)(1+γ)e−γ
)λ
.
Now we will show that g(λ, γ) is the dominating term in the denominator as λ
gets large. Observe that (1 + γ)(1+γ) ≥ eγ since taking the natural log of both sides
we obtain:
(1 + γ) ln(1 + γ) ≥ γ
ln(1 + γ) ≥ γ
1 + γ
,
which we know to be true from Eq. (5.3). Therefore g(λ, γ) gets arbitrarily large
with λ. We conclude that:
lim
λ→∞
1
g(λ, γ)
= 0.
Hence:
lim
λ→∞
E(λ,C)
g(λ, γ)−1
= lim
λ→∞
1 + o(1/λ)
g(λ, γ) + 1 + o(1/λ)
(g(λ, γ))−1
= 1.
Finally, we obtain g(λ, γ) =
√
2piC(1 + γ)Ce−λγ through Eq. (5.2). 
Lemma 5.2.1 states that the Erlang-B formula can be approximated by (and is
asymptotically equal to) the following expression, which we refer to as the QD for-
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Figure 5·2: QD Approximation with C = (1 +γ)λ and γ = 0.25. The
stem plot is the Erlang-B formula given by Eq. (5.1) while the line plot
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mula:
E(λ,C) '
(√
2piC(1 + γ)Ce−λγ
)−1
. (5.6)
Figure 5·2 compares the Erlang-B and QD formulas, for carrier capacities typical
to an LTE network (Telesystem Innovations, 2010). Clearly, the values obtained
are almost indistinguishable. All of the results presented in the rest of this chapter
are based the QD formula. Numerical examples will be provided to confirm their
accuracy.
5.3 Optimal Carrier Aggregation
In this subsection, we define the problem of optimal carrier aggregation and provide
numerical methods on calculating the level needed. Smith and Whitt (Smith and
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Whitt, 1981) show that the Erlang-B formula is upwards scalable, that is:
E(λ,C) > E(λn,Cn). (5.7)
Thus, flows in a larger network experience a smaller blocking probability than that
in a smaller network operating under a similar traffic load ρ = λ/C. This result is
not surprising to teletraffic engineers, who know that combining two networks into a
larger network results in better performance due to statistical multiplexing.
Therefore, when two providers experience similar loads but differ in network sizes
in terms of the number of carriers they each possess, the larger provider initially
provides an improved service to its users. Hence the smaller provider is inherently at
a disadvantage in a competitive spectrum market.
We now turn our attention to the possibility of the smaller provider increasing
its capacity by carrier aggregation. This way, the smaller provider can decrease
the blocking probability experienced by its users. Let ψ∗(n) denote the minimum
(optimal) level of carrier aggregation the smaller provider needs to increase its network
capacity to a size that achieves the same blocking performance as the larger provider,
namely E(λ,Cψ∗(n)) = E(λn,Cn)1. Formally:
ψ∗(n) , min{ψ : E(λ,Cψ) ≤ E(λn,Cn)}. (5.8)
Using the QD formula given by Eq. (5.6), we get:
E(λ,Cψ) '
(√
2piCψ(1 + γ′)Cψe−λγ
′
)−1
, (5.9)
E(λn,Cn) '
(√
2piCn(1 + γ)Cne−λnγ
)−1
, (5.10)
1While Cψ must be an integer value when using Eq. (5.1), there exist continuous relaxations of
the Erlang-B formula (Jagerman, 1974). Furthermore, as the capacity tends to infinity in a QD
regime, ψ can be treated as continuous.
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Figure 5·3: Optimal level of carrier aggregation ψ∗(n) of the smaller
provider with respect to scaling factor n for different initial traffic loads
ρ = λ/C. Solid lines are exact, markers are QD approximation, and
C = 50.
where Cψ = λ(1 + γ′) and hence (1 + γ′) = ψ(1 + γ). Then we can rewrite Eq. (5.8)
as:
ψ∗(n) , min
{
ψ :
√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ)C
eλγ
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ(ψ−1)
≥ 1
}
. (5.11)
As the left hand side of the inequality in Eq. (5.11) is increasing in ψ, equivalently
ψ∗(n) is the solution of:√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ)C
eλγ
)ψ−n
eλ
(
ψC
eλ
)ψ
= 1. (5.12)
Eq. (5.12) provides a fast way of numerically calculating the optimal level of carrier
aggregation needed, which can be achieved using a binary search procedure as the
left hand side is increasing in ψ. In Figure 5·3 we illustrate the calculated values of
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the optimal level of carrier aggregation using the QD formula and the exact Erlang-B
formula. One can observe that the calculations based on the QD formula work well:
even at a capacity as low as 50 carriers, the maximum percentage error2 between
the QD approximation and the actual Erlang-B calculation is 0.5714%, which occurs
when ρ = 0.9.
5.4 Structural Properties of Optimal Carrier Aggregation
In this section, we derive structural properties of optimal carrier aggregation. Specif-
ically, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the optimal carrier aggregation with
respect to the scaling factor n. We also show that the amount of carrier aggrega-
tion needed diminishes when the initial traffic load at which the providers operate is
higher.
5.4.1 Scaling Laws
From Eq. (5.7), it follows that the difference between the blocking probabilities of the
two providers increases with the scaling factor n. Thus the disadvantaged provider
needs to aggregate more carriers as n gets larger. We next provide asymptotic lower
and upper bounds on the optimal level of carrier aggregation as a function of the
scaling factor n:
Theorem 5.4.1 (Capacity Scaling Law) Consider two providers differing by a
scaling factor of n. Then the optimal level of carrier aggregation with respect to the
scaling factor as n→∞ satisfies:
1. ψ∗(n) = o
(
n
log(n)
)
2. ψ∗(n) = ω (nα) , for any constant α < 1,
where o(·) and ω(·) are standard asymptotic notations respectively representing strict
upper and lower asymptotic limiting behavior of the functions within the parentheses.
2Calculated by
∣∣∣∣∣ψQD − ψErlangψErlang
∣∣∣∣∣ · 100, where ψQD is given by Eq. (5.6) and ψErlang is given by
Eq. (5.1).
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Proof of Theorem 5.4.1. Making use of Eq. (5.2), let us rearrange Eq. (5.12) to
obtain: √
ψaλψψλ(1+γ)ψ =
√
naλneλ(ψ−1),
where a =
(1 + γ)(1+γ)
eγ
. Taking the loga(·) (which we will simply denote by log(·) to
alleviate the notation) of both sides and dividing by λ yields:
log(ψ)
2λ
+ (1 + γ)ψ log(ψ) + ψ =
log(n)
2λ
+ n+ (ψ − 1) log(e). (5.13)
We will prove the upper and lower bounds separately.
1. Let us assume that ψ = n
loga(n)
. We will check the upper bound by substituting
for ψ in Eq. (5.13) and showing that as n→∞, the left hand side is strictly greater
than the right hand side. We get:
1
2λ
log
(
n
log(n)
)
+
n(1 + γ)
log(n)
log
(
n
log(n)
)
+
n
log(n)
>
log(n)
2λ
+ n+
n log(e)
log(n)
− log(e).
Canceling the common terms and rearranging, we can rewrite this relationship as:
γ log(n) + 1 +
log(e) log(n)
n
>
(
1 + γ +
log(n)
2λn
)
log(log(n)) + log(e),
which is true for sufficiently large n (as log(n) = o(n)). Thus, we have demonstrated
that when ψ = n
log(n)
and n is sufficiently large, the left hand side of Eq. (5.12) is
strictly greater than one. Since the left hand side of (5.12) is increasing in ψ, we
conclude that there must be some ψ′ < ψ = n
log(n)
that satisfies Eq. (5.12).
2. Assume that ψ = nα, α < 1. We will demonstrate that substituting for ψ in
Eq. (5.13) results in the left hand side being strictly smaller than the right hand side
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as n→∞. We get:
α log(n)
2λ
+ α(1 + γ)nα log(n) + nα < n+
log(n)
2λ
+ log(e)(nα − 1).
Dividing by nα and collecting and rearranging the terms we have:
α(1 + γ) log(n) + 1 +
log(e)
nα
< n1−α +
(1− α) log(n)
2λnα
+ log(e),
which, since n = ω(log(n)), holds as n gets large. Therefore, when ψ = nα, α < 1,
the left hand side of Eq. (5.12) is smaller than one. Hence, there must be another
ψ′ > ψ = nα that satisfies Eq. (5.12). 
Theorem 5.4.1 states that n/ log(n) and nα are asymptotic upper and lower bounds
on ψ∗(n) respectively. Therefore as the scaling factor increases, the level of optimal
carrier aggregation scales sub-linearly but also asymptotically approaches (though
never achieves) a linear relationship. This behavior can be observed in Figure 5·3.
5.4.2 Traffic Load
Having provided scaling laws on optimal carrier aggregation with respect to the scaling
factor n, we now turn our attention to the scaling with respect to the traffic load.
In the next theorem, we state that the optimal level of carrier aggregation needed
by the smaller provider is lower in a market where both providers experience a high
initial traffic load. Therefore, in high load markets it is easier for a smaller provider
to aggregate spectrum in order to compete.
Theorem 5.4.2 (Traffic Load Scaling Law) Let ρj denote the traffic load in a
market j, which consist of two providers that differ in size by a scale of n such that:
ρj =
λjn
Cn
=
λj
C
for j = 1, 2.
Further define ψ∗j (n) to be the optimal level of carrier aggregation for the smaller
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provider in the market characterized by load ρj. Then, for two given traffic loads,
such that ρ1 > ρ2,
ψ∗1(n) < ψ
∗
2(n).
The next two lemmas give inequalities that we will use in the proof of our theorem.
Lemma 5.4.1 For γ > 0 and n > 1:
(1 + nγ) ln(1 + nγ) > n(1 + γ) ln(1 + γ).
Proof. We start by exponentiating both sides of the equation to obtain:
(1 + nγ)(1+nγ) > (1 + γ)n(1+γ).
Observe that the lhs is equal to the rhs when n = 1. Taking the derivative of both
sides of the equation with respect to n we get:
∂(1 + nγ)(1+nγ)
∂n
= (1 + nγ)(1+nγ)γ(ln(1 + nγ) + 1)
∂(1 + γ)n(1+γ)
∂n
= (1 + γ)n(1+γ)(1 + γ) ln(1 + γ).
Using the inequality provided in Eq. (5.3) we can show that:
γ ln(1 + nγ) + γ > γ ln(1 + γ) + γ ≥ (1 + γ) ln(1 + γ).
Hence if (1 + nγ)(1+nγ) ≥ (1 + γ)n(1+γ),
∂(1 + nγ)(1+nγ)
∂n
>
∂(1 + γ)n(1+γ)
∂n
.
Now we will proceed with a contradiction argument. Let n′ > 1 denote the minimum
n which once again satisfies such that:
(1 + n′γ)(1+n
′γ) = (1 + γ)n
′(1+γ).
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By continuity, there must exist an n∗ < n′ such that
∂(1 + nγ)(1+nγ)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
<
∂(1 + γ)n(1+γ)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
.
However, by the way we have defined n′, it must be that:
(1 + n∗γ)(1+n
∗γ) > (1 + γ)n
∗(1+γ), (5.14)
which implies:
∂(1 + nγ)(1+nγ)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
>
∂(1 + γ)n(1+γ)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
.

Lemma 5.4.2 For γ > 0 and n ≥ 1:
ψ∗(n) < ρ+ (1− ρ)n.
Proof. Substituting ρ = λ/C = 1/(1+γ) from Eq. (5.2), this inequality is equivalent
to:
ψ∗(n) <
1 + nγ
1 + γ
. (5.15)
We will proceed to prove this inequality by showing that if ψ = 1+nγ
1+γ
, the lhs of
Eq. (5.12) is strictly greater than the rhs. Substituting ψ into the Eq. (5.12) we
obtain: √
1 + nγ
n+ nγ
(1 + γ)−λ(n−1)
(
1 + nγ
1 + γ
)λ(1+nγ)
> 1.
Taking the ln(·) of both sides, λ → ∞ and rearranging the terms, one gets the
equivalent condition:
(1 + nγ) ln(1 + nγ) > n(1 + γ) ln(1 + γ),
which we demonstrated in Lemma 5.4.1. By continuity there must be a ψ′ < 1+nγ1
1+γ1
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that satisfies Eq.(5.12). 
Proof of Theorem 5.4.2. Assume that the different loads are caused by different
arrival rates such that λ1 > λ2 while the capacity is kept constant at C. Then we
have:
C = λ1(1 + γ1) = λ2(1 + γ2). (5.16)
It immediately follows that (1 + γ1) < (1 + γ2). Using Eq. (5.12), the following need
to be satisfied in optimality:√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ1)
C
eλ1γ1
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ1(ψ−1)
= 1, (5.17)√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ2)
C
eλ2γ2
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ2(ψ−1)
= 1. (5.18)
Suppose ψ∗2(n) = ψ and satisfies Eq. (5.18). Then we need to show that the left
hand side of Eq. (5.17) is strictly greater than one when ψ∗1(n) = ψ.
Let us rewrite the left hand side of Eq. (5.18) as the following:√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ2)
C
eλ2γ2
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ2(ψ−1)
=
√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ1)
C
eλ1γ1
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ1(ψ−1)
(λ1/λ2)
C(ψ−n)
e(λ1−λ2)(1−n)
.
Now we will demonstrate that:
e(λ1−λ2)(n−1) < (λ1/λ2)C(n−ψ). (5.19)
Start by taking the ln(·) of both sides of (5.19) to get:
(λ1 − λ2)(n− 1) < C(n− ψ) ln(λ1/λ2).
Since ln(λ1/λ2) ≥ λ1−λ2λ1 by inequality (5.3) and C = λ1(1 + γ1):
C(n− ψ) ln(λ1/λ2) ≥ (1 + γ1)(n− ψ)(λ1 − λ2). (5.20)
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From Lemma 5.4.2 we have that ψ < ρ+(1−ρ)n, which by substituting ρ = 1/(1+γ1)
and rearranging the terms, can be rewritten as:
(1 + γ1)(n− ψ) > (n− 1). (5.21)
Combining Eqs. (5.20) and (5.21), we get to the inequality in (5.19). Then we can
claim that:√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ1)
C
eλ1γ1
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ1(ψ−1)
>
√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ2)
C
eλ2γ2
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ2(ψ−1)
= 1.
Therefore, by continuity and the fact that the left hand side of (5.17) is increasing in
ψ, there must be another
ψ′ < ψ = ψ∗2(n)
that satisfies Eq. (5.17). Hence, ψ∗1(n) < ψ
∗
2(n). 
Theorem 5.4.2 states that the level of carrier aggregation needed to provide a
service level that can compete with the larger provider in the market is higher (lower)
under a low (high) traffic load, which is also illustrated in Figure 5·3. This implies
that the marginal benefit of aggregating spectrum is higher when the providers are
operating under a higher load.
5.5 General Bounds
In this section, we seek to establish an upper bound that holds for all possible values
of the scaling factor n. We will first establish that optimal carrier aggregation ψ∗(n)
is concave in n:
Lemma 5.5.1 (Concavity) For 1 ≤ n1 < n2,
ψ′∗(n1) < ψ′∗(n2).
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Figure 5·4: Linear upper bound on the optimal level of carrier aggre-
gation ψ∗(n) provided in Theorem 5.5.1, with C = 50 and ρ = 0.5.
Proof. Let n1 = n and n2 = n + x, where x ∈ R+. We know that ψ∗(n) satisfies
Eq. (5.12). Taking the derivative of the both sides of Eq. (5.12) and rearranging the
terms one can obtain the following:
ψ′∗(n) =
1
2n
+ C ln(1 + γ)− λγ
1
2ψ∗(n) + C ln(1 + γ) + C ln(ψ
∗(n))
. (5.22)
Note that the derivative depends on the exact value of ψ∗(n). In order to show that
ψ′∗(n) < ψ′∗(n+ x),
we must know something about ψ∗(n) and ψ∗(n + x). One can observe through
Eq. (5.12) that when n is incremented by a constant x > 0, ψ∗(n) increases by an
amount smaller than x such that:
ψ∗(n+ x) < ψ∗(n) + x.
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Let ψ∗(n+ x) = ψ∗(n) + δ where δ ∈ (0, x). Further define ξ = C ln(1 + γ). Then we
can make the following statement:
ψ′∗(n+ x) =
1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
1
2ψ∗(n+x) + ξ + C ln(ψ
∗(n+ x))
=
1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
1
2ψ∗(n)+2δ + ξ + C ln(ψ
∗(n) + δ)
.
Using the expressions we have obtained for ψ′∗(n) and ψ′∗(n+x), we need to show:
1
2n
+ ξ − λγ
1
2ψ∗(n) + ξ + C ln(ψ
∗(n))
>
1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
1
2ψ∗(n)+2δ + ξ + C ln(ψ
∗(n) + δ)
. (5.23)
Rearranging the terms in Eq. (5.23) we obtain:
x
2n(n+x)
+ 1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
δ
2ψ∗(n)(ψ∗(n)+δ) +
1
2ψ∗(n)+2δ + b+ C ln(ψ
∗(n))
>
1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
1
2ψ∗(n)+2δ + b+ C ln(ψ
∗(n) + δ)
.
(5.24)
Since x
2n(n+x)
> 0 if we can show that:
1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
δ
2ψ∗(n)(ψ∗(n)+δ) +
1
2ψ∗(n)+2δ + b+ C ln(ψ
∗(n))
>
1
2n+2x
+ ξ − λγ
1
2ψ∗(n)+2δ + b+ C ln(ψ
∗(n) + δ)
,
Eq. (5.24) also holds. We can rewrite the last inequality in the following fashion:
C ln(
ψ∗(n) + δ
ψ∗(n)
) >
δ
2ψ∗(n)(ψ∗(n) + δ)
. (5.25)
By Eq. (5.3),
C ln
(
ψ∗(n) + δ
ψ∗(n)
)
≥ Cδ
ψ∗(n) + δ
. (5.26)
Furthermore,
Cδ
ψ∗(n) + δ
>
δ
2ψ∗(n)(ψ∗(n) + δ)
(5.27)
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since C ≥ 1 and ψ∗(n) ≥ 1. Combining Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27), we obtain Eq. (5.25),
thus confirming Eq. (5.23). 
Given the derivative of ψ∗(n) is decreasing in n, we next establish the tightest
possible linear upper bound on ψ∗(n):
Theorem 5.5.1 (Linear Upper Bound) For γ > 0 and n ≥ 1:
ψ∗(n) ≤ (1− f(ρ)) + f(ρ)n, (5.28)
where f(ρ) = 1− 1− ρ1
2C
+ ln (1/ρ)
.
Proof of Theorem 5.5.1. We will start our proof by providing a linear function of
the form g(n) = a + bn, where a and b are constants, that is equal to ψ∗(n) when
n = 1 and has the same derivative at that point. From the way we defined ψ∗(n) in
Eq. (5.8), it follows that ψ∗(1) = 1. Then g(n) = (1− b) + bn in order to satisfy this
inequality.
Taking the derivative of the both sides of Eq. (5.12) and rearranging the terms
one can obtain the following:
ψ′∗(n) =
1
2n
+ C ln(1 + γ)− λγ
1
2ψ∗(n) + C ln(1 + γ) + C ln(ψ
∗(n))
. (5.29)
Note that Eq. (5.29) depends on the exact value of ψ∗(n). Evaluating this expression
at ψ∗(1) = 1 yields:
dψ∗(n)
dn
∣∣∣∣
n=1,ψ∗(1)=1
=
1
2
+ C ln(1 + γ)− λγ
1
2
+ C ln(1 + γ)
. (5.30)
Rearranging the terms in Eq. (5.30) and substituting ρ for 1
1+γ
, we obtain:
dψ∗(n)
dn
∣∣∣∣
n=1,ψ∗(1)=1
= 1−
1− ρ
1
2C
+ ln (1/ρ)
.
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Then b = 1−
1− ρ
1
2C
+ ln (1/ρ)
and
g(n) =
1− ρ
1
2C
+ ln (1/ρ)
+
1− 1− ρ1
2C
+ ln (1/ρ)
n.
Now we will show that g(n) ≥ ψ∗(n) for n ≥ 1. Observe that g(1) = ψ∗(1). In
Lemma 5.5.1 we have established that the derivative of optimal carrier aggregation
with respect to the scaling factor n is decreasing in n. Then we can state that
dg(n)
dn
≥ dψ
∗(n)
dn
for any n ≥ 1.
Let h(n) = g(n)− ψ∗(n). Taking the derivative with respect to n we get:
dh(n)
dn
=
dg(n)
dn
− dψ
∗(n)
dn
≥ 0.
By the mean value theorem there exists an n0 such that:
dh(n0)
dn
=
h(n)− h(1)
n− 1 =
g(n)− ψ∗(n)
n− 1 ≥ 0.
Since n ≥ 1 we conclude that g(n) ≥ ψ∗(n). 
Theorem 5.5.1 provides a way to quickly calculate an upper bound on the optimal
carrier aggregation, which is rather tight for small values of the scaling factor n
as illustrated in Figure 5·4. However, since ψ∗(n) is concave, as the scaling factor
increases, the linear upper bound diverges from the actual value. The strength of the
linear upper bound that we provide lies in its ability to provide simple insight on the
impact of network parameters on optimal carrier aggregation.
As a possible solution to the divergence of the linear upper bound, one could seek
to obtain a piece-wise linear upper bound expression on ψ∗(n) by using the results
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provided in Lemma 5.5.1 and Theorem 5.5.1. Starting at ψ∗(1) = 1, one can use the
linear bound provided in Eq. (5.28) to approximate the value of ψ∗(n) at a larger value
of n, which can then be used to obtain the derivative ψ′(n) provided in Eq. (5.29).
The derivative value can then be assumed to be the linear slope of ψ∗(n), and the
calculation procedure starts over.
Algorithm 1 Piecewise Upper Bound Calculation
procedure Bound(ψ, Scale, StepSize)
Initialize: ψ ← 1, n← 1
Set counter: State← 1
EvaluationPoints← Floor(Scale/StepSize)
while EvaluationPoints ≥ State do
n← n+ StepSize
ψ ← (1− f(ρ)) + f(ρ)n
f(ρ)← ψ′∗(n)
∣∣∣∣
ψ
State← State+ 1
return Bound
Next, we propose a simple algorithmic procedure to compute a piece-wise linear
bound on ψ∗(n) (see Algorithm 1). The algorithm takes as input the scaling factor n,
referred to as Scale, as well as the step size, referred to as StepSize, that defines the
distance between points at which the slope of the bound is recalculated. The proce-
dure starts from the known point of ψ∗(1) = 1 and uses the linear bound established
to calculate the bound on ψ∗ at every evaluation point determined by the step size
until the target scaling factor is reached.
Using Algorithm 1, if the step size is chosen small enough, the bound on ψ∗(n)
will approach the real value. Therefore, one can obtain a relatively tight piecewise
linear upper bound on ψ∗(n), which is illustrated in Figure 5·5 for several different
traffic loads, with a step size of 1.
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Figure 5·5: C = 50 - Piecewise linear upper bounds on the optimal
level of carrier aggregation ψ∗(n) obtained by the initial linear upper
bound provided in Theorem 5.5.1, the slope of which is then adjusted
at integer values of the scaling factor n using the derivative expression
provided in Eq. (5.29).
5.6 Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide numerical examples, where we calculate how much spec-
trum needs to be aggregated to preserve competition in different markets.
Consider two providers in a spectrum market with network parameters given as
follows:
(λ1, C1) = (90, 150) and (λ2, C2) = (60, 100).
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Bandwidth 1.4 MHz 3 MHz 5 MHz 10 MHz 15 MHz 20 MHz
Resource Blocks 6 15 25 50 75 100
Table 5.1: LTE bandwidth configurations and associated number of
resource blocks as specified in 3GPP Release 8 (3GPP, 2012).
The capacity numbers provided here are in line with the spectrum holdings of Verizon
and T-Mobile in the New York City area, which respectively are 30 MHz and 20 MHz
(translated into the number of resource blocks from Table 5.1), according to the FCC’s
Spectrum Dashboard (Federal Communications Commission, ). In this example, the
scaling factor is n = 150/100 = 1.5 and both providers are in a moderately loaded
market with ρ = 90/150 = 60/100 = 0.60. Using Equation (5.12), we obtain the
carrier aggregation needed by the smaller provider: ψ∗(1.5) = 1.102.
This result tells us that in order to provide the same level of service as the larger
provider, the smaller provider needs to increase its capacity at least by 1.102 times
its current value. Therefore, d100 × 0.102e = 11 additional carriers are needed to
bring the smaller provider’s service level in line with that of the larger provider.
Taking a single carrier to be a resource block in an LTE deployment, the smallest
LTE bandwidth that matches this requirement has a bandwidth of 3 MHz from Table
5.1. This is the amount of spectrum that the smaller provider needs to aggregate in
order to guarantee its ability to compete with the larger provider.
Next, we consider two different markets: (i) a market where the spectrum holdings
of the providers have the same scaling factor but the traffic load ρ is higher and (ii)
a market where there is an increase in the scaling factor n while the traffic load ρ is
the same.
(i) Consider a market where the scaling factor is n = 1.5 while the traffic load
of the market increases to ρ = 0.9. The parameters of the two providers are now as
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follows:
(λ1, C1) = (135, 150) and (λ2, C2) = (90, 100).
Under the new load, the carrier aggregation needed by the smaller provider becomes
ψ∗(1.5) = 1.037.
Thus, d100 × 0.037e = 4 additional carriers are needed by the smaller provider,
fewer than the number of carriers calculated before and in line with Theorem 5.4.2.
Under the same LTE scenario considered previously, Table 5.1 indicates that aggre-
gating a minimum of 1.4 MHz of spectrum in the market with a higher traffic load is
enough to achieve the same goal.
(ii) This time, we consider a market where the scaling factor is increased to n = 6
but the traffic load is the same as the first market (i.e., ρ = 0.6). The parameters of
the providers are given as follows:
(λ1, C1) = (90, 150) and (λ2, C2) = (15, 25).
These numbers are in line with the spectrum holdings of Verizon and T-Mobile in
Logan County, IL, which respectively are 30 MHz and 5 MHz (translated into the
number of resource blocks from Table 5.1), according the FCC’s Spectrum Dash-
board (Federal Communications Commission, ). In this case, the carrier aggregation
needed by the smaller provider is ψ∗(6) = 1.719.
This time, the smaller provider needs an additional d100 × 0.719e = 72 carriers.
Notice that the increase in the total capacity needed is smaller than the increase in
the scaling factor since:
ψ∗(6)/ψ∗(1.5) = 1.559 < 6/1.5 = 4.
Under the same LTE scenario considered previously, Table 5.1 indicates that aggre-
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gating a minimum of 15 MHz of spectrum is needed to achieve the same goal, as the
scaling factor increases to 6.
5.7 Extension to Delay Systems
In Section 5.2, we presented a QD regime approximation of the Erlang-B formula
through Lemma 5.2.1. The assumption was that if all the carriers are busy upon the
arrival of a flow, then the flow is lost. This is referred to as a loss system.
Our results can easily be extended to a delay system. In such a system, all active
flows share the entire network capacity. If the number of flows exceeds C, then the
flows can still be transmitted but at a rate below their peak rate. In that case, the
flows will experience congestion and additional delay. The probability that an arrival
flow experiences congestion is given by the Erlang-C formula:
Ec(λ,C) =
λC
C!
C
C−λ∑C−1
k=0
λk
k!
+ λ
C
C!
C
C−λ
.
This equation holds for the same general traffic model as presented in Sec-
tion 5.1 (Bonald and Roberts, 2012).
Using the results of (Zeltyn, 2004) for the analysis of queuing systems in the QD
regime we have:
Ec(λ,C) '
(√
2piCγ(1 + γ)C−1eλγ
)−1
. (5.31)
Through following similar steps as in Section 5.3 and replacing the QD formula of
Erlang-B with Eq. (5.31), it is possible to show that the optimal carrier aggregation
in a delay system is given by:
ψ∗c (n) = min
{
ψ :
√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ)C
eλγ
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ(ψ−1)
(
1 +
ψ − 1
ψγ
)
≥ 1
}
. (5.32)
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Figure 5·6: Comparison of optimal carrier aggregation under loss and
delay systems, with C = 50 and ρ = 0.7.
As the left hand side of the inequality in Eq. (5.11) is increasing in ψ, equivalently
ψ∗c (n) is the solution of:√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ)C
eλγ
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ(ψ−1)
(
1 +
ψ − 1
ψγ
)
= 1. (5.33)
Note that Eq. (5.33) is the same as Eq. (5.12) except for the 1 + ψ−1
ψγ
term at the
end. Since 1 + ψ−1
ψγ
> 1 for ψ > 1, one quickly concludes that the left hand side
of Eq. (5.33) is always strictly greater than the left hand side of Eq. (5.12). In other
words, for the same system parameters, the level of optimal carrier aggregation under
the Erlang-C delay model is always smaller than that under the Erlang-B loss model:
ψ∗c (n) < ψ
∗(n)
Figure 5·6 illustrates this relationship. By replacing Eq. (5.12) with Eq. (5.33) and
following a similar analysis, the same structural properties given in Theorems 5.4.1
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and 5.4.2 also hold for the QD Erlang-C formula. To give an example, we revisit
Theorem 5.4.1 here:
Theorem 5.7.1 (Erlang-C Capacity Scaling Law) Consider two providers dif-
fering by a scaling factor of n. Then the optimal level of carrier aggregation with
respect to the scaling factor n satisfies:
1. ψ∗c (n) = o
(
n
log(n)
)
2. ψ∗c (n) = ω (n
α) , for any α < 1,
where o(·) and ω(·) respectively represent strict upper and lower asymptotic limiting
behavior on the function within the parentheses.
Proof of Theorem 5.7.1. Let us rearrange Eq. (5.33) to obtain:√
ψ
n
(
(1 + γ)C
eλγ
)ψ−n
ψCψ
eλ(ψ−1)
=
ψγ
ψ(1 + γ)− 1 . (5.34)
We will prove that n/log(n) and nα are still asymptotic upper and lower bounds
by showing that the term ψγ
ψ(1+γ)−1 converges to a constant and thus does not affect
the asymptotic relationships.
1. Assume that ψ = n
log(n)
. Then replacing ψ in the right hand side term of
Eq. (5.34) we obtain:
ψγ
ψ(1 + γ)− 1 =
nγ
log(n)
n
log(n)
(γ + 1)− 1 ,
and:
lim
n→∞
nγ
log(n)
n
log(n)
(γ + 1)− 1 =
γ
1 + γ
= (1− ρ).
2. This time, assume that ψ = nα, α < 1. Then replacing ψ in the right hand side
term of Eq. (5.34) we obtain:
ψγ
ψ(1 + γ)− 1 =
nαγ
nα(1 + γ)− 1 ,
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and
lim
n→∞
nαγ
nα(1 + γ)− 1 =
γ
1 + γ
= (1− ρ).

5.8 Applications to Secondary Spectrum Markets
We next discuss how our results on carrier aggregation apply to pricing games in
secondary spectrum markets. In Chapter 3, we identified the minimum (break-even)
price at which it is profitable for a provider implementing a coordinated access policy
to start admitting secondary users. The break-even price pBE is directly linked to the
Erlang-B formula:
pBE = KE(λ,C). (5.35)
The break-even price plays a critical role in determining the Nash equilibrium of a
game where two providers compete in prices to attract secondary demand. Without
loss of generality, suppose that the break-even price of provider 1 is lower than that of
provider 2. Recall that Theorem 3.4.1 provided in Chapter 3 states the competition
results in a price war that is won by provider 1 (i.e., provider 1 captures the entire
market). One concludes that the outcome of the pricing game is directly related to
the break-even prices, which in turn relate to the Erlang-B formula.
Hence, the level of optimal carrier aggregation acts as an identifier of necessary
network provisioning to obtain a competitive price advantage in a secondary spectrum
market. All of our previous results, such as the structural properties with respect to
scaling factors and traffic loads and the established general bounds can be readily
applied to the question of how to strategically implement carrier aggregation in a
secondary spectrum market.
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5.9 Summary
In this chapter of the dissertation, we investigated the impact adding additional ca-
pacity to a network provider through carrier aggregation. We accomplished this by
providing computational methods, scaling laws, and bounds on the optimal carrier
aggregation. Under a QD regime, we derived an approximation of the Erlang-B for-
mula. This approximation is highly accurate as long as the number of carriers is large
enough (e.g., above 50) and the spectrum utilization does not approach 100% (e.g.,
90% or below), an assumption that is consistent with measurement studies (Valenta
et al., 2010).
Using the QD formula, we investigated optimal carrier aggregation by proving
two scaling laws: (i) with respect to the scaling factor n and (ii) with respect to the
traffic load. Specifically, we obtained sub-linear (though close to linear) asymptotic
upper and lower bounds in the form ψ∗(n) = o (n/ log(n)) and ψ∗(n) = ω (nα) for
any α < 1. Then, we demonstrated that if the traffic load under which each provider
operates increases, then the level of carrier aggregation required is reduced. This
result indicates that the marginal benefit of carrier aggregation in a heavily loaded
network is higher than that in a lightly loaded network.
Next, we derived an upper bound on ψ∗(n) that applies to any value of n and
is provably the tightest possible. This upper bound explicitly relates to the network
parameters and can provide regulators and market players with useful guidelines. We
also provided a method of improving it to a piece-wise linear bound by iteratively
approximating ψ′(n).
We explained how the results derived for loss systems, based on the Erlang-B for-
mula, extend to delay systems based on the Erlang-C formula. We proved that for the
same network parameters, the optimal level of carrier aggregation in a delay system
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is always smaller than in a loss system. Finally, we provided a relationship between
the profitable pricing of users in secondary spectrum markets and the Erlang-B for-
mula for which our results apply. Hence, the results on optimal carrier aggregation
presented in this chapter are directly applicable to pricing strategies in secondary
spectrum markets, where providers can aggregate spectrum to lower their prices in a
possible price war.
Chapter 6
Networks with Spatial Interferences
In the previous chapters we have limited our analysis to a single access point (AP) in a
wireless landscape. However, in reality wireless networks consist of many APs covering
different geographical areas and depending of their distance some of these APs will
be subject to interference. Therefore, to accurately model wireless network behavior
it is important to consider the spatial aspect of wireless spectrum. In this chapter we
extend on our previous analysis of profitability for a single AP presented in Chapters 3
and 4 to a network consisting of many APs and experiences interference. We describe
the spatial model being considered and propose a decoupling method to characterize
the stochastic behavior of APs under interference. Using this approximated model we
then identify the profitability conditions for admitting secondary users into a network
under the coordinated access policy described in Chapter 3.
6.1 Spatial Model
In this section we introduce the network model considered and the accompanying
notation. Consider a cellular provider whose network is given by the graph G = (I, E)
where |I| = n. Each vertex i ∈ I represents a cell which has a dedicated primary-user
base whose traffic arrivals form a Poisson process with rate λi > 0 (i.e., the average
number of requests per unit time), and a finite number of spectrum bands Ci on
which these arrivals are serviced. For each served primary user, provider i collects a
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Figure 6·1: A Hexagonal Lattice Topology Network. Cells that are in
the interference neighborhood of the black cell are colored red.
reward of K units. The primary users occupy a single unit of capacity for a duration
that is generally distributed with mean µ, which we assume to be 1, without loss of
generality, independently of other requests and arrival times.
In addition to the primary arrivals, the provider at a single cell i faces a possible
independent secondary arrival process with rate σi that is also Poisson. The intensity
of secondary arrivals is a function of the price p charged per access, denoted by
σ(p). Here σ(·) is the demand function, which is assumed to be continuous and
non-increasing. We assume that the secondary users have the same channel holding
statistics as the primary users. This assumption is valid when both types of traffic
are generated by similar applications.
Let xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , Ci} denote the occupancy level of cell i. Each cell i has
a certain number of neighboring cells denoted by the set N(i) = {j | (j, i) ∈ E},
which consists of the cells that share an edge with cell i. Let wij denote the level of
interference of a call arrival at cell i with cell j, such that in the duration of the call
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wij units of resources are also occupied at cell j. We assume that the interference
is symmetric such that wij = wji. Self interference is allowed such that wii = 1. A
network occupancy is feasible if for all cells i ∈ I:
xi +
∑
j∈N(i)
wjixj ≤ Ci. (6.1)
Figure 6·2 illustrates the model being considered on a hexagonal topology common
to cellular networks.
We define λ, C, and x as the corresponding vectors containing the individual
parameters of all cells in the network G. Further, let wi = [wi1, wi2, ..., wiI ] denote
the interference vector of cell i in the network.
The provider uses an admission policy to decides whether to admit or reject a
secondary arrival to its network, which we denote by Ai. We assume that Ai depends
only on the number of each class of users (primary and secondary) in the system and
belongs to the class of occupancy-based policies. The performance of occupancy-based
policies are insensitive to the call length distribution except through the mean (Mutlu
et al., 2010). Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume exponentially dis-
tributed service times for the purpose of analysis in the rest of the chapter.
Since network cells have a finite number of channels, they cannot accommodate
new requests if all of the channels are occupied. This results in some requests being
blocked. We define Bi,k(λ, σi, Ai) to be the blocking probability for class k users
(k = 1 for primary and 2 for secondary) when secondary demand given by σi is
admitted at cell i and the access policy implemented for secondary users in cell is Ai.
The goal of the provider is to maximize the total revenue collected. The revenue
rate of cell i when the network services secondary demand of σi units at cell i is given
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by:
Rii(p, σi, Aj) = (1−Bi,2(λ, σi, Ai))σip+ (1−Bi,1(λ, σi, Ai))λiK
whereas the revenue rate of cell j 6= i is given by:
Rij(p, σi, Aj) = (1−Bj,1(λ, σi, Ai))λjK.
For cell i, the first and the second terms are respectively the revenue generated
by secondary and primary requests being serviced. For cells other than i, the only
revenue is that collected from the primary users. Each term represents the expected
long time rates per unit time. The total reveue rate of the network is given by the
summation of the revenue rates over all cells in the network G:
R(p, σi, Ai) = (1−Bi,2(λ, σi, Ai))σip+
∑
j∈I
(1−Bj,1(λ, σi, Ai))λjK. (6.2)
6.2 First-order Erlang Fixed Point Approximation
In this section we will consider a network in the absence of secondary users and provide
a decomposition model that effectively removes interference between the cell while still
capturing its impact of interference on the network. We start by providing a quick
explanation of Kelly’s work on loss network where he introduced the use of Erlang
Fixed Point Approximation (EFPA) to approximate the blocking probabilities (Kelly,
1991; Kelly, 1986).
For a single cell the probability that an arriving call will be blocked is given by
the well-established Erlang-B formula:
E(λ,C) =
λC
C!∑C
k=0
λk
k!
. (6.3)
136
In a network setting, however, where a call arrival uses resources in multiple cells,
the Erlang-B formula is no longer valid. Kelly in (Kelly, 1986) provides the well-
studied Erlang Fixed Point Approximation formula that yields the loss probabilities
in a network. The approximation assumes that each cell blocking is independent from
the rest of the network and the call arrivals are thinned accordingly. Al Daoud et. al.
provide the EFPA formula in (Al Daoud et al., 2007), which is given by the following
set of equations:
bi = E
(
(1− bi)−1
∑
j∈I
wijλj
∏
k∈I
(1− bk)wjk , Ci
)
for i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n. (6.4)
If a call arrival to cell i is blocked with probability bi and assuming that such events are
independent, the effective load at cell i is given by
∑
j wijλj
∏
k(1− bk)wjk . Eq. (6.4)
states that the blocking probability at cell i is consistent with the load it faces. The
set of equations (6.4) has a unique solution (Kelly, 1991); hence the approximation is
well defined.
The loss probability of a call arriving in cell i is simply the probability of not
being able to accommodate the call at all cells which are being affected by its arrival.
This probability is given by the following:
Bi(λ,C) = 1−
∏
j∈I
(1− bj)wij . (6.5)
Kelly has shown in (Kelly, 1991) that when both the arrival rates and capacities
at the network are increased in line with the other, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
λi(n) = λ and lim
n→∞
1
n
Ci(n) = C.
the blocking probabilities calculated by the approximation in Eq. (6.5) converge to
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Figure 6·2: A symmetric hexagonal network - Red cells are in the
interference neighborhood of the white cell, where a call arrival to the
white cell will also occupy w units capacity in the red cells.
their exact values since it has been demonstrated in (Kelly, 1991) that:
1−Bi(λ,C) =
∏
j∈I
(1− bj)wij + o(n−1/2). (6.6)
For small interference values wij, making use of the binomial series expansion, we
can make the following approximation:
1−Bi(λ,C) =
∏
j∈I
(1− bj)wij ≈
∏
j∈I
(1− wijbj). (6.7)
Now we consider only the first iteration of Eq. (6.4) in an effort to remove the
coupling between the cells in the network, which then allows us to treat each cell as
an independent queue. For relatively low blocking regimes such that almost all of the
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arrivals to the network are accepted, Eq. (6.4) is well approximated by:
bˆi = E
(∑
j∈I
wijλj, Ci
)
= E
λi + ∑
j∈N(i)
wijλj, Ci
 (6.8)
Therefore it is as if the total arrival rate at cell i is the sum of its own arrival rate
and its neighbors’ arrival rates multiplied by the respective probability of interference
at each neighbor cell. Let
λ′i = λi + λN(i), (6.9)
where λ′i is the effective load at cell i and λN(i) =
∑
j∈N(i)wijλj is the effective
interfering arrival rate from the neighboring cells. Hence, the blocking at cell i in the
first-order approximation is given by the Erlang-B formula under the effective load:
bˆi = E(λ
′
i, Ci). (6.10)
In the next lemma we will show that as the network is scaled up with the load
(λ/C) kept constant, the Erlang-B formula tends to zero.
Lemma 6.2.1 For λ < C,
lim
n→∞
E(λn,Cn) = 0. (6.11)
Proof. Smith and Whitt’s work (Smith and Whitt, 1981) (page 54) has shown that
we can express the Erlang-B formula in the following form:
E(λn,Cn)−1 =
∞∫
0
e−x
(
n+ x/λ
n
)Cn
dx. (6.12)
To determine the limit, we first need to determine:
lim
n→∞
(
n+ x/λ
n
)Cn
. (6.13)
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We can rewrite Eq. (6.13) in the following form:
lim
n→∞
(
n+ x/λ
n
)Cn
= elimn→∞ Cn log(
n+x/λ
n ).
Taking t = 1/n, we obtain:
lim
n→∞
Cn log
(
n+ x/λ
n
)
= lim
t→0
C
log(1 + tx/λ)
t
.
Using L’Hospital’s rule:
lim
t→0
C
log(1 + tx/λ)
t
= lim
t→0
C
d log(1+tx/λ)
dt
dt
dt
= lim
t→0
C
x/λ
1 + tx/λ
= Cx/λ.
Now we can take the limit:
lim
n→∞
E(λn,Cn)−1 = lim
n→∞
∞∫
0
e−x
(
n+ x/λ
n
)Cn
dx
=
∞∫
0
e−xeCx/λdx =∞
for λ < C which implies limn→∞E(λn,Cn) = 0. 
Now we present our first theorem, which establishes that the first-order approx-
imation to the EFPA is also asymptotically exact as the cell arrivals and capacities
increase proportionally.
Theorem 6.2.1 Let b = (b1, b2, ..., bI) denote the solution to EFPA given in
Eq. (6.4). Then in a network where
∑
j∈I wijλj < Ci for all i:
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w=0.05, λ=8 Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7
Bi (simulated) 2.9319e-3 9.8786e-4 9.7598e-4 9.8269e-4 9.8703e-4 9.7383e-41 9.8934e-4
Bˆi (approximated) 2.9823e-3 9.9993e-4 9.9993e-4 9.9993e-4 9.9993e-4 9.9993e-4 9.9993e-4
bˆi (approximated) 2.7477e-3 7.8410e-4 7.8410e-4 7.8410e-4 7.8410e-4 7.8410e-4 7.8410e-4
Error (%) 1.72 1.22 2.45 1.75 1.31 2.68 1.07
w=0.15, λ=5 Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7
Bi (simulated) 1.1394e-3 2.2178e-4 2.2042e-4 2.2218e-4 2.2131e-4 2.2196e-4 2.2113e-4
Bˆi (approximated) 1.1461e-3 2.2674e-4 2.2674e-4 2.2674e-4 2.2674e-4 2.2674e-4 2.2674e-4
bˆi (approximated) 1.1039e-3 4.6991e-5 4.6991e-5 4.6991e-5 4.6991e-5 4.6991e-5 4.6991e-5
Error (%) 0.59 2.23 2.86 2.05 2.45 2.15 2.53
Table 6.1: Blocking probabilities of a symmetric hexagonal network
given in Figure 6·2 with two different configurations. Bi is the block-
ing probability obtained from the simulation of the exact system. Bˆi
and bˆi represent the approximations made in Eq.’s (6.5) and (6.10),
respectively. The error percentages are between the simulated and ap-
proximated call blocking probabilities (Bi and Bˆi). All cells have a
capacity of C = 20. The interference weights are the same and wij = w
for all i,j.
lim
n→∞
E
(
(1− bi)−1
∑
j∈I
wijλjn
∏
k∈I
(1− bk)wjk , Cin
)
E
(∑
j∈I
wijλjn,Cin
) = 1 (6.14)
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 6.2.1 we have stated that the Erlang-B formula
can be expressed in the following form:
E(λn,Cn)−1 =
∞∫
0
e−x
(
n+ x/λ
n
)Cn
dx.
Rewriting the ratio in Eq. (6.14) using the integral form we get:
lim
n→∞
∫∞
0
e−x
(
n+x/
∑
j∈I
wijλj
n
)Cin
dx
∫∞
0
e−x
(
n+x/(1−bi)−1
∑
j∈I
wijλj
∏
k∈I
(1−bk)wjk
n
)Cin
dx
. (6.15)
Using Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem (Rudin, 1964, pp. 321), we can
take the limit inside the integral, to show the ratio of these two expressions is equal
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to one, it is sufficient to show that:
lim
n→∞
(
n+x/
∑
j∈I
wijλj
n
)Cin
(
n+x/(1−bi)−1
∑
j∈I
wijλj
∏
k∈I
(1−bk)wjk
n
)Cin = 1, (6.16)
Now assume that limn→∞ bi = 0 for all i. Taking the limit of Eq. (6.16) then yields:
e
Cix/
∑
j∈I
wijλj
e
Cix/
∑
j∈I
wijλj
= 1.
Finally, we need to check our assumption that limn→∞ bi = 0. We consider the
right hand side of Eq. (6.4). Using the integral notation provided in Eq. (6.12), if the
assumption holds, we have just shown that in the limit it is given by the expression: ∞∫
0
e
x(Ci/
∑
j∈I
wijλj−1)
dx
−1
which goes to zero for
∑
j∈I wijλj < Ci following from the results in Lemma 6.2.1.
Hence our initial assumption holds and is a solution to the EFPA. Since we know
that the solution of the EFPA is unique, there can be no other solution that satisfies
Eq. (6.4). 
Theorem 6.2.1 states that as the network size increases, the blocking probabilities
calculated by the EFPA and the first-order calculation proposed in Eq. (6.8) are the
same in the limit. Therefore one can conclude that for large networks, the blocking
probability of an individual cell can be well approximated by modeling it as a single
cell in isolation as long as the load increase due to its neighbors are accounted for.
In Table 6.1 we provide the results of a computer simulation of a hexagonal network
topology shown in Figure 6·2. Even at low values of λ and C, the approximation is
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Figure 6·3: The auxillary model to of the symmetric hexagonal net-
work provided in Figure 6·2
very close to the simulation results. Naturally, one can expect the approximation to
be worse at these values if the interference given by wij had been higher. However,
for relatively low levels of interference one can conclude that the EFPA is sufficiently
close to the real value and hence in the rest of the chapter we shall assume that
bˆj = bj.
6.3 Profitability of Secondary Demand
In this section we seek to establish profitability conditions on secondary demand
where admitting secondary users into the network at a single cell site results in an
improved revenue for the network provider.
For a given secondary demand σ admitted at cell i for secondary price p, let
A∗i (p, σ) denote an access policy that maximizes the revenue rate for a provider. We
refer to A∗i (p, σ) as the optimal coordinated access policy. We represent the resulting
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maximal revenue R∗i (p, σ) as follows:
R∗i (p, σ) = Ri(p, σ, A
∗
i (p, σ)) = max
Ai
Ri(p, σ, Ai). (6.17)
Now, consider a policy that admits secondary users only when the occupancy
(i.e., the number of users being served) in a node drops below a constant Ti ∈ [0, Ci],
which we term the admisssion threshold. We denote the implementation of a threshold
policy with the notation Ai(σ, p) = Ti. Let T
∗
i denote the optimal threshold value
that maximizes the revenue of the provider such that:
T ∗i = arg max
Ti=0,...,Ci
Ri(p, σ, Ti) (6.18)
The optimal threshold value depends on all parameters of the provider including
intensity of the secondary demand. It is well-known that the optimal threshold policy
is also the optimal admission policy for a network consisting of a single AP (Key, 1990;
Miller, 1969; Ramjee et al., 1997).
It is important for a network provider to identify conditions it makes sense from
a revenue perspective to ever accept a secondary request at a single cell i. If the
secondary price-demand pair (p, σ) yields profit relative to serving primary demand
only, (p, σ) represents an economically viable situation for a provider. The issue is
closely related with the opportunity cost of accepting a secondary request: On the
one hand such a request brings an immediate revenue of p, on the other hand it may
cause rejecting future requests, possibly with higher immediate revenue, due to the
channel that it holds temporally.
Definition 6.3.1 Let pBEi (Ai) denote the break-even price that determines the prof-
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itability of the admission of secondary users in node i under policy Ai such that:
Ri(p, σ, Ai) ≥ Ri(p, 0, Ai) if p ≥ pBEi (Ai)
Ri(p, σ, Ai) < Ri(p, 0, Ai) if p < p
BE
i (Ai)
Following from our definition, pBEi (A
∗
i ) denotes the break-even price under the op-
timal admission policy, which we name the general optimal break-even price; whereas
pBEi (T
∗
i ) denotes the break-even price under the optimal threshold policy, which we
name the threshold break-even price. It has been previously demonstrated that the
optimal break-even price is insensitive to the shape or the intensity of the secondary
demand (Al Daoud et al., 2012).
In Al Daoud et. al.’s work (Al Daoud et al., 2012) it has been established that
pBEi (A
∗
i ) does not depend on the value of the secondary demand σ. Hence the value
of the optimal break-even price does not change whether we set σ =∞ or a constant
σ′. We will next derive an expression for the break-even price under threshold policies
and infinite secondary demand, assuming this type of policies are optimal. Once we
establish this price, we will show that this gives us the tightest upper bound among
the threshold break-even prices on the general optimal break-even price if the optimal
policy is not of threshold type.
Assume that the optimal admission policy is of threshold type such that A∗i = T
∗
i .
Since the optimal admission policy is insensitive to secondary demand, we will identify
the break-even price by setting σ =∞ and thus considering a network where all states
below the threshold value are always occupied by secondary users. Specifically, we
identify a price condition that yields a better revenue under any threshold policy
than the revenue generated by a policy that flatly rejects all secondary arrivals. This
determines the sign of the balance in the trade-off when making a control decision to
admit a secondary user or not. We state our main result on this profitability condition
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in the following theorem:
Theorem 6.3.1 The break-even price pBEi (A
∗
i ) is given by the following expression:
pBEi (A
∗
i ) = min
T
K
pio(T )
∏
j∈N(i)(1− wij b˜j)
(
λi
λ′i
(∏
j∈I
(1− wijbj)− (1− pio(C))
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wij b˜j)
)
+
∑
k∈N(i)
(
λk
λ′i
∏
j∈I
(1− wkjbj)− (1− wkipio(C))
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wkj b˜j)
))
. (6.19)
where
pio(k) =
{
(λ′i)
k/k!
Go
for k = T + 1, T + 2, . . . , Ci
0 otherwise,
bˆi = E(λ
′
i, Ci),
b˜j = E(λ
′
j + wij(T + 1)piio(T + 1), Cj),
and Go =
∑Ci
k=T+1
(λ′i)
k
k!
is a normalizing constant, λ′i is the effective load given in
Eq. (6.9).
Proof. Let T be the maximum state of cell i at which secondary arrivals are
admitted. If we set σ =∞, then T +1 channels at cell i will always be occupied, since
upon a departure at occupancy level T + 1 a new secondary request is immediately
admitted to the system. Therefore, the state space of cell i reduces to T + 1, T +
2, ..., Ci. The occupancy process of cell i under such a policy is illustrated in Figure 6·4
and has the following equilibrium distribution:
pio =
{
(λ′i)
k/k!
Gio
for k = T + 1, T + 2, . . . , Ci
0 otherwise,
(6.20)
where Go =
∑Ci
k=T+1
(λ′i)
k
k!
is a normalizing constant.
Before considering the impact on a neighboring cell j, we first calculate the effec-
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Figure 6·4: Occupancy process of cell i when the secondary demand
is set to ∞ and the threshold value is T . T + 1 channels are always
occupied by secondary users.
tive secondary demand that is the result of the threshold policy in cell i. Secondary
demand is generated when a secondary arrival is admitted immediately after a de-
parture from cell i where T + 1 channels are busy. Since secondary users have unit
holding time, T+1 secondary arrivals are served on average in a unit time, which then
translates into an effective secondary demand with a rate of (T +1)pio(T +1) at cell i.
The effective load at the neighboring cell j is now given by λ′j +wij(T + 1)pio(T + 1)
and the blocking becomes:
b˜j = E(λ
′
j + wij(T + 1)pio(T + 1), Cj). (6.21)
The secondary revenue generated at cell i is given by σeff ·p = (T+1)piio(T+1) ·p.
On the other hand, a primary request is admitted when less than Ci channels are
occupied, the revenue rate of which is then given by λiK(1 − piio(Ci)) at cell i and
λjK(1 − pijo(Cj)) for all j ∈ N(i). These revenue rates are then subjected to the
blocking of the neighboring nodes. The policy is profitable if the revenue rate we
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formulated exceeds the revenue rate in the absence of secondary users, i.e.,
(T + 1)pio(T + 1) p
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wij b˜j) + λiK(1− pio(C))
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wij b˜j) (6.22)
+
∑
k∈N(i)
λkK(1− wkipio(C))
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wkj b˜j) >
λiK
∏
j∈I
(1− wijbj) +
∑
k∈N(i)
λkK
∏
j∈I
(1− wkjbj).
Algebraic manipulation of this inequality yields:
p >
K
pio(T )
∏
j∈N(i)(1− wij b˜j)
(
λi
λ′i
(∏
j∈I
(1− wijbj)− (1− pio(C))
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wij b˜j)
)
+
∑
k∈N(i)
(
λk
λ′i
∏
j∈I
(1− wkjbj)− (1− wkipio(C))
∏
j∈N(i)
(1− wkj b˜j)
))
. (6.23)
The value of T that minimizes the right hand side of Eq. (6.23) yields the form in
Eq. (6.19). 
Now consider the case when the optimal policy is not threshold type, i.e.,
A∗i (p, σ) 6= T ∗i . Then the property of being insensitive to secondary demand does
not apply for the threshold type policy we have just considered and under which we
derived the break-even price. To avoid confusion, let us expand our notation and let
T ∗i (σ) denote the optimal threshold under secondary demand σ. Thus the break-even
price derived in Theorem 6.3.1 becomes pBEi (A
∗
i ) = p
BE
i (T
∗
i (∞)). In the following the-
orem, we will establish that this break-even price gives us the tightest upper bound
that can be established on the optimal break-even price among all threshold type
policies regardless of the secondary demand.
Theorem 6.3.2 The threshold break-even price established under infinite secondary
demand is a lower bound on all other threshold break-even prices such that for any
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secondary demand σ′ <∞:
pBEi (T
∗
i (∞)) ≤ pBEi (T ∗i (σ′))
Proof. We will demonstrate the inequality in the theorem by establishing that
setting the price equal to the threshold break-even price under a finite secondary
demand yields a positive revenue under infinite demand, i.e.,
Ri(p
BE
i (T
∗
i (σ
′)),∞, T ∗i (∞)) ≥ Ri(pBEi (T ∗i (σ′)), σ′, T ∗i (σ′)).
Consider a policy Aˆ(p,∞) that does a random thinning of the secondary demand and
brings it to σ′ by setting an initial threshold value. It then implements the threshold
policy T ∗i (σ
′). Hence the policy Aˆ(p,∞) generates the same revenue as the policy
T ∗i (σ
′):
Ri(p,∞, Aˆ(p,∞)) = Ri(p, σ′, T ∗i (σ′)). (6.24)
Since T ∗i (∞) represents the optimal threshold policy when the secondary demand is
infinite, we have:
Ri(p,∞, T ∗i (∞)) ≥ Ri(p,∞, Aˆ(p,∞)). (6.25)
Combining Eq.’s (6.24) and (6.25) gives us the desired inequality:
Ri(p,∞, T ∗i (∞)) ≥ Ri(p, σ′, T ∗i (σ′)). (6.26)

6.3.1 Numerical Results
In this section we present numerical results on the break-even price expression we
provided in Theorem 6.3.1. Although the expression we provided in Eq. (6.19) does
not state which threshold value T minimizes the break-even price, based on previous
149
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
λ
Br
ea
k−
ev
en
 P
ric
e
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
λ
T*
(∞
)
Figure 6·5: The break-even price and the optimal threshold value
that minimizes it as provided in Eq. (6.19) for a network with 7 cells,
each with a capacity of C = 30 and the interferences are as shown in
Figure 6·2 with w = 0.1. (K=100)
results obtained in Chapter 3 and numerical analysis, we conjecture that the optimal
threshold value is zero. Figure 6·5 illustrates this where we calculate the optimal
threshold value over a range of primary arrival rates that maintain low blocking
within the network.
In other words, the break-even price derived in Theorem 6.3.1 is obtained when
the network provider admits secondary users into the network only when the cell at
which they are admitted into the network is empty. This has the following intuitive
explanation: The impact secondary users have on the network is two-fold. First, they
occupy a channel at the cell where they are being admitted. Secondly, they increase
the likelihood that the call arrivals in the neighborhood of cell i will be blocked. Both
of these effects result in an opportunity cost for the provider in terms of the primary
revenue lost. Due to the stochastic nature of the call arrival departure process at
each cell, this risk is minimized when cell i is completely empty.
We then turn our attention to the accuracy of approximation of the break-even
price. In order to do so we have simulated the revenue rate of the network with
a hexagonal topology as illustrated in Figure 6·2 under a lock-out (no secondary
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Figure 6·6: The simulated profit of a network provider shown in Fig-
ure 6·2 for different prices. The error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. (w=0.05, C=5, λ=3, K=100). The results are obtained
after 10 million primary arrivals at each cells and over 60 simulations.
admission) and the T = 0 threshold policy. Figure 6·6 illustrates the increase in
profits when secondary users are admitted to an empty network. One can observe
from the figure that the break-even price is approximately given by pBE = 18, with a
possible range of [16.2, 19.5] due to the confidence interval provided. Using Eq. (6.19)
we obtain pBE = 20.4 which indicates a 10% error between the simulated result
and our approximation. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that for the
network values of λ = 3 and C = 5 there is significant amount of blocking in the
network where our first order approximation is not very accurate. While it would
be desirable to simulate the same network with low blocking values, simulating the
network becomes more time intensive in order to stay within the same confidence
intervals. This because the difference in revenues are essentially generated whenever
the network is full or the network is empty both of which become very rare events as
the capacity is increased.
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a framework to determine the profitable admission of
secondary users in a multicell network that is subject to spatial interference. We have
first provided a method to decouple the behavior in the individual cells from the rest
of the network using a first order approximation to Erlang fixed point methods. Then,
using the provided decoupling we have identified profitability conditions of secondary
user admission at a single cell and provided the corresponding price expression in
terms of the network parameters.
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks and Future
Directions
In the dissertation, we have investigated the profitability and the competitive behavior
of oligopolies in secondary spectrum markets, which can be formed as a result of
dynamic spectrum sharing in wireless communications. We have been motivated by
the initiatives of the FCC in this direction, encouraging the formation of such markets
as a possible way to improve spectrum utilization compared to the current situation.
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation we have focused on the pricing of secondary
users in a possible secondary market modeled after FCC’s private commons. We have
investigated competitive behavior and the market outcomes it leads to between the
market participants in an attempt to collect revenues from secondary users at a
profitable price.
In Chapter 3, we focused on the first of the two proposed regimes for secondary
spectrum access, namely coordinated access under private commons. Such an inves-
tigation can help provide important guidance to a firm’s strategic decision process,
by explicitly determining the parameters on which market success depends. To ac-
complish this goal, we formulated the problem as a non-cooperative game, in which
providers with finite network capacities are making strategic pricing and access con-
trol decisions with respect to secondary users.
We analyzed the implementation of coordinated access, for which we demonstrated
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that the optimal access policy is of threshold type. We showed that each provider
has a unique break-even price, above which profitability is guaranteed regardless of
the secondary user demand response. Next, using the notion of Nash equilibrium,
we formalized the possible outcomes resulting from a non-cooperative game in which
optimal coordinated access is implemented by two or more network providers. We
explained how the best response dynamics of each provider reflect a price war, which
leads to a single provider (that with the lowest break-even price) capturing the entire
secondary spectrum market.
In Chapter 4, we considered the same private commons competition however this
time under an uncoordinated access policy. Under uncoordinated access, the break-
even price is no longer insensitive to the secondary demand and market sharing be-
tween providers becomes a possible best response. The possible market outcomes
under an uncoordinated access policy are highly dependent on the specific shape of
the secondary demand function, the analysis of which can become very complex.
To address this complexity, we next focused on an uncoordinated access regime for
secondary spectrum detailed under private commons using a demand overflow model.
Once again using the notions of best response and Nash equilibrium, we show
the emergence of two markedly different possible market outcomes, depending on
the secondary demand function σ(p) and the network parameters of each provider.
We established the existence market sharing price intervals and showed that if they
intersect, then the providers converge to a price profile where they will share the
market. On the other hand, if the market sharing price intervals do not intersect,
the Nash equilibrium reflects a price war wherein the winning provider sets its price
slightly below the break-even price of its competitor and gets all the profit.
Next, in Chapter 5 we shifted our focus from the pricing and competition in private
commons to the question of aggregating more spectrum in an effort to improve a
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network providers ability to compete in secondary spectrum markets. Motivated by
the recent FCC ruling regarding reserved spectrum in auctions and added capability
of carrier aggregation by LTE-Advanced, we sought to investigate the possibility of
a single small provider increasing its spectrum holdings to be able to compete with
larger providers.
First, we derived a many server approximation for the Erlang-B formula under a
quality driven (QD) regime. Using this QD approximation, we identified an optimal
level of carrier aggregation. We investigated the scaling behavior of optimal carrier
aggregation two-fold: (i) with respect to the scaling factor n and (ii) with respect to
the traffic load. We obtained sub-linear (though close to linear) asymptotic upper
and lower bounds. Then, we demonstrated that if the traffic load under which each
provider operates increases, then the level of carrier aggregation required is reduced.
This result indicates that the marginal benefit of carrier aggregation in a heavily
loaded network is higher than that in a lightly loaded network. Finally, we provided a
relationship between the profitable pricing of users in secondary spectrum markets and
the Erlang-B formula for which our results apply. Hence, the results on optimal carrier
aggregation presented in the chapter are directly applicable to pricing strategies in
secondary spectrum markets, where providers can aggregate spectrum to lower their
prices in a possible price war.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we reconsidered the problem of profitable pricing of sec-
ondary users in a spatial topology, in contrast to the single cell setting of in previous
chapters. We presented a framework to determine the profitable admission of sec-
ondary users in a multicell network that is subject to spatial interference. We used
the Erlang fixed point approximation (EFPA), which works well for low blocking
regimes, to obtain a better understanding of the total revenue a multicell network
generates. Through the EFPA we decoupled the blocking and revenue generation of
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each cell from the rest of the network. Then, using the provided decoupling we identi-
fied profitability conditions of secondary user admission at a single cell and provided
the corresponding price expression in terms of the network parameters.
In our analysis, we have made some simplifying assumptions that can be gradually
removed to include more general topologies and traffic patterns in the future works.
Specifically, the EFPA works well in network that experience low levels of blocking.
While it can be expected that commercially deployed networks will be operating in or
near this level of performance, the cases where usage peaks should also be considered
separately. Also, we only considered the existence of secondary users in a single cell
in the network and provided a specific break-even price for this type of admission.
However, in reality secondary users can be expected to be present at all cell sites at
different density levels. Admitting secondary users at multiple locations is a larger
problem that deserves its own investigation. However, we also note that the break-
even price provided in Chapter 6 considers when should the first secondary user be
admitted to the network and hence should be applicable when further admission
scenarios are considered.
In summary, with this dissertation we shed light into regulatory impact of the
formation of healthy oligopolies in secondary spectrum markets. We accomplished
this by considering the nature of provider competition in private commons under
coordinated and uncoordinated access and its subtle outcomes. Future work could
focus on extending the model by taking into account spillover, quality of service and
spatial distribution factors in bringing the competition closer to reality and analyzing
the impact of each layer of additional complexity on the market outcomes.
A self-evident line of future work is the price competition analysis of the multicell
network setting given profitable pricing conditions. For example, once the break-
even price for every cell is calculated using the methodology provided in Chapter 6,
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where should the provider choose to open its spectrum for secondary access? If this
provider is facing competition from one or more providers who also have cell cites
at the same geographic area, what would be the market equilibrium? Would every
provider choose to isolate their secondary service areas in an effort to prevent price
wars and maximize profits or would they choose to compete over cell sites that are
particularly profitable or desirable? Many questions such as these remain open and
provide rich directions for future work.
Bibliography
3GPP (2012). Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) Base Station
(BS) radio transmission and reception (Release 8). TS 36.104, 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP).
Akyildiz, I., Lee, W., Vuran, M., and Mohanty, S. (2006). Next generation/dynamic
spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: A survey. Computer Net-
works, 50(13):2127 – 2159.
Al Daoud, A., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2007). Secondary pricing of spectrum
in cellular CDMA networks. In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic
Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 535–542. IEEE.
Al Daoud, A., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2010). Pricing strategies for spec-
trum lease in secondary markets. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
18(2):462–475.
Al Daoud, A., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2012). Profit-robust policies for
dynamic sharing of radio spectrum. In IEEE Global Communications Conference
(GLOBECOM), pages 1186–1191. IEEE.
Alanyali, M., Al Daoud, A., and Starobinski, D. (2011). Profitability of dynamic
spectrum provision for secondary use. In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in
Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 136–145. IEEE.
Allon, G. and Gurvich, I. (Summer 2010). Pricing and dimensioning competing
large-scale service providers. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
12(3):449–469.
Alotaibi, M. and Sirbu, M. A. (2011). Spectrum aggregation technology: Benefit-cost
analysis and its impact on spectrum value. Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference (TPRC).
Alotaibi, M. and Sirbu, M. A. (2015). Impact of spectrum aggregation technology
and frequency on cellular networks performance. In IEEE Symposium on New
Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 331–340.
Andrews, M., Ozen, U., Reiman, M., Wang, Q., et al. (2013). Economic models of
sponsored content in wireless networks with uncertain demand. In Proceedings /
IEEE INFOCOM, pages 3213–3218. IEEE.
157
158
Anick, D., Mitra, D., and Sondhi, M. (1982). Stochastic theory of a data-handling
system with multiple sources. Bell System Technical Journal, 61(8):1871–1894.
Bae, J., Beigman, E., Berry, R., Honig, M., Shen, H., Vohra, R., and Zhou, H. (2008).
Spectrum markets for wireless services. In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers
in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 1 –10.
Bertsekas, D. (1976). Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control. Academic Press,
Inc.
Besbes, O. and Zeevi, A. (November/December 2009). Dynamic pricing without
knowing the demand function: Risk bounds and near-optimal algorithms. Oper-
ations Research, 57(6):1407–1420.
Bolcskei, H., Nabar, R., Oyman, O., and Paulraj, A. (2006). Capacity scaling laws
in MIMO relay networks. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
5(6):1433–1444.
Bonald, T. (2006a). The Erlang model with non-Poisson call arrivals. ACM SIG-
METRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 34(1):276–286.
Bonald, T. (2006b). Insensitive queueing models for communication networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 1st International Conference on Performance Evaluation Method-
olgies and Tools, Valuetools ’06, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
Bonald, T. and Roberts, J. W. (2012). Internet and the Erlang formula. ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 42(1):23–30.
Borst, S., Mandelbaum, A., and Reiman, M. I. (2004). Dimensioning large call centers.
Operations Research, 52(1):17–34.
Buddhikot, M. (2007). Understanding dynamic spectrum access: Models,taxonomy
and challenges. In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 649 –663.
Bykowsky, M. (2003). A secondary market for the trading of spectrum: promoting
market liquidity. Telecommunications Policy, 27(7):533–541.
Bykowsky, M., Olson, M., and Sharkey, W. (2010). Efficiency gains from using a
market approach to spectrum management. Information Economics and Policy,
22(1):73–90.
Chandrasekhar, V., Andrews, J. G., and Gatherer, A. (2008). Femtocell networks: a
survey. IEEE Communications Magazine, 46(9):59–67.
159
Chapin, J. and Lehr, W. (2007). Cognitive radios for dynamic spectrum access - the
path to market success for dynamic spectrum access technology. IEEE Commu-
nications Magazine, 45(5):96 –103.
Doyle, L., McMenamy, J., and Forde, T. K. (2012). Regulating for carrier aggregation
& getting spectrum management right for the longer term. In IEEE Symposium
on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 10–
20. IEEE.
Duan, L., Huang, J., and Shou, B. (2010). Competition with dynamic spectrum
leasing. Computing Research Repository (CoRR), abs/1003.5517.
Federal Communications Commission. Mobile spectrum dashboard. http://reboot.
fcc.gov/reform/systems/spectrum-dashboard.
Federal Communications Commission (2003). Secondary markets initiative. http:
//wireless.fcc.gov/licensing/secondarymarkets.
Federal Communications Commission (2004). Promoting efficient use of spectrum
through elimination of barriers to the development of secondary markets. http:
//hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-167A1.pdf.
Federal Communications Commission (2008). FCC auctions: Summary: Auc-
tion 73. http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_
summary&id=73.
Federal Communications Commission (2014a). FCC adopts revised mobile spec-
trum holdings policies to preserve & promote a competitive wireless market-
place. http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2014/
db0515/DOC-327109A1.pdf.
Federal Communications Commission (2014b). Mobile spectrum holdings report and
order. http://www.fcc.gov/document/mobile-spectrum-holdings-report-
and-order.
Fierce Wireless (2015). FCC should create a 40 MHz reserve for 600 MHz auction,
public interest groups urge. http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/fcc-
should-create-40-mhz-reserve-600-mhz-auction-public-interest-
groups-urg/2015-02-25.
Fortetsanakis, G., Papadopouli, M., Karlsson, G., Dramitinos, M., and Yavuz, E.
(2012). To subscribe, or not to subscribe: Modeling and analysis of service
paradigms in cellular markets. In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic
Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 189–200.
160
Fred, S., Bonald, T., Proutiere, A., Re´gnie´, G., and Roberts, J. (2001). Statisti-
cal bandwidth sharing: a study of congestion at flow level. ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 31(4):111–122.
Gupta, P. and Kumar, P. (2000). The capacity of wireless networks. IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, 46(2):388 –404.
Halfin, S. and Whitt, W. (1981). Heavy-traffic limits for queues with many exponen-
tial servers. Operations Research, 29(3):567–588.
Harel, A. (1988). Sharp bounds and simple approximations for the Erlang delay and
loss formulas. Management Science, 34(8):pp. 959–972.
Hassidim, A., Segalov, M., Shaqed, A., et al. (2013). Network utilization: The flow
view. In Proceedings / IEEE INFOCOM, pages 1429–1437. IEEE.
Iglehart, D. L. (1965). Limiting diffusion approximations for the many server queue
and the repairman problem. Journal of Applied Probability, 2(2):429–441.
Ileri, O., Samardzija, D., and Mandayam, N. (2005). Demand responsive pricing
and competitive spectrum allocation via a spectrum server. In IEEE Symposium
on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 194
–202.
Iwamura, M., Etemad, K., Fong, M.-H., Nory, R., and Love, R. (2010). Carrier
aggregation framework in 3GPP LTE-Advanced [WiMAX/LTE update]. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 48(8):60–67.
Jagannathan, K., Menache, I., Modiano, E., and Zussman, G. (2012). Non-
cooperative spectrum accessthe dedicated vs. free spectrum choice. IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, 30(11):2251–2261.
Jagerman, D. L. (1974). Some properties of the Erlang loss function. Bell System
Technical Journal, 53(3):525–551.
Jagers, A. and Doorn, E. A. V. (1986). On the continued Erlang loss function.
Operations Research Letters, 5(1):43 – 46.
Janssen, A. J. E. M., Leeuwaarden, J. S. H. V., and Zwart, B. (2008). Gaussian
expansions and bounds for the Poisson distribution applied to the Erlang B
formula. Advances in Applied Probability, 40(1):pp. 122–143.
Jung, E. and Liu, X. (2012). Opportunistic spectrum access in multiple-primary-user
environments under the packet collision constraint. IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, 20(2):501–514.
161
Kaczor, W. and Nowak, M. (2001). Problems in mathematical analysis II. American
mathematical society.
Kasbekar, G. and Sarkar, S. (2012a). Spectrum pricing games with random valua-
tions of secondary users. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
30(11):2262–2273.
Kasbekar, G. S. and Sarkar, S. (2012b). Spectrum pricing games with spatial reuse in
cognitive radio networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
30(1):153–164.
Kavurmacioglu, E., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2012a). Competition in sec-
ondary spectrum markets: Price war or market sharing? In IEEE Symposium on
New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 440–451.
IEEE.
Kavurmacioglu, E., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2012b). Provider competi-
tion and price equilibria in private commons. CISE Technical Report 2012-
IR-0007, Boston University. http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/cise/download.php?
publication_id=1251.
Kavurmacioglu, E., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2014a). Competition in pri-
vate commons: Price war or market sharing? IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, PP(99):1–1.
Kavurmacioglu, E., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2014b). Demand-insensitive
price relationships in competitive private commons. ACM SIGMETRICS Per-
formance Evaluation Review, 41(4):16–19.
Kavurmacioglu, E., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2014c). Demand-invariant
price relationships and market outcomes in competitive private commons. ACM
Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), 14(2-3):15.
Kavurmacioglu, E. and Starobinski, D. (2015a). Network dimensioning with carrier
aggregation. CISE Technical Report 2015-IR-0001, Boston University. http:
//www.bu.edu/phpbin/cise/download.php?publication_id=1266.
Kavurmacioglu, E. and Starobinski, D. (2015b). Network dimensioning with carrier
aggregation. In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access
Networks (DySPAN). IEEE.
Kelly, F. (1986). Blocking probabilities in large circuit-switched networks. Advances
in Applied Probability, 18(2):473–505.
Kelly, F. and Williams, R. (2004). Fluid model for a network operating under a fair
bandwidth-sharing policy. Annals of Applied Probability, 14(3):1055–1083.
162
Kelly, F. P. (1991). Loss networks. The Annals of Applied Probability, 1(3):319–378.
Key, P. B. (1990). Optimal control and trunk reservation in loss networks. Probability
in the Engineering and Informational Sciences, 4(02):203–242.
Kim, H., Choi, J., and Shin, K. (2011). Wi-Fi 2.0: Price and quality competitions
of duopoly cognitive radio wireless service providers with time-varying spectrum
availability. In Proceedings / IEEE INFOCOM, pages 2453 –2461.
Kone, V., Yang, L., Yang, X., Zhao, B. Y., and Zheng, H. (2012). The effectiveness of
opportunistic spectrum access: A measurement study. IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, 20(6):2005–2016.
Korcak, O., Alpcan, T., and Iosifidis, G. (2012). Collusion of operators in wireless
spectrum markets. In 10th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimiza-
tion in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2012, pages 33 –40.
Krishnan, K. R. (Sep). The convexity of loss rate in an Erland loss system and
sojourn in an Erlang delay system with respect to arrival and service rates.
IEEE Transactions on Communications, 38(9):1314–1316.
Maille, P. and Tuffin, B. (2010). Price war in heterogeneous wireless networks. Com-
puter Networks, 54(13):2281 – 2292.
Maille, P., Tuffin, B., and Vigne, J. (2011). Technological investment games among
wireless telecommunications service providers. International Journal of Network
Management, 21(1):65–82.
Mayo, J. W. and Wallsten, S. (2010). Enabling efficient wireless communications:
The role of secondary spectrum markets. Information Economics and Policy,
22(1):61 – 72.
Michalopoulou, M., Riihijarvi, J., and Mahonen, P. (2011). Towards characterizing
primary usage in cellular networks: A traffic-based study. In IEEE Symposium
on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 652
–655.
Miller, B. L. (1969). A queueing reward system with several customer classes. Man-
agement Science, 16(3):pp. 234–245.
Mutlu, H., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2009). Spot pricing of secondary spec-
trum access in wireless cellular networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Network-
ing, 17(6):1794 –1804.
Mutlu, H., Alanyali, M., and Starobinski, D. (2010). On-line pricing of secondary
spectrum access with unknown demand function and call length distribution. In
Proceedings / IEEE INFOCOM, pages 1–9. IEEE.
163
Nekovee, M. (2009). A survey of cognitive radio access to tv white spaces. In Ul-
tra Modern Telecommunications & Workshops, 2009. ICUMT’09. International
Conference on, pages 1–8. IEEE.
Niyato, D. and Hossain, E. (2008). Competitive pricing for spectrum sharing in
cognitive radio networks: Dynamic game, inefficiency of Nash equilibrium, and
collusion. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 26(1):192 –202.
Osbourne, M. J. (2004). An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press,
New York, NY, USA, 1st edition.
Ozgur, A., Leveque, O., and Tse, D. (2007). Hierarchical cooperation achieves optimal
capacity scaling in ad hoc networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
53(10):3549–3572.
Paul, U., Subramanian, A., Buddhikot, M., and Das, S. (2011). Understanding traffic
dynamics in cellular data networks. In Proceedings / IEEE INFOCOM, pages
882 –890.
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2012). Real-
izing the full potential of government held spectrum to spur economic
growth. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/pcast_spectrum_report_final_july_20_2012.pdf.
Ramjee, R., Towsley, D., and Nagarajan, R. (1997). On optimal call admission control
in cellular networks. Wireless Networks, 3(1):29–41.
Ren, Y., Zhang, Q., and Chen, P. (2011). Cooperative and non-cooperative wsps in
dynamic spectrum leasing. In Proceedings, 2011 Third International Conference
on Communications and Mobile Computing, pages 274 –277.
Reuters (2014). FCC votes to restrict AT&T, Verizon in 2015 spectrum
auction. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/15/us-usa-wireless-
fcc-idUSBREA4E0RF20140515.
Rudin, W. (1964). Principles of mathematical analysis, volume 3. McGraw-Hill New
York.
Sengupta, S. and Chatterjee, M. (2009). An economic framework for dynamic
spectrum access and service pricing. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
17(4):1200 –1213.
Shared Spectrum Company. General survey of radio frequency bands
(30 MHz to 3 GHz): Vienna, virginia, september 1-5, 2009. http:
//www.sharedspectrum.com/wp-content/uploads/2010_0923-General-
Band-Survey-30MHz-to-3GHz.pdf.
164
Shen, Z., Papasakellariou, A., Montojo, J., Gerstenberger, D., and Xu, F. (2012).
Overview of 3GPP LTE-advanced carrier aggregation for 4G wireless communi-
cations. IEEE Communications Magazine, 50(2):122–130.
Smith, D. R. and Whitt, W. (1981). Resource sharing for efficiency in traffic systems.
Bell System Technical Journal, 60(1):39–55.
Straub, P. G. (1995). Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games. The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 35(4):339 – 363.
Talluri, K. T. and Ryzin, G. V. (2004). The Theory and Practice of Revenue Man-
agement. Springer Science+Business Media, New York, NY, USA.
Telesystem Innovations (2010). LTE in a nutshell. http://www.tsiwireless.com/
docs/whitepapers/LTE%20in%20a%20Nutshell%20-%20Physical%20Layer.
pdf.
Tellis, G. J. and Gaeth, G. J. (1990). Best value, price-seeking, and price aversion:
The impact of information and learning on consumer choices. Journal of Mar-
keting, 54(2):pp. 34–45.
Valenta, V., Marsˇa´lek, R., Baudoin, G., Villegas, M., Suarez, M., and Robert, F.
(2010). Survey on spectrum utilization in Europe: Measurements, analyses and
observations. In 2010 Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Cog-
nitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks & Communications (CROWNCOM),
pages 1–5. IEEE.
Wall Street Journal (2014). Verizon, AT&T may face bidding lim-
its in spectrum auction. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304626304579510154106120342.
Wang, W., Zhang, Z., and Huang, A. (2010). Spectrum aggregation: Overview and
challenges. Network Protocols & Algorithms, 2(1).
Weiss, M., Krishnamurthy, P., Doyle, L. E., and Pelechrinis, K. (2012). When is
electromagnetic spectrum fungible? In IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in
Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 349–357. IEEE.
Willkomm, D., Machiraju, S., Bolot, J., and Wolisz, A. (2008). Primary users in
cellular networks: A large-scale measurement study. In IEEE Symposium on
New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), pages 1 –11.
IEEE.
Xie, L.-L. and Kumar, P. (2004). A network information theory for wireless commu-
nication: scaling laws and optimal operation. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 50(5):748–767.
165
Xing, Y., Chandramouli, R., and Cordeiro, C. (2007). Price dynamics in competitive
agile spectrum access markets. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communica-
tions, 25(3):613 –621.
Yuan, G., Zhang, X., Wang, W., and Yang, Y. (2010). Carrier aggregation for
LTE-advanced mobile communication systems. IEEE Communications Maga-
zine, 48(2):88–93.
Zeltyn, S. (2004). Call centers with impatient customers: exact analysis many-server
asymptotics of the M/M/n+G queue. PhD thesis, Technion Institute of Technol-
ogy.
Zeng, G. (2003). Two common properties of the Erlang-B function, Erlang-C func-
tion, and Engset blocking function. Mathematical and Computer Modelling,
37(1213):1287 – 1296.
CURRICULUM VITAE
